



**Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance  
management system for the Namibian public service**

by

JAFET NELONGO

submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: PROF J C PAUW

CO-SUPERVISOR: PROF L C VAN JAARSVELDT

OCTOBER 2016

## DECLARATION

Name: **MR. JAFET NELONGO**

Student number: **35196165.**

Degree: **DOCTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Exact wording of the title of the dissertation or thesis as appearing on the copies submitted for examination:

**Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service**

I declare that the above dissertation / thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.



SIGNATURE

DATE: 25 OCTOBER 2016

## **DEDICATION**

I would like to dedicate this study to

my late father

Ananias Nelongo

and

my mother

Elizabeth Ndengu

Thank you, Mom and Dad, for everything you gave me. It is because of your love, encouragement, support and inspiration that I was able to achieve the successes and milestones I have, thus far, accomplished in my life. Dad, your wisdom and passion for learning has inspired me throughout my academic journey. Mom, your kindness and constant praise made the many late nights of studying so much easier. Together, you instilled in me values and provided me with a warm, loving home and a sanctuary within which I was able to thrive and achieve great things. I am proud to have had parents like you.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the following, all of whom made such an immense contribution to the completion of this study:

- Almighty God who provides me with ongoing protection and a clear vision and who gave me supportive parents;
- My promoter, Professor J C Pauw, and my co-promoter, Professor L C Van Jaarsveldt, for making my doctoral research journey an interesting and worthwhile experience by their constructive criticism and invaluable academic guidance from the beginning to the end. Prof. Pauw and Prof. Van Jaarsveldt, you really helped me to climb the highest academic mountain without fear because you stood by me when things became difficult;
- The Government of the Republic of Namibia for its financial support in the form of a scholarship which covered both the registration and tuition fees for three academic years;
- Mr F Kapofi, Secretary to the Cabinet, at the time of the study, and who gave me permission to conduct research in the Namibian public service. Also, Mrs Nangula Mbako, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and her team for their support during this study;
- All the respondents (ministers, PMS coordinators, senior managers, and PMS facilitators) who agreed to be interviewed during the data collection process and the validation of the findings;
- My family, especially my wife, Mrs Josefina N Nelongo, and my NIPAM colleagues for taking on such major responsibilities when I was engaged in my study; and
- Ms Alexa Barnby, for her professional language editing of this thesis.

In short, I am because you are and one tree does not make a forest.

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ACBF</b>	Africa Capacity Building Foundation
<b>ACC</b>	Anti-Corruption Commission
<b>ADI</b>	Analogue Device Inc
<b>AU</b>	Africa Union
<b>BEM</b>	Business Excellence Model
<b>BPR</b>	Business Process Re-engineering
<b>BSC</b>	Balanced scorecard
<b>CAMPS</b>	Conference of African Ministers of Public Service
<b>CDB</b>	Constituency Development Budget
<b>CSG</b>	Consultancy Service Group
<b>CRO</b>	Chief Regional Officer
<b>DOs</b>	Desired outcomes
<b>DPI</b>	Directorate of Performance Improvement
<b>DPSM</b>	Department of Public Service Management
<b>ECA</b>	Economic Commission for Africa
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GPRA</b>	Government Performance and Result Act
<b>GRN</b>	Government of the Republic of Namibia
<b>IFs</b>	Internal facilitators
<b>KPIs</b>	Key performance indicators
<b>MIT</b>	Ministerial Implementation Teams
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and evaluation
<b>MBNQA</b>	Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
<b>MBOs</b>	Management by objectives
<b>MDIs</b>	Management development institutes
<b>MERS</b>	Merit and Efficiency Rating System
<b>MoF</b>	Ministry of Finance
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of understanding
<b>MPMSTF</b>	Ministerial Performance Management System Task Force
<b>MTEF</b>	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
<b>MTISP</b>	Medium Term Institutional Strategic Plans

<b>NDP</b>	National Development Plan
<b>NDP 3</b>	Third National Development Plan
<b>NDP 4</b>	Fourth National Development Plan
<b>NIPAM</b>	Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management
<b>NPC</b>	National Planning Commission
<b>NPM</b>	New Public Management
<b>OMAs</b>	Offices, ministries and agencies
<b>OPM</b>	Office of the Prime Minister
<b>PAS</b>	Performance appraisal system
<b>PDP</b>	Personal development plan
<b>PM</b>	Prime minister
<b>PME</b>	Performance monitoring and evaluation
<b>PMS</b>	Performance management system
<b>PMSIC</b>	Performance Management System Implementation Committee
<b>PMSNOC</b>	Performance Management System National Oversight Committee
<b>PMU</b>	Performance Management Unit
<b>PPBS</b>	Planning Programming Budgeting Systems
<b>PS</b>	Permanent secretary
<b>RBM</b>	Results-based management
<b>RCs</b>	Regional Councils
<b>RIT</b>	Regional Implementation Team
<b>SOE</b>	State owned enterprises
<b>SWAPO</b>	South West Africa People's Organisation
<b>ToT</b>	Training of trainers
<b>USAID</b>	United States of America International Development
<b>WASCOM</b>	Wages and Salary Commission
<b>ZBB</b>	Zero Based Budgeting

## **ABSTRACT**

This study investigates the constraints and success factors in the implementation of the third performance management system (PMS) for the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. It was purported to be implemented in 2006. However, various government publications reported that its implementation process was poor or slow. The study also made a contribution to the discussions regarding individual performance agreements by politicians.

The review of the existing literature revealed that at the time of this study no academic research was conducted in the Namibian public service considering the PMS implementation process in totality. Furthermore, the conditions or factors of an effective policy and performance management system implementation which had been identified helped the researcher to decide on the focus of the study.

Methodologically, the study uses an implementation research design which focused on process evaluation using the mixed method approach. During phase one, data was collected using a diagnostic tool to determine the status of the PMS implementation. The results of phase one guided the interviews conducted during phase two that provided an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. A purposive sampling method was applied in selecting nineteen respondents who participated in this study. Documentary sources were used during all the phases of the study.

The main findings of the study are: notable achievements in terms of the PMS design and its implementation, with four Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) and Regional Councils (RCs) being identified as most successful at the time of the study. Internal leadership commitment proved to be the main success factor. However, the PMS was not implemented fully because it did not meet the requirements of an effective one.

The study recommends to establish the PMS unit in each OMA and RC, integrate the PMS with all aspects of human resources, simplify the PMS forms, formulate a PMS policy for Namibian politicians, apply the templates and implementation modalities of an individual performance agreement of political executives,

formulate a social contract for the constituency councillors in the Government of the Republic of Namibia, and introduce a Constituency Development Budget (CDB) to support the implementation of the social contract.

**Key terms:** performance management, effective implementation, expertise, performance agreement, political executives, social contract, implementation, scholarship, stakeholders, PMS structures and policy



## Table of contents

DECLARATION .....	i
DEDICATION.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	iv
ABSTRACT .....	vi
Table of contents .....	viii
List of tables .....	xiii
List of figures .....	xiii
List of graphs .....	xiii
<b>CHAPTER 1 .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>GENERAL INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.2 THE BACKGROUND TO THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAMIBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE.....	2
1.2.1 Performance Management System at the African Union.....	2
1.2.2 The Performance Management System in the Namibian Public Service.....	4
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT.....	7
1.4 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.....	9
1.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY .....	10
1.6 THE DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY.....	11
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .....	12
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	12
1.9 REFERENCE TECHNIQUE APPLIED.....	16
1.10 TERMINOLOGY .....	17
1.11 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS .....	18
1.12 CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	22
<b>CHAPTER 2 .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>REVIEW OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES .....</b>	<b>24</b>
2.1 INTRODUCTION .....	24
2.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON IMPLEMENTATION IN POLICY STUDIES .....	25
2.2.1 The Concept of Implementation.....	25
2.2.2 Main Schools of Thought on Policy Implementation.....	27
2.2.3 Constraints in Policy Implementation .....	29
2.2.4 Conditions for Effective Policy Implementation .....	32
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	34
<b>CHAPTER 3 .....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.....</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1 INTRODUCTION .....	36
3.2 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION.....	36
3.2.1 The Concept of Performance Management System.....	36
3.2.2 Brief History of Performance Management Systems.....	38
3.2.3 Aims and Objectives of a Performance Management System.....	41
3.2.4 Attribute versus Result-Based Performance Management Approaches.....	43

3.2.5	Performance Management System Frameworks .....	43
3.2.5.1	Logical Framework .....	43
3.2.5.2	Results-Based Management.....	44
3.2.5.3	Business Excellence Model .....	46
3.2.5.4	The Balanced Scorecard .....	47
3.3	EXISTING GAP IN THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORKS .....	50
3.4	EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .....	55
3.4.1	Performance Management System Design.....	56
3.4.2	Leadership.....	58
3.4.3	Regulatory Framework for a Performance Management System .....	59
3.4.4	Resources and Expertise.....	60
3.4.5	Stakeholder Involvement .....	62
3.4.6	Implementation Structure(s).....	63
3.4.7	Performance Assessment of Employees .....	64
3.4.8	The PMS Implementation: Rewards and Sanction.....	65
3.5	CONSTRAINTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .....	66
3.6	CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	68
<b>CHAPTER 4</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>THE REGULATIVE SYSTEM FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAMIBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE .....</b>		<b>69</b>
4.1	INTRODUCTION .....	69
4.2	THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 1990 (AS AMENDED) .....	69
4.3	THE ACTS GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE IN NAMIBIA .....	73
4.3.1	The Labour Act No. 11 of 2007 .....	73
4.3.2	The Public Service Commission Act No. 2 of 1990 .....	74
4.3.3	Public Service Act No.13 of 1995.....	74
4.3.4	State Finance Act No. 31 of 1990 .....	76
4.4	CHARTERS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY.....	77
4.4.1	The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration (2011).....	77
4.4.2	The Namibian Public Service Charter (2012) .....	78
4.4.3	The Customer Service Charter (2011) .....	80
4.5	THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT POLICY (2011) .....	80
4.6	CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	82
<b>CHAPTER 5</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....</b>		<b>84</b>
5.1	INTRODUCTION .....	84
5.2	PRAGMATIC RESEARCH PARADIGM.....	84
5.3	THE RESEARCH DESIGN .....	85
5.4	TIME HORIZONS .....	87
5.5	PURPOSIVE SAMPLING STRATEGY .....	88
5.6	RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS .....	90
5.6.1	Methodological Triangulation .....	90
5.6.2	Data Gathering Techniques .....	91
5.6.2.1	A Mini Survey .....	92

5.6.2.2	The Art of the Research Interview.....	92
5.6.2.2.1	<i>The unstructured interview.....</i>	94
5.6.2.3	Document Analysis .....	95
5.7	DATA ANALYSIS METHODS.....	95
5.8	ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....	97
5.9	VALIDITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS MEASURES.....	97
5.10	CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	99
<b>CHAPTER 6</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS</b>	<b>.....</b>	<b>100</b>
6.1	INTRODUCTION .....	100
6.2	PRESENTATION OF PHASE ONE RESULTS.....	101
6.2.1	Brief Overview of the Namibian Public Service .....	101
6.2.2	Historical Overview of the PMS in the Namibian Public Service.....	102
6.2.3	The Primary Objectives of the PMS in the Namibian Public Service .....	102
6.2.4	The PMS Management Structures in the Namibian Public Service .....	104
6.2.5	Criteria for Measuring the PMS Implementation.....	107
6.2.6	The Status of the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014 .....	108
6.2.6.1	OMAs Implementation Status .....	108
6.2.6.1.1	<i>The PMS implementation in the most successful and the least successful OMAs.....</i>	110
6.2.6.2	RCs Implementation Status .....	111
6.2.6.2.1	<i>The PMS implementation in the most successful and the least successful RCs.....</i>	112
6.2.6.3	Comparison between the Progress of OMAs and RCs from 2006 to 2014 .....	113
6.2.6.4	Performance Agreements of Political Executives .....	116
6.3	PHASE TWO RESULTS.....	117
6.3.1	Brief Descriptions of the Respondents .....	117
6.3.2	Presentation of Phase Two Results .....	122
6.3.2.1	The Achievements from 2006 until 2014.....	122
6.3.2.1.1	The design of the PMS framework.....	122
6.3.2.1.2	The implementation of the PMS framework .....	124
6.3.2.2	Success Factors in the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014 .....	127
6.3.2.2.1	<i>Financial resources.....</i>	127
6.3.2.2.2	<i>The PMS implementation structures .....</i>	130
6.3.2.2.3	<i>Leadership commitment .....</i>	138
6.3.2.2.4	<i>Implementation approach .....</i>	139
6.3.2.2.5	<i>The PMS capacity building .....</i>	141
6.3.2.2.6	<i>Regulatory framework.....</i>	142
6.3.2.2.7	<i>The design of the performance management system .....</i>	144
6.3.2.3	The Constraints of the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014 .....	145
6.3.2.3.1	<i>Inadequate financial resources .....</i>	145
6.3.2.3.2	<i>The PMS implementation structures .....</i>	146
6.3.2.3.3	<i>Inadequate leadership commitment.....</i>	147
6.3.2.3.4	<i>Inadequate PMS implementation capacity (skills) in officials.....</i>	149
6.3.2.3.5	<i>Poor stakeholder involvement and communication .....</i>	152

6.3.2.3.6	<i>Implementation modality</i> .....	154
6.3.2.3.7	<i>The PMS regulatory framework</i> .....	156
6.3.2.3.8	<i>The performance management system design</i> .....	159
6.3.2.3.9	<i>Other factors</i> .....	161
6.3.2.4	The Inclusion of Namibian Political Executives in the PMS .....	162
6.3.2.4.1	<i>The functions of the political executives in the Namibian government</i> .....	162
6.3.2.4.2	<i>The existing performance mechanisms for the Namibian political executives</i> .....	163
6.3.2.4.3	<i>The performance agreements of the political executives</i> .....	165
6.3.2.5	The Requirements of an Effective PMS Implementation in the Government of the Republic of Namibia .....	168
6.4	CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	171
<b>CHAPTER 7 .....</b>		<b>173</b>
<b>INTERPRETATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS .....</b>		<b>173</b>
7.1	INTRODUCTION .....	173
7.2	CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION .....	174
7.3	PMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ACHIEVEMENTS .....	175
7.3.1	The PMS Framework.....	175
7.3.2	The Availability of Financial Resources.....	177
7.3.3	The Implementation Structures .....	178
7.3.4	The PMS Principles and Framework.....	179
7.3.5	The PMS Capacity Building .....	180
7.3.6	Organisational and Individual Planning .....	181
7.4	THE SUCCESS FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION ACHIEVEMENTS .....	182
7.4.1	Leadership Commitment.....	183
7.4.2	The Role of Expertise in the PMS Implementation .....	185
7.4.3	The Simplification of the PMS Framework .....	187
7.4.4	The PMS Implementation Approach .....	188
7.5	CONSTRAINTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE POOR PMS IMPLEMENTATION.....	190
7.5.1	Absence of Full Leadership Commitment .....	191
7.5.2	Minimal Stakeholder Involvement and Consultation.....	192
7.5.3	The PMS Implementation Structures .....	193
7.5.4	Inadequate Supporting Documents (Incompleteness).....	195
7.5.4.1	The Absence of a Reward Policy .....	196
7.5.4.2	The Absence of Performance Standards .....	197
7.5.4.3	The Absence of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework .....	198
7.5.4.4	Late Approval of the PMS Policy and Staff Rules .....	200
7.5.5	The Complexity of the PMS Framework.....	201
7.6	THE INCLUSION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES IN THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION.....	203
7.6.1	The Need for Performance Agreements and Social Contracts for Politicians .....	204
7.6.2	The Content of the Performance Agreement and Social Contract.....	205
7.6.3	The Implementation Modalities of the Performance Agreement and Social Contract .....	207

7.7	THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM .....	211
7.8	CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	213
<b>CHAPTER 8 .....</b>		<b>216</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>		<b>216</b>
8.1	INTRODUCTION .....	216
8.2	GENERAL CONCLUSIONS .....	216
8.2.1	The PMS Implementation Achievements, Success Factors and Constraints in the Namibian Public Service. ....	217
8.2.1.1	Achievements .....	218
8.2.1.2	Success Factors or Driving Forces .....	218
8.2.1.3	Constraints or Impediments .....	219
8.2.2	The Guidelines to Including Political Executives on the PMS Implementation .....	220
8.2.3	An Effective Performance Management System in the Namibian Public Service .....	224
8.2.4	The Contribution of the study to the Scholarship on Policy Implementation and Performance Management Systems .....	225
8.3	RECOMMENDATIONS .....	228
8.3.1	Recommendation 1 .....	228
8.3.2	Recommendation 2 .....	229
8.3.3	Recommendation 3 .....	230
8.3.4	Recommendation 4 .....	230
8.3.5	Recommendation 5 .....	231
8.3.5.1	Implementation Modalities .....	231
8.4	SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .....	232
REFERENCES .....		233
APPENDICES		
APPENDIX 1: The diagnostic tool (phase one) .....		260
APPENDIX 2: Interview guide for facilitators, coordinators and managers (2015) .....		264
APPENDIX 3: Interview guide for M&E manager – NPC (2015) .....		266
APPENDIX 4: Interview guide for political executives (2015) .....		268
APPENDIX 5: Interview consent form (2015) .....		269
APPENDIX 6: List of government publications required .....		270
APPENDIX 7: Permission letter to OPM, phase one .....		271
APPENDIX 8: Permission letter, phase two .....		272
APPENDIX 9: Draft performance agreement for political executives (ministers) .....		273
APPENDIX 10: Draft social contract for honourable constituency councillors .....		276
APPENDIX 11: Annual performance rating form (Old) .....		279
APPENDIX 12: Permission letter from the secretary to cabinet in 2013 .....		280
APPENDIX 13: Ethics approval/clearance by UNISA in 2014 .....		281
APPENDIX 14: Annual rating form (new and proposal) .....		282
APPENDIX 15: New or proposed rating guidelines .....		283
APPENDIX 16: Editor's letter .....		284

## **List of tables**

Table 3.1: Logical Framework (Log Frame) matrix .....	44
Table 3.2: Results-based management framework.....	46
Table 3.3: The Business Excellence Model (BEM) example: five enablers and four results.....	47
Table 6.1: Number of OMAs that reached the PMS milestones from 2006 to 2014 .....	108
Table 6.2: Number of RCs that reached the PMS milestones from 2006 to 2014 .....	111
Table 6.3: The quality of the PMS ToT developed in 2006 .....	150

## **List of figures**

Figure 2.1: Policy making process which includes implementation .....	27
Figure 3.1: The Balanced Scorecard Framework.....	48
Figure 3.2: Political and administrative executives: the existing gap .....	55
Figure 5.1: The empirical process of the study .....	87
Figure 5.2: Methodological triangulation .....	91
Figure 6.1: The PMS Framework by 2014 .....	122
Figure 6.2: PMS Toolkit overview .....	133
Figure 6.3: The quality of the PMS training in 2015 .....	136

## **List of graphs**

Graph 6.1: Number of OMAs and RCs with strategic plans .....	114
Graph 6.2: Number of OMAs and RCs with annual plans .....	114
Graph 6.3: Number of OMAs and RCs with performance agreements.....	115

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Namibia, formally known as South West Africa (SWA), has a long history of colonisation. In 1878, the United Kingdom (UK) annexed the harbour of Walvis Bay in SWA. In 1883 a German trader, Adolf Lüderitz, laid claim to the rest of the coastal region of SWA on behalf of Germany and, in 1884, the entire country was declared a German protectorate. The colonial period in SWA was marked by violence. The German colonists gained control of the land, minerals and other resources by means of purchase, theft and the application of superior military power. Germany's rule in SWA came to an end with the outbreak of World War I and the Allied occupation of SWA (Republic of Namibia, 2004:28). In 1920, as was the case with Germany's other colonies at the end of World War I, the League of Nations gave Great Britain the mandate to administer SWA on its behalf. Britain then delegated the administration of SWA to South Africa, which it did until 1990 (Keyter, 2002:1). Although the mandate required that South Africa promote the material and moral well-being and the social development of the South West African people, this was not done (Republic of Namibia, 2004:28). For example, farmland which had previously been seized by the Germans was now given to or subsidised for Afrikaner settlers (Republic of Namibia, 2004:29).

At independence on 21 March 1990, the government of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) inherited an administration that was not fit for purpose. As a result, public service reform topped the political agenda in order to strengthen the delivery capacity in line with the government's manifesto of 1989. A performance management system (PMS) was one of many public service reform initiatives introduced on independence. Subsequently, the PMS evolved and changed from the development and use of the Merit Assessment and Efficiency Rating System to the Performance Appraisal System (PAS) that was recommended by the Namibian Wages and Salary Commission (WASCOM) in 1997 (African Capacity Building Foundation, 2004:24).

A PMS is aimed at improving service delivery by imparting a culture of focus on results rather than on process (Mutahaba, 2011:22). Although it was one of the key reform initiatives introduced at independence, its implementation remained a challenge from 2006 to 2014, thus both before and during the time of this study. The researcher attended many meetings during which various suggestions were made but still, implementation continued to be poor (Republic of Namibia, 2014d).

Accordingly, the aim of this study was to investigate the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibia public service in order to identify achievements, constraints and success factors. Thus, the suspected poor implementation of the performance management system is the primary practical problem on which this study focused.

## **1.2 THE BACKGROUND TO THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAMIBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE**

### **1.2.1 Performance Management System at the African Union**

Globally, there is a general understanding that the design and implementation of a PMS targets mainly managers and that it is based on the principal–agent theory as part of the New Public Management (NPM) ideology in order to elicit the best possible performance from subordinates (Kim, 2009; Blackman, Buik, O'Donnell, O'Flynn & West, 2012; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2011; Laegreid, Roness & Rubecksen, 2005; USA, 2012). As a result, the PMS aimed at political executives remains under-developed (Kim, 2009).

The need for an effective PMS in the public service was identified as critical by all the member states of the African Union during the drafting of the Customer Service Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service (African Union Commission, 2011). Accordingly, the PMS became part of the AU long-term strategies for the establishment of a capable public service in order to address the challenges posed by poverty, underdevelopment and global competitiveness and that call for good governance on the entire African continent (African Union Commission, 2011). The Seventh Conference of African Ministers of Public Service (7th CAMPS) held in Nairobi, Kenya from 9–14 May 2011, under the theme “Towards Effective and Efficient Service Delivery”, acknowledged the need



for a radical change in public service in order to reduce poverty and underdevelopment (7th CAMPS, 2011:2).

Mutahaba (2011:22) observes that, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, almost all African countries have adopted some form of public service reform, and a common reform measure within such reforms is the PMS. The mounting pressure on governments to reform their structures and processes and to achieve excellence, responsiveness and integrity in the public service led to the design of a PMS (Maphorisa, 2010:10). The main objectives of a PMS include the improved performance, efficiency, accountability and effectiveness of public institutions (Dzimhiri, 2008:46). In addition, it should also be understood that performance management will achieve its ultimate objectives only if it is integrated with all the processes of an organisation, for example, human and financial resources. The pressure for quality public service delivery by the African governments made performance management implementation in the African public service inevitable (African Union Commission, 2011). Economic development in the developing countries is highly dependent up the government's machinery through which it effectively and efficiently implements policies (Adebayo, 2000). Both the Economic Report on Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, 2011) and the 7th CAMPS (2011) identify that economic growth and development in Africa were constrained by poor performance resulting from both the inefficient utilisation of resources, as well as an unresponsive service delivery culture.

The African Union has developed a generic PMS framework and it forms part of its management guidelines (7th CAMPS, 2011) aims at helping its member states with the design and implementation process. The generic PMS framework for the African member states, of which Namibia is a member, includes the following elements, namely: National vision; national medium term development strategy; organisational strategic plan linked to the budget in terms of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF); annual institutional plans; institutional performance agreement/contracting, monitoring implementation; measuring results at the institutional level (outputs and outcomes); measuring results at the individual level and reward and sanction (African Union Commission, 2011).

However, Mutahaba (2011:22) argues that the implementation of a PMS remains a challenge in the 54 countries that are member states of the African Union. Mutahaba (2011:23) indicates that it would appear that many African countries have taken up a few elements of the PMS framework only and that only two countries (Kenya and Botswana) have taken up the full set of 11 elements of the PMS framework. Mutahaba (2011:27) and Maphorisa (2010:12) conclude that Africa has been slow to make use of the PMS tools that were ushered in by the NPM reform movement. Accordingly, the overall objectives of this study are to identify both the constraints and the success factors in the implementation of the PMS for the Namibian public service and to make a contribution to the existing body of knowledge of the subject.

A study conducted by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 2005:45) reveals that, in spite of efforts made by African countries, the results achieved remain somewhat poor and that the socio-economic situation of many African countries that have undertaken reforms has even, in most cases, deteriorated as a result of limited implementation capacity. Mbigi (2010) indicates that “PMS implementation in Africa requires effective leadership, management capacity and simple templates that can be completed by a man with five years of schooling”. However, most of the existing literature in the field as discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.4) identified capacity development as a critical element of an effective PMS implementation process but it did not cite specific topics to be covered at the different levels (political and administrative). This study will, thus, also attempt to identify critical topics for capacity development at the different levels of the public service in the interests of an effective PMS implementation (see § 8.3). The next section provides a brief overview of the PMS in the Namibia public service in order to provide a context to the system investigated in this study.

### **1.2.2 The Performance Management System in the Namibian Public Service**

As indicated earlier, Namibia became independent on 21 March 1990. The SWAPO government inherited a colonial administration, as well as a PMS called the Merit Assessment and Efficiency Rating. Using the Merit Assessment, the lower-level staff members were evaluated on factors such as responsibility,

insight, human relations, organisation and productivity, while the Efficiency Rating assessed management ability (Kapofi, 2009:3). This system was later suspended due to its colonial connotation and the subjectivity involved in its application. A new system, termed the Performance Appraisal System (PAS), was introduced in 1996 in accordance with a recommendation of the Wage and Salaries Commission (WSCOM) Report (Republic of Namibia, 1995b). The PAS was, however, suspended by Cabinet during 1998 owing to the lack of a supporting organisational culture and insufficient training on the system prior to its implementation (Kapofi, 2009:3).

The suspension of the PAS resulted in a search for a suitable PMS for the Namibian public service. The PMS investigated in this study was endorsed by Cabinet in 2002 and was ready for implementation in 2006 (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:4). However, in 2010, The Performance Management System Report (Republic of Namibia, 2010a:1) indicated “that none of the Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) and Regional Council (RCs) has fully implemented the PMS”. According to the Third National Development Plan (NDP 3) (Republic of Namibia, 2008:192), the PMS was expected to be fully implemented by 50% of 27 OMAs and 75% of 13 RCs by 2012. However, in 2013, only the Kavango Regional Council was awarded a trophy for its progress regarding the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. In addition, the Government Accountability Report 2012/2013 (Republic of Namibia, 2014d:26) indicates that “78% of Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) had completed a review of strategic and annual plans alignment to the Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4), 76% of Regional Councils (RCs) were introduced to the next stage in PMS process which is performance agreement development”. This provided proof that, from 2006–2013, the PMS had not been fully implemented in the Namibian public service. This information highlighted the need to identify achievements, constraints and success factors in the implementation of the third PMS in the Namibian public service.

Studies conducted in the Namibian public service by Mutahaba (2011), ECA (2005) Nelongo (2009), Enkali (2006), Kantema (2007), Wandjiva (2011) and Shafudah (2011) did not involve an extensive exploration of all elements of the

PMS implementation process. Enkali (2006) investigates performance coaching in one ministry, while Nghidinwa (2007) focuses only on cadre appointment without linking it to policy implementation. Nelongo (2009) only focuses on the development of the strategic plan for a specific regional council. The studies closest to this study were those of Kantema (2007), who focuses on the role of PMS in improving public service delivery, Shafudah (2011) who focuses on an appraisal of the performance management process in one directorate of the Ministry of Finance and Wandjiva (2011), who focuses only at the role of communication in strategic planning in the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare.

Thus, the absence of an empirical study on the Namibian experience of PMS implementation process in totality has left a gap in the history of the Namibian public service, in particular post-independence. In addition, the current PMS framework focuses only on administration and excludes the political executives (it refers to the political level) while there was also inadequate discussion and guidelines on how to include political executives in the PMS framework. If properly designed and implemented, an individual performance agreement for political executives is likely to improve performance and accountability at both the political and the administrative levels of the government. This study, therefore, attempted to add to the discussions and provide guidelines that link both political and administrative executives to the implementation of the PMS. The review of existing literature revealed that much has been written about political accountability in general (Heywood, 2007; Newton & Van Deth, 2010; Gildenhuis & Knipe, 2000; Hopewood, 2008). For example, Article 41 of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, provides that “[a]ll Ministers shall be accountable individually for the administration of their own ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of Cabinet, both to the President and to the Parliament” (Republic of Namibia, 1990a). However, at the time of the study there had been inadequate discussion on individual performance agreements for politicians although this was gaining momentum in some African countries (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda and Namibia).

In conclusion, it is not possible to generalise the lessons learnt from certain African countries to the entire continent because each country has its own unique context in terms of, among other things, leadership, policies and educational background. It is, therefore, important for each African country to understand the PMS implementation constraints and success factors within its own context in order to inform the policy process. Hence, this study endeavoured to obtain insider perspectives on the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service so as to determine the achievements, constraints and success factors in the implementation process.

### **1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT**

After the suspension of the PAS by Cabinet in 1998, a third PMS was slowly implemented although no tangible results of the implementation process were documented. Between the years 2008 and 2012, the researcher observed the following: changes in the PMS framework, offices, ministries and agencies (OMAs) using various frameworks (the balanced scorecard and logical framework) and the holding of several planning and training workshops but without actual implementation of the PMS. Thus, despite the PMS topping the political agenda in the country (ACBF & GRN, 2005; EU & GRN, 2006; Republic of Namibia, 2006; 7th CAMPS, 2011; African Union Commission, 2011), a slow or poor implementation process was taking place. This triggered this study which aimed to identify the achievements, constraints, and success factors characterising the implementation process and to make recommendations that may inform the policy process within the Namibian context. Poor PMS implementation inhibits the good governance required for economic transformation because it prevents optimum efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency in public institutions. This argument is based on the findings of studies conducted by Lutabingwa and Auriacombe (2009), De Waal (2002) and Martinez (2001) to the effect that an effective PMS has the potential to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in organisational performance. A study conducted by Kantema (2007:xi) into the Namibian public service reveals that public servants were in agreement that a PMS could improve the public service performance and, indeed, service delivery. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the discussion on individual

performance agreements for politicians as the discussions held up to the time of the study were inadequate (see § 3.3).

The absence of an effective and efficient PMS in Namibia may lead to the following: Firstly, a delay in the establishment of a developmental state in Namibia because the prerequisites for a developmental state include a competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy that ensures the effective and efficient implementation of strategies and policies and, secondly, it results in the wastage of financial resources as a result of the misalignment between budgets and plans (ECA, 2011:3).

Despite previous and valuable studies by various researchers, it is not yet known whether the PMS in the Namibian public service has met all the requirements or conditions of both effective policy implementation (see § 2.2.4) and the PMS itself (see § 3.4). The alleged poor PMS implementation process is the **problem** that the study investigated. The main research **question** was as follows:

- What are the main constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system (PMS) in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014?

The **research problem** involved finding a way in which to determine these constraints and success factors in the context of the study.

### **Secondary Research Questions**

1. What are the main constraints and success factors one may expect based on the current literature on PMS implementation?
2. How are success and failure in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service defined and measured?
3. Which offices, ministries, agencies (OMAs) and regional councils (RCs) are the most and least successful in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service and why?
4. Are staff members properly trained both before and during the implementation process?

5. Does government allocate sufficient money to support the implementation process?
6. Are structures established and staffed with well-trained staff members to support the implementation process?
7. Are key stakeholders (politicians, senior managers, public service commissioners and trade unions) properly involved both before and during the implementation process?
8. Does the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service enjoy legal support?
9. Should the political executives be included in the implementation of the PMS?

#### **1.4 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The primary objectives of the study were to

1. obtain stakeholder views on the achievements, success factors and constraints in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service
2. compare and contrast the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs in terms of achievements, constraints and success factors
3. obtain views and propose guidelines on the inclusion of political executives in the implementation of the PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia
4. obtain views and ideas on the requirements of an effective PMS for the Namibian public service and make recommendations to inform the policy process
5. contribute to the existing body of knowledge on policy implementation and PMSs and
6. make informed recommendations regarding the implementation process of a PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia, one which includes both politicians and administrative staff.

## **1.5 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY**

The review of the existing literature on implementation studies concluded that there is no consensus on the correct approach (top or bottom up) to policy implementation. This study aimed to make a contribution to this discussion (see §§ 2.2.2 and 8.2.1).

The significance of the study provided the rationale for conducting the study and statements as to why the results would be important (Creswell, 2003:149). The researcher was of the view that the study would make a practical contribution towards the successful implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service and which is critical to the attainment of Vision 2030 and to address global competitive challenges. The Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) (2007:22) observes that “economic welfare motive seems to be the major reason why people decide to move from one place to the other”. An effective public service would contribute to the successful implementation of government policies as well as Vision 2030 and, ultimately, result into poverty reduction and the social and economic upliftment of the Namibian people. In addition, an effective PMS results into the proper planning and execution of the government projects that are developed and implemented by government institutions. The issue of meeting targets, being result-oriented and quality service delivery becomes part of the management process in the public service.

Furthermore, an effective public service is critical in terms of the political stability of a country because the citizens develop trust in the government. If properly implemented, a public service PMS may instil a greater sense of pride, patriotism and morale on the part of public servants and help to build a culture of client service among them (Van der Walddt, 2004:30). A PMS may also promote the competitiveness and good governance which are imperative for economic transformation because they ensure sound public sector management in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, economy, accountability and transparency (World Economic Forum, 2013:40).



It was anticipated that the outcomes of the study would be an evidenced-based list of the achievements, constraints and success factors which play a role in the effective implementation of a PMS and, thus, contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the subject. In addition, the study was expected to contribute to the current literature on policy implementation and discourse on the subject of performance management and to make recommendations to inform practice. This was done through a systemic evaluation of the existing literature. Based on the existing literature it was hoped that the results of the study would also determine consensus, contrast, and new knowledge in the areas of PMS and policy implementation.

Most importantly, the inadequate discussion on the individual performance agreements of political executive was another gap that was identified and it was believed that the study would be able to provide guidelines in this regard. The introduction of individual performance agreements for the political arm is a new idea which had gained momentum in some African countries (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda and Namibia) at the time of the study. For example, in terms of Article (41) of the Namibian Constitution, political executives are individually accountable for the administration of their OMAs. The accountability of the executive has been better documented in Political Science as compared to individual performance agreements (see § 1.2.2). One of the main reasons for introducing an individual performance agreement for political executives is to ensure an effective and efficient public service and which is a critical element in good governance (Republic of South Africa, 2010:2). Poor performance has been identified as one of the main constraints on economic growth and development in Africa, resulting from the inefficient utilisation of resources and an unresponsive service delivery culture (ECA, 2011; 7th CAMPS, 2011).

## **1.6 THE DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

The delimitation of the study refers to how a study is narrowed in scope (Creswell, 2003:150). The study was delimited to three aspects, namely, the achievements, constraints and success factors in the implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. The study was limited to the PMS which was approved by Cabinet in 2002 and which was deemed to be ready for

implementation in 2006. The findings of the study were limited to the Namibian public service and may not be generalised to other countries.

## **1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

The limitations of a study identify potential weakness in the study (Denscombe, 2010:43; Creswell, 2003:150). The following include some of the limitations of this study on constraints and success factors in the implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service.

Firstly, the study was limited to the process evaluation only because the system had not been fully implemented at the time of the study. Secondly, the findings of the study were limited to what was happening in the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. And thirdly, it was anticipated that time would constitute a major problem as a result of the busy work schedules of key participants (PMS coordinators and facilitators in the public service). However, the researcher was able to use the letter of permission from the Secretary to Cabinet in order to gain access to the participants and to relevant government documents (see Appendix 12).

## **1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This section provides a brief explanation of what was done during the study and how it was done. The study investigated the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service in order to identify achievements, constraints and success factors which played a role in the implementation of the system.

The unit of analysis determined the implementation research design selected as the most appropriate for the purposes of the study. This study was a type of evaluation study and the focus was on the question “What is happening?” in respect of the design, implementation, administration, operation, services, and outcomes of social programmes (Werner, 2004:1). However, for the purpose of this study, the outcome was excluded because the intervention being investigated had not been implemented fully at the time of the study. The main roles of implementation research are to identify the causes of implementation problems or

failure and to suggest ways of enhancing the likelihood of ensuring compliance with policy objectives, generally focused on strategies for the improved communication of intentions, coordination of the links in the chain, management of resources and control of implementing agents (Barrett, 2004:254; Peters, Adam, Alonge, Agyepong & Tran, 2013:1). Thus, process evaluation explores the elements involved in the actual delivery of an intervention (Watson & Platt, 2000:30).

Although the majority of studies conducted by previous researchers (Saetren, 2014; Scofield & Sausman, 2004; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005; Peters et al., 2013; Barrett, 2004; O'Toole, 1997; Hill & Hupe, 2009; Wessels & Van Jaarsveldt, 2007; Hu, 2012; Wessels, Pauw & Thani, 2009) were more than adequate, the researcher found that their focus tended to be on methods rather than their research design. For example, a study conducted by Peters et al. (2013:2) indicates that the research question is the prime factor in implementation research. In their study "Taxonomies for the analysis of research designs in public administration", Wessels et al. (2009) uses the unit of analysis as a possible methodological indicator.

In addition, Rossi and Berk (1981:187) argue that the choice of evaluation methods derives initially from the particular question posed and that appropriate evaluation techniques must be linked explicitly to each of the policy questions posed. One of the best practices among implementation researchers is the use of several research methods and sources of data in one single study. A study on "Mixed methods designs in implementation research" conducted by Palinkas, Aarons, Horwitz, Chamberlain, Hurlburt and Landsverk (2010:44) find that a mixed methods design was being used increasingly in order to develop a scientific base for both understanding and overcoming barriers to implementation. Hu (2012) relies on a mixed method approach to examine the implementation of a migrant children's education policy within the context of rapid urbanisation and large-scale rural-urban migration in China.

In his study "The adoption and use of PMSs, including measurement, monitoring and evaluation in Africa", Mutahaba (2011) bases his findings on a number of sources including a survey of relevant literature, reports of the Conference of

African Ministers of Public Service (CAMPS) workshops on the subject, field visits and a diagnostic tool to determine the degree of success and failure of PMSs in each of the member states of the African Union. For the purposes of this study the researcher also applied the same concept of a diagnostic tool although the design for this study was different (e.g. this design included a column for causes or reasons for either success or failure) (see Appendix 1).

The nature of the research questions posed by previous researchers determined the type of research design, methods and form of data required. In a study by Saetren (2005) it was determined that “Facts and myths about implementation research, relied on numerous data sources and research methods”. The approach used by Saetren (2005) in what Cresswell (2003:208) and Palinkas et al. (2010:44) refer to “a mixed method approach”. This refers to the mixing of quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. In her study, “Implementation of health promotion policy in Norwegian municipalities”, Rosse (2000) argues that from a process perspective, the implementation is studied primarily as an empirical process while the actions of the actors who participate in the implementation process are the central focus of the research.

Thus, given the unit of analysis of this study, the study employed an implementation research design which used a mixed method approach. The study was divided into two phases with a document analysis running concurrently with both phases.

**In phase one** the researcher conducted a mini survey using a diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1) limited to the PMS Director in the Office of the Prime Minister and including the data of all the OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service. The PMS Director completed the diagnostic tool in consultation with colleagues and all the PMS coordinators throughout the entire public service. The researcher limited this process to the PMS Director because he/she was deemed to be in the best position to provide accurate data. The diagnostic tool consisted of questions that would help in determining the degree of success and/failure and the causes or reasons of such success/failure in all the OMAs and RCs of the Namibian public service. The data collected during this phase was validated by the interviews that were conducted during phase two.

**In phase two** the researcher conducted unstructured interviews with the following groups, namely, PMS coordinators of the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs which had been identified, PMS facilitators, and some key senior managers in the public service (see § 5.5). However, due to limited resources only the two most successful and the two least successful OMAs from central government and the two most successful and the two least successful RCs from the regional governments were considered during phase two. In addition, unstructured interviews were conducted with the PMS facilitators at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) although only those who had been involved in the implementation process from 2006 to 2014 were considered. Furthermore, the researcher conducted unstructured interviews with all the selected respondents (see §§ 5.5 and 5.6.2.2.1). A document study was also conducted concurrently with the two phases (see § 5.6.2.3). During the interviews the researcher asked the respondents to express their views on the following: the achievements, constraints and success factors, the inclusion of political executives and the requirements in respect of an effective PMS implementation in the Namibian public service.

In addition to phase one and two of the data collection process, the researcher also tried to answer the first secondary question during the analysis of the existing literature on policy study and PMS (see §§ 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 3.4 and 3.5).

**Methodologically** the study used both quantitative and qualitative data (mixed method approach) in order to address the main research question of the study. The requisite data was collected from three main sources, namely, a mini survey using a diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1), unstructured interviews, and a document study. As already indicated, **phase one** included a mini survey which was used to collect data. The following steps will be followed:

1. Design the diagnostic tool, taking into account all the key stages or milestones in the PMS process used in the Namibian public service (see Appendix 1). This step was complemented by a document study, which included a review of government reports and records from the Office of the Prime Minister.
2. Pre-test the tool with a small group of people and revise accordingly.

3. Draft a letter for each accounting officer and send the diagnostic tool with the letter granting permission to conduct the study from the Secretary to Cabinet. The researcher delivered the letter and the diagnostic tool by hand to all the OMAs in both the central government and the Khomas Regional Council although an email including all the above information was sent to OMAs located at some distance from the central government.
4. Analyse the data using Microsoft Excel to identify the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs in order to inform the sampling to be used for the purposes of the second phase.

The methods used during **phase two** included unstructured interviews with the PMS coordinators of the most successful and the least successful OMAs (two most successful and two least successful) and RCs (two most successful and two least successful). In addition, the researcher conducted interviews with the PMS facilitators at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and some key senior managers in the PMS in the public service. The review of relevant documents complemented the two phases of the study.

The data or information obtained was presented according to the research questions and analysed applying both numerical and narrative techniques in terms of the themes and categories which emerged (see § 5.7). The main categories included the achievements, constraints and success factors in the implementation process of a PMS in the Namibian public service. In addition, another category called 'The political executives' was also used in order to guide the discussion on their inclusion in the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian context. The interpretations and discussions of the data were supported by relevant literature as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this study.

## **1.9 REFERENCE TECHNIQUE APPLIED**

The researcher used the Harvard referencing technique in the study. References were listed in alphabetical order by using the surname of the authors, initials, year of publication, title of the publication or document, place of publication and publisher. The nature of the source determined how it was referenced (see list of

references at the end of this work). The next section presents the definitions of the key concepts used in the study.

## **1.10 TERMINOLOGY**

The main key terms that were used are concisely defined below in order to shed light on their meaning in the context of the study. Most of these terms appear in chapter 2 of the study.

**Administrative executive** refers to senior non-political officials who are appointed based on their qualifications and expertise to advise the government in terms of policy formulation and implementation (own definition).

**Effective implementation** refers to the appropriate actions taken with regard to a specific policy and that culminate in the realisation of the policy objectives or produces the intended results in terms of quality, quantity, time and cost (own definition).

**Involvement** in the context of this study refers to the participation of people or parties with interests in the PMS implementation process (own definition).

**Leadership** in the context of this study was used in accordance with the following definition proposed by Armstrong (2008:21), namely, “[i]t is the process of developing and communicating a vision for the future, motivating people and gaining their engagement”.

**Performance management system** is a key instrument which is designed to help in linking the people in an organisation to the organisation’s goals and strategies (Kaul, 1998:16).

**Performance measurement** is a process through which either success or failure as measured by pre-agreed standards is determined. In other words, information on what has happened is used to determine the level of actual results (outputs) by individuals, teams and organisations (own definition).

**Policy** refers to a statement of regulatory intention which sets operational specifications that are designed to achieve organisational or institutional goals and objectives (Chiraw, 2008:34).

**Political executives** refer to elected officials who are members of the Cabinet and who are charged with dual functions, namely, policy formulation and policy implementation. These are politicians who, in most cases, are political heads or ministers of government institutions (own definition).

**Researcher** in the context of this study it refers to the writer or author (Jafet Nelongo) of this thesis.

**Resources** in the context of this study refer to the staff members, assets and money required for an effective PMS implementation (Own definition).

**Scholarship** refers to the existing body of knowledge or what has been achieved by other scholars in the field. This word is also an action word which refers to what scholars do and the way in which they do it (Pauw, 2014). Mouton (2001:87) states that when referring to a review of the scholarship (literature review), we are, in fact, demonstrating an interest in a whole range of research products that have been produced by other scholars.

**Stakeholders** refer to a person, group or organisation that has a direct or indirect stake in an organisation because such person, group or organisation may affect or be affected by the organisation's actions, objectives and policies (Business Dictionary, 2011:1).

**PMS management structures** in the public service context refer to the design (elements) of the public service, which makes provision for the establishment of sections, units and oversight bodies at both the national and organisational levels to ensure the effective implementation of the PMS process (own definition).

## **1.11 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS**

The last section of this chapter presents an outline of the rest of the thesis. It briefly discusses how the study will unfold and indicates the main topics that will



be discussed in each of the remaining chapters. This thesis was divided into the following eight chapters:

**Chapter 1** provides a general introduction to the study and includes the research problem and its setting. The chapter places the problem under study in a context which then leads to the formulation of the problem statement and research question. This chapter also presents the research design, research methods as informed by the best practices of previous writers and how the study unfolds. The study comprised implementation research and used a mixed method approach for the data collection, data presentation and data analysis. The study was divided into two phases. During phase one the researcher conducted a mini survey to obtain the respondents' views on the degree of success and/or failure and the reasons for such success/failure in the implementation of the PMS in each of the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service. However, due to limited financial resources the second phase involved unstructured interviews with the PMS coordinators of the four most successful and the four least successful OMAs and RCs only. In addition, unstructured interviews were conducted with some key senior managers in the public service and also the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister. This chapter also presents the definitions of key terms and an overview of all the chapters.

**Chapter 2** presents a critical analysis of the existing literature on policy implementation with the aim of guiding and directing the study in its response to the main research question. The researcher reviewed existing literature on implementation studies in order to identify possible constraints and success factors in terms of policy implementation. The review of existing literature helped the researcher to identify some of the main factors that have been found to influence policy implementation, both positively and negatively, namely, leadership as well as the resources and capacity of the implementing agencies. It was found that the use of the word 'stage' when defining the term implementation means that the holistic view of the policy process is lost because the policy process is looked at as an independent element and not as part of the policy formulation. There is no consensus on the right approach (top or bottom up) to policy implementation. However, this study makes a contribution to that effect in a later chapter. Lastly,

the main topics covered in this chapter include the definition of the term 'implementation' in the context of policy studies, approaches to policy implementation, effective policy implementation and constraints to effective policy implementation.

**Chapter 3** presents a critical analysis of the existing literature on the PMS concept, in order to guide and direct the study in responding to the main research question. The review of the existing literature on the PMS concept, as contained in chapter 3, found similarities in various contexts in terms of the constraints and success factors involved in effective policy implementation and PMS. The gaps identified in the existing literature included the absence of any studies on the PMS implementation in totality and taking into account its achievements, constraints and success factors as well as inadequate discussion on a performance agreement for political executives. The main topics covered in this chapter include the definition of the term PMS, its evolution, the aims and objectives of a PMS, discussions on the various PMS frameworks, PMS implementation challenges, the elements of an effective implementation of the PMS and the experiences of certain African countries (South Africa, Botswana and Kenya) in the implementation of a PMS. The concluding remarks in this chapter linked chapters 2 and 3 together by identifying general constraints, conditions or requirements for an effective PMS policy and for effective PMS implementation.

**Chapter 4** provides a critical analysis of the legislation and policies underpinning performance management in the Namibian public service. The aim of this analysis was to determine the legality of the system and the justification for the said system. It was deemed important to establish the legality of the performance management because of its possible enforcement if challenged before a court of law. The key legislation and policies discussed include the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, all government Acts relevant to the study, the African Public Service Charter on Values and Principles and the Namibian Public Service Charter.

**Chapter 5** presents a detailed discussion of the research design and methodology used in the study. The overarching research design was presented in chapter 1 (see § 1.8). This chapter presents the strategy adopted in the study. The research

process onion approach proposed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003:138) underpin the overall layout of this chapter and the discussions contained in the chapter. The main topics covered in this chapter included the research design (evaluation studies: implementation research), research philosophy (interpretivism), research approach (inductive), time horizons (cross-sectional), sampling strategy (purposive), data collection methods (document study, unstructured interview, and survey using a diagnostic tool), data analysis methods (numerical, themes and categories – the study collected both quantitative and qualitative data), ethical considerations and the quality measures applied.

**Chapter 6** reports the results of the study using tables, graphs and narrative forms but with limited discussions. The chapter starts by restating the problem statement and main research question in order to provide a proper context to the study. The results of the study were organised according to the secondary research questions (see § 1.3). It is important to note that the research results were reported or presented without referring to the theories or literature discussed in chapter 2 and 3.

**Chapter 7** presents the interpretations and discussion of the main research results according to the secondary research questions and based on the main research question (Glatthorn & Joyner, 2005:199). It was anticipated that the discussions and interpretations would either confirm or oppose what had been identified in the literature review on policy implementation and the PMS. The discussions and interpretations of the main findings endeavoured to identify achievements, constraints and success factors which played a role in the implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service. In addition, the study attempted to bridge the main gaps identified in the existing literature.

**Chapter 8** differs from the others chapters because many readers turn first to the last chapter of a thesis. This chapter attempted to demonstrate how the results and conclusions relate to the relevant literature and theory. This chapter also discussed the general conclusions and recommendations of the study as well as suggestions for further research. The chapter was structured according to the primary research objectives and research questions as stated in section 1.4 of this study.

**List of references:** This section presents a list of the references cited in the thesis according to the Harvard referencing style.

**Appendices:** This section contains the data collection instruments, letters granting the researcher permission to conduct the study and other information relevant to the study.

## **1.12 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter oriented the reader by providing a general introduction to the study. The chapter discussed the background of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service, the problem statement, research questions and objectives, the significance of the study and the possible contribution of the study to Public Administration theory, the delimitation of the study, limitations of the study, research design and methodology used, reference techniques applied and terminology used and also provided an overview of the chapters contained in the study.

It became clear that, to date, no academic research has been conducted to determine the achievements, success factors and constraints which played a role in the third PMS in the Namibian public service and which were reported to have been poorly implemented from 2006 to 2014. Studies conducted prior to the time of this study did not appear to focus on the PMS milestones in totality in terms of process implementation. It was also not clear whether this third PMS had met the requirements or conditions of an effective policy and PMS implementation as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of the study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4).

This chapter concluded that no study had been conducted in the Namibian public service and which investigated both the PMS implementation process in totality and the introduction of individual performance agreements at the political level despite the latter having gained momentum in some African countries. In addition, there had clearly been inadequate scholarly discussion on the topics referred to above. It was anticipated that this study would make a contribution to filling these gaps by answering the research questions based on the primary objectives of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

The next chapters (chapter 2 and 3) present a critical discussion of the existing literature relevant to the study.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **REVIEW OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP ON IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter presented the general introduction and background to the study which investigated the implementation of a third PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. This chapter contains a critical discussion of the existing scholarship on implementation studies. The study employed a thematic or constructs approach in order to fully understand the complexity of the phenomenon under study. Bless et al. (2006:24) define a literature review as “the process of reading whatever has been published that appears relevant to the research topic”. However, Mouton (2001:86) prefers the term ‘scholarship’ because a literature review does not necessarily encapsulate all that the researcher intends to convey. Mouton (2001:87) argues that the term ‘scholarship’ conveys more about what the researcher is looking for in their field in terms of the available body of knowledge in order to ascertain how other scholars did it, what they found and what instrumentation they used and to what effect. Based on Mouton’s argument, it makes considerable sense to use the term ‘scholarship’ because the process goes beyond what has been found to include the how it was found (methodology). The latter is extremely important for new studies that are not only looking at what happened but also how it was done in order to either avoid or apply the methodology used in previous studies.

Despite the fact that the various definitions of the term literature review differ in terms of conceptualisations, there is, nevertheless, consensus that a literature review is not merely a summary or quotations from different sources but a discussion of the existing body of knowledge in relation to the research topic in terms of what has been done, how it was done and key findings. This study found that the main purpose of the literature review is to sharpen and deepen the theoretical framework of the relevant research, to familiarise the researcher with the latest developments in related areas, to identify possible gaps in the existing knowledge as well as weaknesses in previous studies, to discover connections,

contradictions or other relations between various research results by comparing different investigations, to identify the variables that must be considered in the research as well as those that may prove irrelevant, and to study the advantages and disadvantages of the research methods used by others in order to adopt or improve on them in one's own research.

Accordingly, this chapter presents a critical overview of the existing scholarship in the field of "implementation studies" by using the thematic approach in terms of which key themes are either pre-determined or emerge from the literature relevant to the topic under investigation (Onwuegbuzie, Leech & Collins, 2012). The review of the existing scholarship is expected to help the researcher to identify gaps and be able to make a contribution to the subject knowledge.

## **2.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON IMPLEMENTATION IN POLICY STUDIES**

### **2.2.1 The Concept of Implementation**

The researcher was of the opinion that an investigation into the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service would be credible if it were conducted within the context of policy studies because this would inform the design of the study and also identify constraints and success factors in policy implementation in general. Implementation literally means to put in action. Although the various writers on policy studies (Cloete, Wissink & De Coning, 2006:12; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005:540; Durlak & DuPre, 2008:328; Schofield & Sausman, 2004:235; Steinbach, 2009:1; Wissink, 1990; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993:11; Matland, 1995; DeGroff & Cargo, 2009:47; Bervir, 2011:103; Hill & Hupe, 2009:7; Parsons, 2005:461) differ in terms of conceptualisation, there is nevertheless consensus that policy implementation either refers to the process of turning policy into practice or it is a stage at which policy action occurs.

However, the researcher does not support the use of the word 'stage' in the definition because it has created an impression that implementation is considered only after a policy decision has been made. This definition, which includes the word 'stage', results in poor policy implementation because it does not take a holistic, but rather a stage, approach. Accordingly, the researcher supports the


argument that implementation may be characterised by 'on going policy formulation' which assumes that both enactment and execution contribute to the content (or characteristics) of a policy and the funding which the executive should consider at the inception of the process (Hupe & Hill, 2006).

The manner in which implementation is defined here influenced the findings of Smith (1973:198) that "the real role of interest groups and other interested groups, including political parties, comes when policies are implemented by the government, and it is at the implementation stage of the policy process when policy may be abandoned by the government, implemented or modified to meet the demands of the interested parties". This definition may simply mean that it is only during implementation that interest groups and others become involved. However, it is the researcher's view that they should be involved throughout the entire policy making process.

It may be concluded that the term 'implementation' means to carry out or execute a policy decision. However, the definition, which uses the word 'stage', results in linear, rather than holistic or system thinking. It should also be noted that implementation and evaluation overlap because continued evaluation takes place in terms of policy objectives and the interaction of various actors during the implementation process (Parsons, 2005:471). This refers to implementation as an evolutionary process. The researcher suggests that the policy making process adopt take a holistic and not the stage approach – see figure 2.1 below.

It is clear from figure 2.1 that, with the identification of policy issues (problem), the policy issues identified may then be translated into government policies that are adopted by, for example, the legislature and then handed over to the administration for implementation under the guidance of the members of the executive. It is in that context that the policy making process should be viewed in a holistic manner because it is essential that implementation is not embarked upon without an understanding of the policy issues that necessitated the formulation of the policy in question.





**Figure 2.1:** Policy making process which includes implementation

**Source:** Cloete et al. (2006)

### 2.2.2 Main Schools of Thought on Policy Implementation

This section presents the different main schools of thought on policy implementation. The researcher's view here includes the assumptions that guided the research study. The late 1960s and early 1970s were characterised by a growing concern about the effectiveness of public policy and governance (Barrett, 2004:250; Saetren, 2014:90). The impetus behind and motivation for implementation studies led to the development of various schools of thought on policy implementation. However, no consensus has been reached on which school of thought is the most appropriate for effective policy implementation. The existing schools of thought on implementation include principal–agent theory (1971); policy implementation deficit (1973); top-down and bottom-up (1980s); communication and policy implementation (1990); high or low levels of ambiguity and conflict model (1995); network settings and policy implementation (1997); human infrastructure for effective implementation in practice and programme (2005); factors that influence implementation in practice settings (2008); and quality implementation framework (2012) (Cloete et al., 2006; Steinbach, 2009; Burke, Morris & McGarrigle, 2012:15–16). The review of the existing scholarship revealed that most of the schools of thoughts had originated in federal states, for example

the United States of America, and hence that their application and analysis should be considered the context of a specific country or region.

The researcher identified that there is no consensus on the appropriate school of thought (top-down, bottom-up or mixed) on implementation. However, the following findings enabled the contribution of this study to the debate:

Firstly, the definition of the term 'implementation', which uses the word 'stage', negated a holistic view of the policy process. However, implementation should not be considered as a standalone stage of the policy formulation process but in a holistic manner. The implementation process should take into account the politics which were at play during the policy formulation because this may lead to its failure. In addition, implementation should form part of the policy formulation. In other words, implementation modalities should form part of the policy formulation and not be considered only after a policy has been adopted. Furthermore, political executives should guide the administrative staff in carrying out public policies because this is part of the ongoing process of policy formulation.

Secondly, in the past writers have attempted to combine two of the approaches, namely, the top-down and the bottom-up approaches. This study corroborates/supports the notion of combining elements of the top-down and bottom-up approaches with both policy formulation and policy implementation, because the hybrid approach takes into account both the interests of the target groups and the perspective of political leadership. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that policy formulation and implementation are not totally top-down or bottom-up in a legitimate government but are, instead, part of a participatory process.

Thirdly, a hybrid approach was developed by researchers, namely, Scharpf (1978), Ripley and Franklin (1982), Elmore (1985), Sabatier (1980), Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole (1990) in an attempt to combine the elements of the two main schools of thought (top-down and bottom-up) on policy implementation. The researcher's view is that the hybrid approach may be the most appropriate in reducing ambiguity and conflict in the policy objectives because this approach helps to create a participatory process. However, it is also essential that the type

of government under which policies are formulated and implemented is taken into account because the process is likely to assume a different course under either a democratic or an autocratic government as a result of the different ideologies that underpin their operations.

### **2.2.3 Constraints in Policy Implementation**

This section identifies constraints in policy implementation and the causes of policy implementation failure cited in existing scholarship. Based on the previous discussions, it is clear that the main constraint with policy implementation starts with the definition of the term 'implementation' in the context of the policy process, which mentions a 'stage' rather than a holistic approach. Writers in the field of policy studies (Cloete et al., 2006:189–191; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005; Bervir, 2011:105; DeGroff & Cargo, 2009:47; Parsons, 2005:470; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993:63; Wessels & Van Jaarsveldt, 2007:103; Scofield & Sausman, 2004:237; Smith, 1973:199; Matland, 1995:161) have identified the following main constraints in policy implementation.

Firstly, determining the extent to which discretion should be given to public agencies in tailoring implementation (Bervir, 2011:105). There is a general observation among the above writers (see § 2.2.3) in the field of policy studies that too high a discretion results in inconsistency and misalignment with central objectives. For example, in the Republic of Namibia, the researcher observed that there were inconsistencies in the implementation of the Regional Council Act, 1992, regarding the involvement of the elected councillors (politicians) in the appointment of staff members below the Chief Regional Officers (CROs).

Secondly, limited understanding of the context in which policies are being implemented poses challenges during implementation (Cloete et al., 2006). For example, an understanding of the types of political ideology that underpins the system of government helps implementers with the implementation approach adopted.

Thirdly, limitations in bureaucratic intelligence include preoccupation with the process instead of with results and the protection of their own budget and power (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993:63; Wessels & Van Jaarsveldt, 2007:103). For

example, implementation capacity triggered the establishment of management development institutes (MDIs) in post-colonial Africa. The Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM), established in 2010, is the most recent MDI to be founded on the African continent at the time of this study. However, poor policy implementation continues to be a feature of most of the public services on the African continent (African Union Commission, 2011).

Fourthly, implementation may become a political game and pose challenges in terms of resolving the interests of the various groups (Parsons, 2005:470; DeGroff & Cargo, 2009:47). Such challenges not only delay the implementation process but, according to Parsons (2005) and DeGroff and Cargo (2009), they also result in the poor coordination of the different actors. Most importantly, such a situation results in what is referred to as 'fragmented accountability'. Another interesting issue which emerged from the existing scholarship is the lack of appropriate models to guide the involvement of politicians in administration during implementation (Parsons, 2005). The researcher's view is that politicians should not leave implementation entirely to the administrative staff after a policy decision has been taken because they are ultimately accountable to society for the outcomes.

In his study, Matland (1995:160) finds that "high policy ambiguity and conflict poses a major challenge during implementation". In many cases policies are not clear and they incorporate conflicting objectives that pose challenge during the implementation process. Matland (1995) bases his findings on a review of the policy implementation literature. The most reviewed work was that of O'Toole (1997) with more than one hundred implementation studies. Based on Matland's findings, the researcher is of the view that the application of one approach, for example top-down or bottom-up, may be a root cause of implementation problems.

This argument was advanced by Matland (1995) as a writer on policy ambiguity and conflict model. However, a different study is needed to test this hypothesis of the researcher.

Poor leadership often results in changes being made before stakeholders are ready and also before the organisational culture is fully aligned (Burke et al., 2012). Burke et al. (2012) base their findings on a review of materials sourced from books, journal articles, websites and other published and unpublished documents and briefs.

In addition, Barrett (2004:252) highlights the key factors discussed below as contributing to what may be perceived as implementation failure. Barrett (2004:252) bases her findings on a review of three decades of implementation studies, presenting them in the form of a personal reflection. According to Barrett (2004:252) these factors include, firstly, the lack of clear policy objectives which leaves room for differential interpretation and discretion in action.

Secondly, another factor is the multiplicity of actors and agencies involved in the implementation as well as problems of communication and coordination between the links in the chain. This point contradicts the researcher's view that political executives should be included in the PMS process because each organisational level has its own responsibilities in the process of policy implementation.

A third factor is the inter- and intra-organisational value and interest differences between actors and agencies, as well as problems of differing perspectives and priorities affecting policy interpretations and motivation for implementation.

Finally, implementation failure may be related to the relative autonomies between implementing agencies and limits to administrative control.

The constraints in policy implementation, as mentioned above, may be classified in a number of main categories such as the tractability of the problem, resources, structure, system, and process and context. In addition, Matland (1995:161) concludes that implementation failures occur because of misunderstanding, poor coordination, insufficient resources, and a lack of an effective monitoring strategy to control and sanction deviant behaviour. Pauw (2014) is of the view that a further cause of policy failure is the fact that the policy itself is not read together with sufficient practical cases. This investigation into the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service will consider the above constraints in more detail (see § 7.5).

#### **2.2.4 Conditions for Effective Policy Implementation**

This section identifies and discusses the conditions required for effective policy implementation. The factors identified will be tested during the empirical section of this study (see § 7.4).

The word 'effective' means successful and working in the way in which it was intended (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2004). Thus, the 'conditions for effective policy implementation' in the context of this study refer to all the elements or requirements that would ensure that the implementation process is in line with and has achieved the policy objectives and, most importantly, that the social issues that necessitated the policy have been addressed (own definition). A number of success factors for effective policy implementation have been identified by various scholars (see § 2.2.3).

One of the most important factors is adequate resources, including both human and financial resources. The capacity of the human resources to effectively and efficiently formulate and execute public policy has been identified as fundamental in effective public policy implementation. In their study, Wessels and Van Jaarsveldt (2007:103) argue that staff plays a significant role in the operations of public institutions. Similarly, Cloete et al. (2006:202) indicate that competent politicians are able to structure implementation. Thus, it made sense to analyse the capacity development strategy for both politicians and public servants both before and during the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service.

Another important factor is leadership commitment at both the political and the administrative levels. In support, Cloete et al. (2006:301) state that "the success of the South East Asia Tigers can basically be attributed to the fact that they were all strong states with strong leaders driving clear, feasible developmental visions and good strategic governance". Although the researcher agrees with this finding, a proper understanding of the context in which implementation happens is vital for any country, including Namibia. Competent and people-oriented leadership mobilises resources, enacts laws, and establishes implementation structures, including oversight bodies to ensure accountability for public policy implementation. Diescho (2014:7) argues that leaders have a vision and they

stimulate interest by means of a compelling vision which unites people in wanting to attain the desired state.

Furthermore, consultation and buy-in with and from all relevant stakeholders is vital for successful implementation because it creates awareness and ownership and reduces resistance (Burke et al., 2012:9).

Another important factor that has been identified is the presence of implementation teams. An implementation teams refers to a core group of individuals who possess specific expertise in implementation and also in the policy, service or programme being implemented. They should be multi-skilled as they are accountable for guiding the overall implementation process and building internal capacity to manage change (Burke et al., 2012:10). In the context of this study the implementation team refers to the PMS facilitators at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).

An implementation plan has also been identified as important. An effective policy implementation requires a plan that clearly outlines the objectives, specific tasks related to implementation, the individuals responsible for accomplishing these tasks, agreed timelines, risk management as well as monitoring and reporting requirements (Burke et al., 2012:10). In the context of this thesis the term 'implementation plan' refers to both the national and institutional implementation plans. In addition, there should be people accountable for these national and institutional implementation plans. The researcher's view is that staff capacity building is a core component of an implementation plan.

Another aspect crucial to successful policy implementation is organisational support. Supportive organisational structures and systems are crucial in helping staff to implement policy. These include systems, policies and procedure within the organisation and which align with the policy, assessment and decision making (Burke et al., 2012:11). In addition, effective and ongoing communication is critical in motivating staff and giving and receiving feedback. Most importantly there should be ongoing training, positive role models and support groups. In the context of this study organisational support refers to the internal staff (change agents), committees and PMS policy and guidelines in the Namibia public service.

The implementation process should also consider the socio-economic conditions, public opinion and other factors affecting the implementation process because of the possibility of losing sight of the macro-level and political variables which structure the entire process (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 2005).

Another important factor that policy implementers should bear in mind is the value of learning from experience. Regular reflection on the implementation process allows for the identification of the strengths and weakness that emerged during the process so as to inform and improve future applications (Burke et al., 2012:11). Burke et al. (2012) base their findings on a review of materials sourced from books, journal articles, websites and other published and unpublished documents and briefs. In this study the researcher also followed this process and made use of a document study as a method of data collection and in the interpretation of the relevant documents (see § 5.6.2.3).

In short, the above findings led to a proper understanding which guided the collection of empirical data for the purposes of this study. It is also important to end the discussion with a summary of the conditions for effective policy implementation as proposed Sabatier and Mazmanian (2005:554), namely: (1) The legislation should give implementing agencies sufficient jurisdiction over both the target groups and the other critical areas of intervention; (2) the legislation should also structure the implementation process so as to maximise the probability that target groups will perform as desired; (3) the leaders of the implementing agency should possess significant managerial and political skills and should be committed to statutory goals; and (4) the programme should be actively supported by both organised constituency groups and a few key legislators throughout the implementation process. In addition, the issue of network and governance and socio-political context should be taken into consideration during the implementation process (DeGroff & Cargo, 2009).

## **2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter reviewed existing scholarship in the field of policy studies and highlighted the growth of implementation research. The findings of this review supported the conclusions from earlier reviews, namely: (1) policy implementation



research has reached a relatively mature stage of development; (2) more progress has been made on the methodological rather than the theoretical fronts; and (3) this field of study has progressed fairly rapidly and there is now what is termed the 'third generation research paradigm' (Saetren, 2014:84). Implementation research remains extremely relevant and any allegations that it has died should be rejected because implementation research studies are taking place in several fields of study and not only in policy studies. Most importantly, the use of numerous sources and methods of data collection and analysis stood out as a significant factor in the implementation research conducted by previous researchers.

The analysis of the term 'implementation' in the context of policy studies arrived at the following conclusions: (1) public policies are intended to guide administrators in addressing issues that affect the inhabitants of a specific geographical setup; (2) the absence of a common implementation model may contribute to the policy ambiguity and conflict which complicate the implementation process; and (3) a misunderstanding of the context in which policies are made and implemented poses a challenge to politicians, administrative staff and other actors. The definition of implementation which includes the word 'stage' obviated the holistic approach to the policy-making process. Moreover, the study confirmed that there is no consensus on the most appropriate approach to policy implementation. The chapter identified the use of the mixed method approach in researching implementation and, as discussed in chapter 5, this approach will be applied in the study.

The next chapter focuses on the review of the scholarship on PMSs.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **REVIEW OF THE SCHOLARSHIP ON PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter reviewed the scholarship on implementation studies with the aim of informing the investigation into the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. This chapter presents a critical discussion of the existing scholarship on PMSs using a thematic or constructs approach. Mouton's (2001) definition of the term 'literature review' also applies to this chapter (see § 2.1). The concluding remarks in this chapter draw together chapters 2 and 3, since both these chapters focus on reviews of existing scholarship deemed relevant to the purposes of this study. The review of existing scholarship on PMSs is expected to identify the gaps, constraints and success factors which play a role in the implementation of a PMS.

#### **3.2 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION**

##### **3.2.1 The Concept of Performance Management System**

A PMS has been defined by Aguinis (2009:2) as a process of identifying, measuring and developing performance in an organisation by linking the performance and objectives of individuals to the organisation's overall mission and goals. A study conducted by Mothusi in Botswana (2009) defines a PMS as a system which links organisational goals to the work plans, appraisal, capacity development, pay and incentives for individuals and teams (Wescott, 1999). The 7th CAMPS (2011:5) defines the concept in an African context as a holistic (all-embracing) and systematic process for ensuring better results from the organisation, teams and individuals by managing performance within an agreed framework of planned goals, objectives and standards. The Government of the Republic of Namibia (2006c:4) defines the PMS in the public service context as a management tool which is aimed at improved public service delivery.

On the other hand, Maphorisa (2010:3) defines a PMS as an authoritative framework for planning, managing and measuring the performance of both the

organisation and the employees. This includes the policy and planning framework as well as performance monitoring, measurement, review and assessment as well as control and corrective measures. Poister (2010:251) defines a PMS as the process of setting goals for an organisation and managing the organisation effectively in order to achieve those goals and eventually bring about the desired outcomes. The organisational performance is a summation of individual performance at the different levels of an organisation. The alignment of individual performance plans or agreements to those of the organisation is critical for an effective PMS.

The analysis of the PMS definitions by the following writers, namely, Aguinis (2005, 2009, 2011), Armstrong (2006), Van der Walddt, Van Niekerk, Doyle, Knipe and Du Toit (2002), Van der Walddt (2004), California State Government (2010), Bussin (2013), Harvard Business School (2010), Homayounizadpanah and Baqerkord (2012), Toppo and Prusty (2012), Esu and Inyang (2009), Ellis and Chinedu (2011), De Waal (2007), Bemthal, Rogers and Smith (2003), Dzimbiri (2008), Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad (2011), Iqbal, Aslam & Arashad (2012), Sacht (2008), Minnaar (2010), 7th CAMPS (2011) and Maphorisa (2010) finds a consensus on the PMS as a continuous process of identifying, measuring, and developing the performance of individuals and teams and aligning performance with the strategic goals of the organisation.

Based on the above, the researcher identified certain unique elements in the definitions proposed by Maphorisa (2010) and Wescott (1999) that may be useful for an effective PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. Maphorisa's (2010) definition includes concepts such as authoritative and corrective measures – these concepts were not included in the definitions suggested by other writers. Wescott's (1999) definition underscores the need for “capacity development, pay and incentive for individual and teams”.

After reviewing the definitions of a PMS that have already been discussed, the researcher supports the definition proposed by the 7th CAMPS (2011:15). Thus, a PMS may be said to be a systematic process which is aimed at improving public service delivery through effective planning, organising, leading (which includes authority, support, empowerment, visioning, influencing, inspiring, doing things

right and leading by example), control through continuous monitoring and evaluation and rewarding both individuals and teams. It is, thus, a management tool which may improve service delivery if successfully implemented.

### **3.2.2 Brief History of Performance Management Systems**

Lawrie, Kalff and Anderson (2005:3) argue strongly that the public sector led the way in terms of innovation in performance management methods up until the early 1970s. The aim of such innovations was to try to meet the economic demands of military campaigns by raising income through taxation. The types of innovation included, among others, process mapping and strategic planning (Lawrie et al., 2005:3). The review of the literature found that the concept of a PMS had existed before NPM which was at its height in the 1990s. In addition, it is believed that the initial steps in the adoption of PMS practice that arose between the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century emanated from different milieus, including social reforms, engineers and specialist administrators as well as large corporations (Mutahaba, 2011:15). Most of the movements were in response to and sought answers for the problems arising from industrialisation, poverty and social unrest, and inefficiency and corruption in government through the rationalisation and quantification of policy and administration.

However, Philip (2011:10) maintains that PMSs were initially designed by the private sector in Western countries and then adopted by the public sector. Nevertheless, the PMS has become a global reform movement which has also been implemented in the public sectors of developing countries.

In his study Mutahaba (2011:13–16) identifies the following seven movements that led to what is referred to as the PMS today:

The first movement, labelled the Social Survey Movement, involved social reformers who were concerned with addressing the societal disorders and problems that had accompanied industrialisation in the first world and included understanding their causes. The best known work of this movement is the study by Charles Booth on *The life and labour of the people of London* 1886 (Mutahaba, 2011:13). Booth believes that, in order to deal effectively with poverty there was a need to gather quantitative information on the characteristics of poverty, including

statistics on the number of poor people, causes of poverty and measures to alleviate it. The movement targeted mainly the socio-economic inequalities that had arisen from the industrialisation processes and sought to sensitise governments on the benefits of quantifying information on the problems that needed to be addressed as well as the results of actions being taken to ameliorate the problems.

The second movement, christened the Scientific Management and the Science of Administration, was, like the social survey movement, focused on developing organisational solutions to the problems/challenges arising from the industrialisation processes.

The third performance improvement movement was concerned with controlling wastage in the production and delivery of goods and services in the public sector. It focused on the adoption of tools and instruments that helped organisations to track records and analyse costs.

The fourth stream in performance movement initially emerged in the United States in the 1940s and was named Performance Budgeting. It focused on improving the budgetary processes of the government in order to be able to express the objectives of government in terms of “the work to be done rather than through mere classification of expenditures items” (Hoover Commission Report in Shafritz & Hyde, 2004:162, in Mutahaba, 2011:14). The movement took some time to become popularised and, in fact, it was not until the 1960s that the US Government adopted it as a standard budgetary method through the adoption of the Planning Programming Budgeting Systems (PPBS) which then spread to Western Europe in the early 1970s. This, in turn, gave way to other approaches such as Management by Objectives (MBOs), Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) as well as Government Performance and Result Act (GPRA) (Kelly & Rivenback, 2003, in Mutahaba, 2011:15).

The fifth performance movement, known as the Social Indicator, emerged in tandem with Performance Budgeting. The movement tried to take the allocation of PPBS further and aimed at developing objectives in the form of outcomes. Thus, government work had to be expressed in terms of improvements in the social

characteristics of the country, province and city. This meant that work had to be undertaken to enhance levels of education, health conditions and reduce crime while measurement would be made against a standard in order to determine either improvement or regression.

The sixth performance movement emphasised the need to ensure quality at all stages of management, namely, inputs, process and outputs (including outcomes), and was aimed at measuring quality in all relevant aspects of organisational management. This movement was known as Total Quality Management. The model was developed in Japan in the 1950s and then implemented in Japan's industrial establishments in the 1960s. It was imported by private sector establishments in the USA and Western Europe in the 1970s and was introduced into the public sector by the 1980s (Mutahaba, 2011:15).

The seventh and contemporary performance movement in the public sector has been labelled the performance management system (PMS) or result-based management. It spread into traditional governmental organisations as part of the measures to contain public expenditure during the unprecedented global economic crisis that engulfed the world in the 1970s and 1980s (Mutahaba, 2011:15). It has, however, been agreed that the PMS application rose together with the NPM movement which was triggered by two oil crises. The first such crisis took place in 1973 and the second one in the early 1980s in India (Mutahaba, 2011:15). Mutahaba (2011:25) concludes that PMS implementation challenges differ from one country to the other.

It is important to note that there has been a shift from a system to a process (Philip, 2011). However, the name has not changed to 'performance management process', as opposed to 'performance management system'. In addition, existing scholarship has indicated that a new approach, termed 'public value management', has been developed to ensure that public value is delivered to the citizenry rather than to the individual (O'Flynn, 2007:360). It is also important to note that the performance management process has evolved several phases since 1960 from the Annual Confidential Reports (ACR), known as 'Employee Service Records', to the modern phase which is characterised by maturity and openness in the approach to addressing people's issues (Aguinis, 2009).

This section has highlighted that performance has evolved from an annual appraisal to a continuous PMS which is characterised by the following: ongoing review of employee performance, two-way communication and the rating of employee performance by both the employee and supervisor after three months, six months and annually.

### **3.2.3 Aims and Objectives of a Performance Management System**

There are various interpretations of the aims and objectives of performance management. The following include some of the aims of a PMS as expressed by various organisations (Armstrong World Industries, Eli Lilly and Co, ICI Paints, Leicestershire Country Council, Macmillan Cancer Relief, Marks and Spencer Financial Services, Royal Berkshire and Battle Hospitals NHS Trust and West Bromwich Building Society) in a survey, 'Trends in Performance Management', which was conducted by IRS (2003:12–19):

- Empowering and rewarding employees in order to motivate them to do their best
- Focusing employees' tasks on the right things and on doing them right
- Aligning everyone's individual goals to the goals of the organisation
- Proactively managing and resourcing performance against agreed accountabilities and objectives
- Linking job performance to the achievement of the organisation's medium-term corporate strategy and service plans
- Aligning personal/individual objectives with team, department/divisional and corporate plans. The presentation of objectives with clearly defined goals/targets using measures, both soft and numeric. The monitoring of performance and the taking of continuous action as required
- Allowing all individuals to become clear about what they need to achieve and the expected standards and how that, in turn, contributes to the overall success of the organisation. They receive regular, fair and accurate feedback and coaching to stretch and motivate them to achieve their best
- Aligning individual accountabilities to organisational targets and activities

- Maximising the potential of individuals and teams in order to benefit both themselves and the organisation, focusing on the achievement of their objectives, and
- Defining the organisation's vision, mission, core values and strategic direction, in order to create value for its shareholders, customers and society.

Aguinis (2013:26) maintains that there are numerous advantages to implementing a well-designed PMS, including the following: it increases motivation and self-esteem, improves performance, clarifies job tasks and duties, provides self-insight and development opportunities and clarifies supervisor expectations. In view of the above bullets, one should also understand that performance appraisal is an element of performance management, because it focuses on the assessment of individual performance.

In short, various organisations view the aims of a PMS in different ways. Nevertheless, there is consensus that the overall aims of a PMS are to establish a high performance culture in which individuals and teams take responsibility for the continuous improvement of operational processes and for their own skills and contributions within a framework provided by effective leadership; to focus people on doing the right things by achieving goals; and to develop the capacity of people to meet and exceed expectations and to achieve their full potential to the benefit of themselves and the organisations.

Most importantly, a PMS is concerned with ensuring that the support and guidance which people need in order to develop and improve are readily available. A major finding by Homayounizadpanah and Baqerkord (2012:1767), based on a survey and interviews conducted with Chabahar Municipality employees, was that "there is a strong positive relationship between a PMS, productivity and efficiency". It may, thus, be concluded that there is a relationship between the PMS's aims and objectives and the public value approach to the management of government institutions. The above findings on the aims and objectives of PMS guided the data collection methods used in this study, namely, a mini survey during phase one and interviews during phase two of the data collection process.



### **3.2.4 Attribute versus Results-Based Performance Management Approaches**

An attribute PMS holds staff accountable for living the organisational values and tends to be more behaviour driven. Dzimbiri (2008:46) argues that this type of traditional public administration model laid considerable emphasis on behavioural or personality characteristics such as loyalty, dependability, punctuality and honesty as central attributes for the evaluation of individual employees. This meant that performance was never linked to departmental, divisional and organisational strategic goals and objectives.

On the other hand, a results-based PMS focuses on results and, in some cases, a combination of attributes. For example, Jack Welch made a proposal at a meeting of the General Electric (GE) Company's five hundred executives that all GE leaders would be held accountable both for "making the numbers" and for "living the values" (Ulrich et al., 1999:12). Ulrich et al. further argue that a leader's job requires more than character, knowledge and action and that it also demands results. Thus, the move towards a combination of attribute and result based PMSs are critical in the public service. Moreover, Ulrich et al. (1999:13) argue that this type of PMS worked for the GE Company. However, the researcher's view is that the public service context is different from that of the private sector. It should, thus, be noted that what worked well in the private sector may not necessarily work in the public sector. The scope and institutional environment are key elements in this respect.

### **3.2.5 Performance Management System Frameworks**

The researcher's view is that a study of PMS implementation necessitates a prior understanding of the various frameworks that guide both its design and the implementation process. Accordingly, this section discusses different PMS frameworks in order to be able to analyse the system being used in the Namibian public service.

#### **3.2.5.1 Logical Framework**

The review of the literature or scholarship revealed that the 'Logical Framework' is the oldest PMS framework. Lawrie et al. (2005:3) point out that the Logical Framework is a PMS device used widely in the non-governmental organisation

(NGO) sector and that it was also used to plan, monitor and evaluate projects originated in work carried out for the US Department of Defence in the 1960s (Odame, 2001). It is also helpful as a planning and evaluation tool in complex and unpredictable environments in which outcomes are not clearly measurable and required interventions are difficult to predict (Lawrie et al., 2005:4). Lawrie et al. (2005:3) further indicate that, initially, it was adopted by the United States Agencies for International Development (USAID) during the 1970s and was widely applied by several developmental organisations for planning and to support the newly emerging discipline of monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

Lawrie et al. (2005:4) argue that a complete “Log Frame” provides a one-page summary of the programme strategic logic: the performance expected from the programme at multiple levels and the means of assessing performance over time. They further point out that good Log Frames are completed by a combination of programme managers, M&E specialists and external stakeholders, for example, intermediary partners and government representatives. The researcher is, however, of the opinion that misunderstanding the framework may lead to wrong application and a consequent wastage of resources. The design of the Logical Framework is presented in table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1:** Logical Framework (Log Frame) matrix

	Result Sought	Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions/Risks
Impact				
Outcome				
Outputs				
Activity				

**Source:** Lawrie et al. (2005:4)

It is clear from table 3.1 above that the Logical Framework is designed sequentially in terms of what ought to be done (horizontal), how it will be measured and perceived assumptions or risks (vertical). This facilitates the monitoring and evaluation of organisational performance using one page only.

#### 3.2.5.2 Results-Based Management

Results-based management (RBM) evolved from the Logical Framework which was introduced in 1969–1970 (Lawrie et al., 2005:4). It (RBM) was first adopted by

the Australian government as early in the mid-1980s and became an increasingly important public sector management theme during the 1990s. Furthermore, it was introduced to achieve the following reasons, namely, to shift the focus of government from inputs, activities and outputs to outcomes achievement and to formalise a PMS framework in the private sector. F W Taylor is considered to be the pioneer of this work in the early 20th century (Lawrie et al., 2005:4).

The proponents of RBM based their support on measurement, evaluation and accountability in the interests of achieving a more efficient and effective resources utilisation by the public sector (Saldanha, 2002:4). The RBM was seen as a mechanism for forcing politicians, bureaucrats and voting citizens to clarify the objectives of government programmes and services. Saldanha (2002:4) further argues that while it was important to plan for and monitor outputs, such outputs cannot, by definition, be used as the sole criteria for judging organisational effectiveness.

It was, thus, important to judge organisational performance based on 'why' this model was established. Thus, evaluation had to focus on the outcomes (client-benefit and satisfaction) achieved. The following factors are critical in implementing RBM, namely, incentives, internal ownership and commitment, simplicity and performance data management and reporting (Saldanha, 2002:5).

In short, the RBM approach was found to be an effective approach at the national level to address long-term targets. However, if applied, it requires the adjustment of targets at various periods without changing the concept because it lacks the yearly targets in its design as it makes provision only for outcome, outputs and activities for the long term. Although there are common elements (outputs and outcomes) to the Logical Framework and Results-based Management, the latter is focused on the end results or outcomes and does not make provision for activities – see table 3.2.

**Table 3.2:** Results-based management framework

Sector	Output	Outcomes
e.g. agriculture	- area irrigated - irrigating systems operated and maintained	- farmers' income - agricultural production/ productivity, and share of GDP

**Source:** Saldanha (2002:5)

It is clear from table 3.2 that the RBM framework is strategic in nature because it only takes into account the sectors' output and outcomes. This type of framework is effective for long term plans (e.g. National Development Plans) as, for example, annual plans are developed by taking into account the final outputs and outcomes of each sector.

#### 3.2.5.3 Business Excellence Model

The Business Excellence Model (BEM) is a gap analysis tool (Hakes, 1999; Tidd, Bessant & Pavitt, 2005) and does not illustrate cause and effect. It is based on the balanced scorecard (BSC). The Business Excellence Model dates back to 1950 and may be traced back over three continents, namely, Asia, America and Europe. It was found to have helped in the growth of Japan's economy in the last quarter of the last century. The need to compete globally became clear in the West and, in 1983, a White House Conference on Productivity was held during which key note speeches were made by President Reagan, Vice President Bush and the Commerce Secretary. They all encouraged creativity, innovation and standard setting in organisations (Hakes, 1999; Tidd et al., 2005).

As a result, the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (MBNQA) was launched in 1988 (Hakes, 1999). The award was aiming at encouraging organisations to take quality management seriously at all times. Hakes (1999) states that the BEM has been used in many organisations, including the Cleveland Constabulary in England and the Post Office Group in Britain. Although the model had been reviewed several times it has, nevertheless, maintained its eight fundamental inputs of performance excellence, namely, customer focus, continuous learning, improvement and innovation, people development and involvement, management by processes and facts and results orientation (Hakes, 1999, Tidd et al., 2005) – see table 3.3.

**Table 3.3:** The Business Excellence Model (BEM) example: five enablers and four results

Enablers		Results	
Leadership	10%	People satisfaction	9%
People management	9%	Customer satisfaction	20%
Policy and strategy	8%	Impact on society	6%
Resources	9%	Business result	15%
Processes	14%		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>50%</b>

**Source:** Adopted from: British Quality Foundation (Hakes, 1996, Tidd et al., 2005)

Table 3.3 shows the design of the BEM which is dependent mainly on enablers (50%) and results (50%). The enablers are what ought to be in place to achieve the results. The term ‘people’ in both the enablers and results refers to the employees of an organisation.

There are also other excellence models designed to measure and guide an organisation towards excellence. These include: The Big Picture (developed to help the analysis of all aspects of the organisation), Investors in People (people development as a means of improving organisational performance), Six Sigma (aimed at customer satisfaction, reducing errors and defects and reducing cycling time), Kaizen Blitz (focusing on how the physical work environment may improve service delivery), Charter Marker (a national standard and quality improvement tool) and ISO 9000:2000 (statutory and regulatory requirements for quality management) (ESAMI, 2010:13).

All the business excellence models discussed above are aimed at improving organisational performance. Although these models are different in design and application, in most cases, they possess some common elements. This is probably because it would appear that they all flowed from the early Business Excellence Model which originated in Japan in the 1950s.


#### 3.2.5.4 The Balanced Scorecard

The balanced scorecard (BSC) has been popular in the implementation of the PMS in certain African countries (e.g. Botswana, Kenya and Namibia). It is a strategic management tool which seeks to address some of the weakness and vagueness inherent in previous management approaches (Kaplan & Norton,

2010:10). Most of the existing sources indicated only that the BSC was created by Kaplan and Norton but without acknowledging the original work at Analogue Device Inc (ADI) from 1986 to 1992 (Schneideman, 2006:3). For example, Arveson (1998 in Mothusi, 2009:20), argues that the balanced scorecard was developed by Kaplan and Norton in the early 1990s as a new strategic management tool which seeks to address some of the weakness and vagueness inherent in previous management approaches.

However, Schneideman (2006:12) argues that the first BSC was created in 1987 at ADI, a mid-sized semiconductor company. Much of the literature on this topic originated through the eyes of outsider observers, for example Kaplan, Shank and Hendrickson, whose work was based on extensive interviews which were conducted at ADI (Schneideman, 2006).

As part of a five-year strategic plan, Schneideman developed a one-page report known as 'The Scorecard'. This scorecard showed three categories of measures, namely, financial, new products and quality improvement processes.



**Figure 3.1:** The Balanced Scorecard Framework

**Source:** Bourne and Bourne (2009) and Kaplan and Norton (2010)

A study conducted by Kaplan and Norton at ADI resulted in the development of the latest scorecard which contained four categories of measures, namely, finance, internal process, customer and learning and growth. This was officially published in 1992 (Geens, 2005) – see figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 shows the recent BSC with four perspectives, namely, finance, internal process, innovation and learning and customer perspectives. It may be used to develop a strategic plan and to measure organisational performance by taking a balanced view of all perspectives.

In view of the history of the BSC the researcher is of the opinion that it was developed to provide a clear prescription of what organisations should measure in order to balance the financial perspective (Kaplan & Norton, 2010). The main benefit of the BSC is that it helps organisations to define how value may be created for the shareholders in each of the four perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). The developers of the BSC (Kaplan & Norton, 2010:3) classify management practices in terms of the five key management processes that they had previously identified as important in respect of successful strategy implementation, namely:

- Mobilisation – orchestrating change through executive leadership
- Strategy translation – defining strategy map, balanced scorecards, targets and initiatives
- Organisation alignment – aligning corporate business units, support units, external partners and boards with the organisational strategy
- Employee motivation – providing education, communication, goal setting, incentive compensation and training of staff
- Governance – integrating strategy into planning, budgeting, reporting and management reviews.

In their book, *The balanced scorecard*, Bourne and Bourne (2009:101) draw on their decade's experience in designing, implementing and measurement of the systems. They suggested the following requirements for the successful implementation of the balanced scorecard in an organisation:

- Point of entry – obtain the understanding and commitment of the management group, clearly defining expectations.
- Participation – individual and group participation to achieve enthusiasm, understanding and commitment; workshop-style meetings to agree on objectives, identify problems and develop improvements and catalyse involvement; a decision-making forum.
- Project management – adequate resources and an agreed timescale.
- Procedure – well-defined procedure with stages of information gathering, information analysis and identifying improvements using simple tools and techniques, including a written record of the results of each stage.

In short, the requirements for successful strategy implementation as identified and discussed above are used to determine the constraints and reasons of such strategy implementation. In addition, the BSC model suggests that it is incumbent on managers to be proactive and focus strategically on those factors that generate sustainable success in the long run instead of focusing on short-term performance only. The application of the BSC in the public service is possible because the measures under each perspective are determined by the nature of organisation (public or private). The BSC has been applied in certain public services in Africa, namely, Namibia, Botswana and Kenya.

### **3.3 EXISTING GAP IN THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORKS**

The discussions above on the various PMS frameworks refer only to senior managers or a management group as being held responsible and accountable for the implementation process. However, this notion and its practical implementation exclude the political executives (President and ministers or cabinet) who are, in most cases, charged with both policy formulation and policy implementation (Heywood, 2007:360). In addition, Heywood (2007:359) identifies some of the most important functional areas of politicians, namely, ceremonial duties, control of policy-making, popular political leadership, bureaucratic management and crisis response.

However, the assumption underlying the existing frameworks is that PMS implementation is for bureaucrats only.



Political accountability has been well documented in Political Science. It is, however, treated differently in the constitutions of each country (Heywood, 2007). For example, Article 41 of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, clarifies the accountability of the political executives (Republic of Namibia, 1990a). However, at the time of the study, a new idea to introduce individual performance agreements at the political level was gathering momentum in some African countries (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda and Namibia). The review of scholarship on the introduction of the NPM and PMS, as discussed by different writers (Blackman et al., 2012; USA, 2012; Laegreid et al., 2005; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2011; Kim, 2009) reveal that the target population was career civil servants rather than political appointees. In addition, a study by Kim (2009:1) concludes that, despite political appointees enjoying a higher level of responsibility than typical career civil servants, their PMS was seriously undeveloped. In their study in Norway (Laegreid et al., 2005:2) find that the PMSs were used primarily by senior managers while government ministers were less interested because there was a general understanding that it was more difficult to report on results than to formulate goals and objectives. The researcher also found that there was a general understanding among researchers (see the above paragraph) in the field that the application of the principal–agent theory informed practice because political executives often take office with the intention of reforming the administrative agencies they oversee.

Despite the fact that it is a new concept, the review of existing publications and related documents supports the conclusion reached by Kim (2009:1) that the PMS for politicians was seriously underdeveloped and that there has been inadequate academic discussion on the design and implementation of the individual performance agreements for political executives (Akhilwanya, 2015; Musonera, 2015). Thus, with the Namibian Government as the main focus of the study, the primary objective of this study was to investigate both the design and implementation modalities as the performance agreements of various political executives that had been published in the local newspaper (*The Namibian*, 2016:6–7) had been criticised. One of the main criticisms was that these performance agreements were more output than results driven.

In the South African context, the design of an individual performance agreement for the executive also appears to be inadequate while it also does not promote individual accountability, because it is signed by several signatories (Republic of South Africa, 2010). For example, most of the key performance indicators (KPIs) in the delivery agreement for ministers are focused on outputs and not on outcomes, there is a lack of a baseline for some KPIs, while the signatories to one delivery agreement included the national Minister of Basic Education, the national Deputy Minister of Basic Education, the nine provincial Members of the Executive Council for Education (MECs) and an additional 17 ministers whose departments played a direct role in the improvement of basic education (Republic of South Africa, 2010:1). It would also seem that neither South Africa nor Rwanda have a policy in place to regulate the practice of signing the individual performance agreements of political executives (Akhalwaya, 2015; Musonera, 2015). All these shortcomings indicate that there has been inadequate discussion on the performance agreements of politicians.

However, it would appear that efforts were being made to strengthen the role of performance information in the political system (Moynihan, 2009; Bourdeaux, 2008, as quoted in Van Dooren & Thijs, 2010:17). In their article, Van Dooren and Thijs (2010:17) argue that such initiatives will be successful only when they acknowledge the different values of politicians and the various positions that political players assume. The researcher is of the opinion that the proper inclusion of political executives in the PMS implementation in the public service of a legitimate government may contribute to its success. Accordingly, this study made an attempt to promote this notion and, at the same time, introduce this new notion into the academic discourse in order to make scientific recommendations and also offer suggestions for future research.

The performance contracts of the permanent secretaries in Kenya are co-signed by the political executives (parent minister counter-signs and prime minister endorses) (Government of Kenya, 2010:9). Similarly, the PMS for the Namibian public service made provision for the political executives to co-sign the performance agreement for the permanent secretaries who are the head of administration (Republic of Namibia, 2014b). However, during August and

September 2015, the Government of the Republic of Namibia was discussing the development and the signing of the performance agreements by ministers and deputy ministers while, in the USA, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 was enacted to provide for the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the Federal Government and also for other purposes (USA Government, 1993).

However, this Act (USA, 1993) does not provide details on the performance agreement of political executives. In 2012 the US Government issued a document known as 'Senior Executive Service (SES) PMS Policy and Operation Procedures'. This document made it very clear that the PMS was primarily for career public servants and that the appointing authority should convey performance expectations throughout the year as well as provide guidelines for performance evaluation (USA, 2012:4).


The Social Contract for Political Accountability between politicians and citizens was initiated in the late 90s by a Philippine-based civil society organisation. However, it was found to be applicable to a small community only, namely, a village council (Areno & Sadashiva, n.d.). In this study the researcher applied the notion of the social contract in order to fit the political arrangement at the regional government level of the Republic of Namibia.

The review of the AU document finds that a proposed governance structure for performance management had been proposed by the 7th Conference of African Ministers of Public Services (7th CAMPS, 2011:23) although the literature consulted (see §§ 3.21 and 3.2.2) did not provide any details on the performance agreements of political executives and the alignment of such agreements to that of the head of administration. The PMS governance structure proposed by the 7th CAMPS (2011:23–24) includes the following bodies or committees: a Performance Management System National Oversight Committee (PMSNOC), which would be chaired by the president or vice president/prime minister, depending on the circumstances in the country, meeting on a quarterly basis; the Performance Management System Implementation Committee (PMSIC), which would be chaired by the permanent secretary to the president, meeting quarterly to provide guidance to the technical body; a Ministerial PMS Task Force (MPMSTF), chaired

by the permanent secretary/chief executive and working closely with the PMS management office in the office of the president/prime minister, and the PMS Secretariat in the office of the president/prime minister's office, which would be headed by a permanent secretary reporting to the president/prime minister or head of the public service. This should, therefore, be staffed by high level experts in PMS and include visioning, planning, budgeting, contracting (drawing up performance agreements), monitoring and measurement.

Both the Economic Report on Africa (ECA, 2011) and the 7th CAMPS (2011) identify that economic growth and development in Africa were being constrained by poor performance resulting from the inefficient utilisation of resources and an unresponsive service delivery culture. Thus, the exclusion of political executives would create disconnection in the terms of the accountability which is an integral element of a good governance system.

In Namibia, political executives are political heads or ministers of government institutions and are accountable to the President and Parliament for the overall performance of their OMAs. This role extends over a variety of areas and, thus, the political executive must carry out several functions (Heywood, 2007:359). Accordingly, the individual assessment of their functions should be formalised by means of individual performance agreement at their level. Hence, a proper inclusion of political executives in the PMS implementation in the public service of a legitimate government may contribute to its success. The existing gap is depicted by figure 3.2.



**Figure 3.2:** Political and administrative executives: the existing gap

Figure 3.2, which was devised by the researcher, illustrates the gap in the literature between the political and the administration with specific reference to the PMS framework. It is, therefore, recommended that, in the context of good governance, each level should be subjected to a PMS. This study also determined whether political executives required a different system from the bureaucratic driven system. The main focus of the study remains as indicated in chapter 1 (see § 1.3) while, as part of its contribution, the study provides additional findings related to the design and implementation of the performance agreements for political executives (see § 8.2.2).

### 3.4 EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The analysis of the existing literature or scholarship find that effective PMS implementation depends primarily on certain conditions, namely; design, leadership, policy, expertise, resources, stakeholders involvement and structure (Aguinis, 2013, 2009, 2011; Armstrong, 2006; Kaplan & Norton, 2010; Kaplan, 2010; De Waal, 2002; Nyembezi, 2009; Mothusi, 2009; Kreklow, 2006; Maphorisa, 2010; 7th CAMPS, 2011; Minnaar, 2010; Muthaura, 2009; Dzimbiri, 2008; Saravanja, 2011; Mutahaba, 2011). The methods used by these researchers were explained as the researcher presented their findings throughout this chapter.

This study focused mainly on issues around the factors which play a role in what is termed 'effective PMS implementation', namely, design, leadership, policy, expertise, resources, stakeholder involvement and structure. The review of existing scholarship identified constraints and success factors regarding the PMS implementation. The constraints and success factors identified in the existing scholarship guided the investigation of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

#### **3.4.1 Performance Management System Design**

The researcher is of the view that the design of any programme determines its success or failure. Thus, in order to conduct a proper investigation into the phenomenon under study, it was important to understand what was meant by an 'ideal PMS'. One of the writers on the subject, Aguinis (2009), identifies the following characteristics of an ideal PMS in terms of its design, namely, strategic congruencies, thoroughness, practicality, meaningfulness, specificity, reliability, validity, acceptability and fairness, inclusiveness, openness, correctability, standardisation and ethicality. The researcher defined strategic congruencies as the linkage or alignment between all milestones in the PMS process in terms of its design. For example, there should be a linkage or an alignment between the targets contained in the organisation's strategic plan, annual plan and individual plans.

Armstrong (2006:28) argues that a good PMS is achieved by, but is not limited to, the following characteristics: Firstly, new staff know what is expected of them from the outset. Secondly, everyone is clear about corporate goals and works towards them. Thirdly, objectives are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time related). Fourthly, a system exists to accommodate day-to-day performance feedback. Fifthly, the personal development plan (PDP) is used formally to help self-developmental activities and/or improve performance. Sixthly, the line manager provides support and the jobholder undertakes the training needed to support the individual and the organization. And finally, appropriate support is in place to eliminate poor performance (Armstrong, 2006:28).

Furthermore, Mutahaba's (2011:23) study on the PMS in all the African countries identified the following characteristics or categories, namely, "National Vision,

National Medium Term Development Strategy, Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), Annual Institutional Plans, Institutional Performance Contracting, Monitoring Implementation, Measuring Results at Institutional Level (Outputs and Outcomes), Measuring Results at Individual Level and Rewards and Sanction". Mutahaba (2011) bases his findings primarily on a document study and interviews which he conducted during his visits to certain African countries. In addition, Mutahaba (2011) develops a diagnostic tool to determine whether the design of the PMS frameworks of these African countries included all the characteristics or categories of what he considered constituted a complete PMS design and implementation.

A study conducted by Saravanja (2011:1) finds that an ideal or effective PMS has certain characteristics. Firstly, the performance management has to be approached from an integrated perspective. Secondly, synergy has to be created between the performance management system and strategic planning, human resources management processes, organisational culture, structure and all other major organisational systems and processes. And thirdly, individual team and organisational strategic objectives must be harmonised. Without integration, no performance management system can succeed on its own, no matter how good it may be.

In short, the analysis of the views of various writers discussed in this section indicates that there is a degree of consensus that an ideal PMS should adopt a holistic approach and also include some of the following:

First, the PMS and tools are designed to address the particular needs of the organisation. Second, the design process involves thorough consultation with major stakeholders and, in particular, with future users of the system. Third, consultation and interaction are necessary to build trust and relationships with employees and relevant stakeholders. Fourth, trust is requirement for the success of the PMS. Finally, the new PMS should be pilot tested before it is applied in the organisation.

The above-mentioned study by Saravanja (2011:1) finds that applying an incomplete system leads to "a loss of credibility, time, financial and human

resources, and increases resistance to change and low acceptance of the new PMS. People involved in the design of the system must have expertise in performance management and an understanding of the system, which often has additional negative consequence of dependency and lack of ownership of the new performance management system”.

In view of the above findings and discussions, this study endeavoured to determine whether the design of the Namibian PMS had been completed before the implementation process (see § 1.4).

### **3.4.2 Leadership**

The former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, stated that the type of leaders required by Africa are men and women of reason and who are qualified and capable of holding their own in world affairs and who may be trusted in their dealings with people and resources (UNISA, 2012). It is, thus, essential that the implementation of the PMS is supported and driven by both top leadership and management (Saravanja, 2011:2). In their study, Jooste and Fourie (2009:51) find that a lack of leadership and, specifically, strategic leadership, at the top of the organisation was one of major barriers to effective strategy implementation. Leadership occurs whenever an individual(s) attempts to influence the behaviour of an individual or a group of people (Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2008:6). It should also be noted that leadership involves directing a group of individuals or role players towards the accomplishment of a particular task (Northouse, 2001) in Naidoo (2005).

In addition, leadership is the function of the designated position and it is not passive but, rather, it is active and progressive (Nikodemus, 2009:13.) However, strategic leadership in government structures is active and progressive only if it continuously creates an enabling environment in which people know what is expected of them, they have the necessary information, resources and support and they are motivated to fulfil their functions and to learn and grow in the process (Mbigi, 2009:20). The above descriptions of leadership are all correct. However, the main point is that leadership should be active and not passive.



In successful strategy execution, Syrett (2012:82) identified the following as the roles of a leader, namely, “instilling focus and clarity; generating engagement and commitment; allocating scant resources; fostering collaboration; creating the right milestones for achievement; and managing pace”. The researcher is in agreement with this list of the roles of leader as provided by Syrett (2012) but is also of the opinion that vision, reward and sanction should be included in the as these are very important roles of the leaders in an effective organisation.

Mbigi (2009:56), who had the opportunity to assist in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service, notes that, “[e]ffective PMS implementation requires leadership which is good at influencing, directing, supporting, visioning and results-oriented. Therefore, it should be noted that a PMS cannot achieve optimum success without energetic and sustained support from the organisation’s top leadership”. This means that elected officials and executive managers need to create and communicate a vision of how the performance measures will be used and also how managers, employees, and stakeholders will benefit (Kreklow, 2006:54–55).

In addition, the researcher argues that leadership, including leadership in government, should promote a culture of learning in organisations in order to empower staff members with the new knowledge and skills required for all government decisions including the PMS. Senge (2006:10) states that leaders in learning organisations demonstrate the ability to conceptualise strategic insight so that it becomes public knowledge and is open to challenge and the further improvement of leadership.

In short, it was found that successful PMS implementation requires results-based leadership which focuses on desired results, clearly communicates expectations and targets to management and employees, consistently takes action, seeks feedback and lives in accordance with a legacy (Kaplan & Norton, 2010:30).

### **3.4.3 Regulatory Framework for a Performance Management System**

The review of existing scholarship (Maphorisa, 2010:6) finds that public sector reform involves moving people out of their comfort zones and also that it requires a regulatory framework to enforce and give it a legal basis should it be challenged

in a court of law. A regulatory framework refers to a set of acts and regulations that form the basis of making rules and guidelines and which overall direction to the planning and development of an organisation (Business Dictionary, 2011:1). In other words, a regulatory framework is simplified version of the legislation (statutory framework) which provides specific details and covers all areas intended for implementation (e.g. Charters). It is vital that a policy framework is as clear as possible in order to guide the design and implementation process, clarify the system's aims for the users and provide the basis for the assessment and evaluation of the system (Van der Waldt, 2004:292).

For example, if a staff member is not prepared to sign a performance agreement then the supervisor's decision to issue him/her with a written warning or a charge of misconduct must be based on the approved policy framework. The 7th CAMPS (2011:27) states that, to ensure that a PMS framework is effectively installed and institutionalised on a sustainable basis, it requires proper legislation that informs and guides its operation. Mothusi (2009:121) finds that the introduction of PMS Policy Framework in Botswana made it mandatory within the public service while the same applied in the United States through the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Hence, Maphorisa's definition of the PMS (2010) becomes relevant because reform requires pressure and authority to hold public servants accountable for targets set at all levels. Sharing the lessons he learnt from Kenya, Muthaura (2009:4) indicates that the absence of a legal framework to steer reform throughout the public sector had been one of the main constraints.

Based on the above discussions, it was concluded that an approved PMS policy and legislation are important to provide a legal basis, enforce implementation and set clear roles and reporting lines.

#### **3.4.4 Resources and Expertise**

For the purpose of this study 'resources' refers to both human and financial resources while expertise refers to the skill, knowledge and attitudes required to implement a PMS successfully. There is consensus among various writers on the subject (Aguinis, 2013, 2009; Armstrong, 2006; De Waal, 2002, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, in Nyembezi, 2009; Mothusi, 2009; Kreklow, 2006; Maphorisa, 2010; 7th CAMPS, 2011; Minnaar, 2010; Muthaura, 2009; Dzimbiri, 2008; Saravanja, 2011;

Mutahaba, 2011, Philip, 2012) that a PMS requires initial investments of resources for both the implementation and for ongoing administration. These include, among others, people, expertise, technology and money in order to establish and maintain a system, develop measures, collect and store data, conduct analyses and complete reports. In his doctoral study, De Waal (2002) concludes that behavioural factors play an important role in the successful implementation and use of PMSs.

Nyembezi (2009:27) advises that training should focus on the process of managing, motivating and evaluating employee performance. The 7th CAMPS (2011:27) argues that the successful design and installation of a PMS require a critical mass of expertise of higher order and located at a central point (President or Office of the Prime Minister), not only to lead the process of developing PMS instruments, but also to provide guidance and technical support to ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) from strategic plan formulation to the assessment of performance. Mothusi (2009:20) identifies adequate training as one of the constraints in the implementation of a PMS in Botswana and indicated that it is critical for successful implementation. Accordingly, this study attempted to ascertain and analyse the capacity development strategy for the central team at OPM and PMS coordinators in the Namibian public service (see § 1.3).

Moreover, Kreklow (2006:55) argues that PMS implementation requires skills that current staff and, especially those on the project team, either may not have or may not have used in a long time. Kreklow (2006:54) further advises that top management requires the support of a small number of internal champions to ensure that performance management actually happens. One of the research objectives (see § 1.3) of this study was to ascertain whether the PMS champions in the Office of the Prime Minister and in the OMAs and RCs were fully trained to support both senior managers and operational staff in the Namibian public service. Lambeth (2007:20) argues that the facilitators and technology used during the process exert a significant influence on the implementation of the PMS.

In support of the above, Muthaura (2009:10) argues that capacity building is key to creating the critical mass, sustaining change and cascading strategic intents at all levels of public institutions. Apart from training it is also essential to determine

whether there is an incentives scheme for the core teams (staff members at the central government who are charged with the design of the system and support to other public servants etc.) in order to ensure continuity. Hersey et al. (2008:43) maintain that managers have to know their people to understand what motivates them and that they must not merely make assumptions.

The analysis of the views of various writers in the field (Aguinis, 2013, 2009, 2011; Armstrong, 2006; Kaplan & Norton, 2010; Mothusi, 2009; Kreklow, 2006; Maphorisa, 2010; 7th CAMPS 2011; Minnaar, 2010; Muthaura, 2009; Dzimbiri, 2008; Saravanja, 2011; Mutahaba, 2011; Philip, 2012) identify the following as major skills required for an effective PMS: leadership, new ways of thinking, system thinking, strategic planning, costing and budgeting, performance indicators, key results areas, core management competences, performance agreements, communication of results and feedback, and the monitoring and evaluation of the system. In addition, Saravanja (2011:2) advises that “especially emphasis should be given to soft skills and the behavioural aspects of performance”. Thus, this study analysed the expertise and rate of turnover among the core teams at the Office of the Prime Minister in Namibia (see § 1.3).

### **3.4.5 Stakeholder Involvement**

In the context of this study the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to all interested parties who played a major role or who were affected by the implementation of PMS in the Namibian public service. These included, among others, politicians, unions, staff members at all levels, the Public Service Commission, members of the public, NGOs and so forth. The involvement of people at the grass root was considered because the development embedded in the strategic plans of the various OMAs and RCs required their inputs and support during the implementation process. The 7th CAMPS (2011:29) states that, to be able to achieve the intended results, the adoption of a PMS should not only involve technical staff in the public service but all stakeholders, including politicians, senior public servants, non-government organisations and members of the general public (see § 1.3).

Bryson (2004:22) notes that the term ‘stakeholder’ has assumed a prominent position in non-profit management theory and practice over the previous 20 years and more especially so in the last decade. In addition, Bendheim and Graves

(1998:4) and Rowley (1997:10) agree that all the factors involved in a PMS are influenced by the overarching effect of multiple stakeholders. Lambeth (2007:6) supports this notion by identifying key principles that may lead to a successful implementation of change in an organisation, namely, involve and obtain the support from people within the system at all times and communicate as early, openly and fully as possible.

In short, the review of existing scholarship confirmed that stakeholder involvement is one of the success factors for an effective PMS implementation (Aguinis, 2009, 2011; De Waal, 2002, 2003, 2007; Kreklow, 2006). This is true not only for the implementation of a PMS but for all government and non-government policy or projects. The researcher's view is that the type of dominant leadership at the central point (core team) may well influence the level of stakeholder involvement. For example, autocratic leadership may not see the need to consult stakeholders but rather to decide on their behalf.

#### **3.4.6 Implementation Structure(s)**

Implementation structures in the context of this study refer to oversight committees or bodies established to manage the PMS implementation process at the central point (OPM) and the OMAs level. The 7th CAMPS (2011:22) proposes that institutional arrangements should involve the setting up of oversight bodies that would provide overall guidance, review reports and make decisions on broad resource allocations at various stages of the PMS implementation process. It further stated that these bodies should operate as committees and that they should meet from time to time. The members would include senior politicians and senior members of the administrative staff.

The view of Jooste and Fourie (2009) and Saravanja (2011) regarding top leadership support is important because committees may sometimes not have sufficient authority or not sufficiently representative to be able to make decisions which affect the entire implementation process. Learning from good practices, the 7th CAMPS (2011:23) proposes a PMS governance structure (see § 3.3). It further advised that the committees should all be staffed by high level experts in PMS including visioning, planning, budgeting, contracting (drawing up performance agreements), monitoring and measurement (7th CAMPS, 2011:23–24).

In short, effective support structures were identified in this section as one of the success factors required for an ideal PMS implementation process. Accordingly, this study endeavoured to find out whether there were supportive structures in place for the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service and whether they were providing service at the required level.

#### **3.4.7 Performance Assessment of Employees**

There are various definitions of the term 'performance assessment'. In addition, the term is used to refer to different contexts, be it education or industry. For example, the University of California (2008) views performance assessment as an opportunity to summarise the contributions of employees over the entire appraisal period (usually one year). In the context of this study, the term 'performance assessment' was used to describe the processes of the quarterly reviews and end of year appraisals of individual performance as per the agreed targets stipulated in the performance agreements. Republic of Namibia (2006a) defines a quarterly review as formal discussions held between the supervisor and a staff member during the course of the year to identify progress and shortcomings and together to propose corrective measures. On the other hand, an appraisal is an end year summative assessment which involves the rating of the overall performance of the staff members. Nyembezi (2009:27) argues that a performance appraisal forms part of the overall process only and it is important for managers to understand it within its wider context and not as a 'quick fix' solution.

According to Douglas McGregor (in Armstrong 2006:101), the "emphasis should be shifted from appraisal to analysis. This implies a more positive approach whereby both the supervisor and staff become active in the whole process to identify weakness, strengths and potentials". Saravanja (2011:2) points out that it is imperative that the PMS implementation be continuously monitored, thus enabling problems to be detected at an early stage to ensure prompt corrective action. Thus, monitoring systems must be developed ensure that information is systematically collected, analysed and interpreted and then used in the decision-making process.

Based on the above views expressed by various writers, it was concluded that the primary purpose of an annual performance assessment or appraisal is to

summarise and rate the performance of an organisation and individual as per pre-determined targets, whereas quarterly reviews at the individual level comprise coaching sessions. The main aim of performance assessment is to ascertain whether staff members are well trained and whether they perceive the PMS process as fair because it may adversely affect the whole PMS if it is not regarded as such.

#### **3.4.8 The PMS Implementation: Rewards and Sanction**

The researcher's view is that the above discussions on performance assessment are meaningless if performance assessment is not linked to either a reward for or recognition of good performance and/or corrective actions or sanctions for poor performance. In their various studies Saravanja (2011:2); Neilson, Martin and Powers (2008:1) and White on Human Resources Management in Nyembezi (2009:27) find that a lack of rewards or motivation was one the main reasons why performance management fails. The researcher is of the opinion that it is essential that rewards are known beforehand and agreed upon by all stakeholders in order to promote transparency and consistency. Poor performance requires action on the part of managers with the aim of improving and assisting the relevant employees. Punitive measures are the last resort that managers have at their disposal should performance not improves to the required standard.

The 7th CAMPS (2011:18) argues that a final and critical element of the PMS is the element of rewarding good results and imposing sanctions on poor performers both during and at the end of the performance cycle. Armstrong (2006) in Kantema (2007:27) asserts that the development of a fair and transparent reward system is a crucial aspect in ensuring an effective PMS. In addition, the reward system should reward people fairly, equitably and consistently in accordance with their value to the organisation and, thus, assist the organisation to achieve its strategic goals. Armstrong (2006:20) further argues that the aims of reward management are to

... reward people according to what the organisation values and wants to pay; reward people for the value they create; develop a performance culture; motivate people and obtain their commitment and engagement; help to attract and retain high quality people that the organisation needs;

develop a positive employment relationship; operate fairly; apply equitably; function consistently; and operate transparently.

Based on the above discussions it was concluded that both reward and sanctions are powerful tools which support the effective implementation of a PMS. Accordingly, this study attempted to ascertain whether this was, indeed, the case during the analysis and interpretation of the research results (see § 7.5.4.1). It was also concluded that, if rewards and sanctions are not in place, then it is not possible for the system to have been implemented properly.

### **3.5 CONSTRAINTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

This section is linked to the factors discussed in chapter 2 (see § 2.2.3). The review of existing literature or scholarship on the subject of PMS indicated certain constraints that required attention at all levels. One of the African Union consultants on the issue, Maphorisa (2010:10), identifies the following as some of the global major challenges hampering the PMS implementation, namely, public sector development as a process; impatience to see quick results; lack of alignment and consistency in performance-related values; lack of clear roles and responsibilities; lack of institutional capacity and structures; lack of clarity about results and agenda; inadequate linkages of programmes to results; inadequate linkages of budget to programmes; the lack of a link between activities and programme outcomes; and an inability to establish such linkage.

In reviewing selected literature on PMS, Maphorisa (2010:11) identifies the following missing components in the implementation of a PMS: a focus on citizens and results; openness about performance agenda; willingness to risk; accountability; trust and relationships between stakeholders; leadership and government of the day; no 'burning platform' (compelling situation); and people feeling comfortable with the status quo.

Reflecting on the discussion on constraints and success factors, it is clear that consensus exists that either a lack or a shortage of relevant expertise hampers policy implementation, including the implementation of a PMS. Van Zyl (2011:2), a



Namibian economist, reported in one of the daily newspapers that the “shortage of skilled manpower will continue to haunt Namibia for years to come”. This study highlights the importance the fact that an effective implementation process of a PMS requires skilled employees to design and lead the implementation process.

In his study on PMSs in senior secondary schools in Botswana, Philip (2011:vi) identifies the following constraints, namely: the system did not match what the teachers valued; school staff did not possess the required skills to implement a PMS; lack of confidence on the part of school managers when leading the PMS; resourcing constraints and increasing resistance on the part of staff while the cascading approach from the head office encountered blockages between the regional offices and the schools. In addition, some of the major problems experienced included the fact that the level of expertise of the trainers diminished at each level of the cascade and the attempt to implement a PMS in an environment that was different from the environment where the system had originated. Similar findings were reported by Machingambi (2013) in “Teachers’ perceptions on the Implementation of the performance management system in Zimbabwe”. A lack of knowledge about system implementation was one the main constraints identified by Aguinis (2013:ix).

Moreover, the constraints reported by the Government of Kenya (Kenya, 2010) includes transfers in the middle of the performance contract period; the merger and split of government ministries during the implementation process; problems associated with the implementation of reforms in the judiciary and the legislature because of the doctrine of the separation of powers; the absence of a legal framework to steer the PMS throughout the public sector and inadequate capacity to cascade it to all levels in public institutions.

In short, the above discussions identified some of the constraints regarding the implementation process of a PMS. These constraints include, but are not limited to the following, namely; lack of integration; absence of a policy framework, design challenges; lack of leadership support; implementation failure; incompetence; lack of reward; communication challenges; inspiration challenges; lack of monitoring and lack of evaluation. Thus, by investigating the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service, this study included the identification of both constraints

and success factors during the collection and interpretation of the data and the discussion of the research results (see §§ 7.4 and 7.5).

### **3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The study observed a growth in both implementation research and PMS scholarship in various fields of studies. Implementation research originated in the 1960s and is still growing despite allegations that it is either dead or no longer relevant. Not all such research has been in the field of policy studies with the majority of the implementation research studies being qualitative and comprising case studies due to the nature of their research questions (Saetren, 2014). The definition of the term 'implementation' using the word 'stage' resulted in the loss of a holistic perspective in the policy making process. It is important to note that the study found that there is no consensus on the best approach to policy implementation.

In addition, it emerged from the study that there are different views on the origin of PMS in either the public or the private sector. However, the most convincing arguments are those which indicate that the public sector led the way in terms of innovation in PMS methods up until the early 1940s (e.g. performance budgeting and military strategy). The PMS body of knowledge is growing very quickly, in particular in the public sector where attempts are being made to adopt frameworks that were designed either for the private sector or for profit oriented organisations (e.g. the balanced scorecard).

Moreover, the existing PMS frameworks do not include political executives and any attempts which have been made to include political executives have not been adequate. It was also possible to observe a trend of similar findings regarding constraints and success factors in both implementation and PMS research (see chapters 2 and 3). The use of a mixed method approach is used primarily in research into policy implementation and PMSs. This, in fact, was taken into account in this study because it had helped previous researchers to arrive at valid, reliable and trustworthy findings (see §§ 2.2.3; 2.2.4; 3.4 and 3.5). The next chapter, chapter 4, investigates the regulative system for PMS implementation in the Namibian public service.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE REGULATIVE SYSTEM FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NAMIBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter presented the discussion on the existing scholarship on the PMS using a thematic or constructs approach. This chapter presents a macro-analysis of the existing regulations in the context of the PMS in the Namibian public service. This analysis is important to the study because it provides a legal basis for the system. This is critical should the system be challenged in a competent labour court. The legality of the system is also important as it helps those in leadership positions to enforce its implementation at all levels in the public service.

#### **4.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 1990 (AS AMENDED)**

The Republic of Namibia was established as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary state founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all, according to Article 1(1) of the Namibia Constitution as amended (Republic of Namibia, 1990a). In terms of Article 1(6), the Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Namibia. Furthermore, Article 95 of the Namibian Constitution mandates government to promote the welfare of its people. The main organs of the State shall be the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary (Article 1(3)). According to Article 27(2), the executive power of the Republic of Namibia shall be vested in the President and the Cabinet. In line with the third amendment of the Namibian Constitution, Article 27 makes provision for the position of Vice-President. The Vice-President shall be appointed by the President from the elected members of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 28(b)).

Based on the third Constitutional amendment, the Cabinet shall consist of the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, and such other Ministers as the President may appoint from the members of the National Assembly, including

members nominated under Article 46(1)(b) thereof, for the purpose of administering and executing the functions of the Government. In the context of the PMS, Article (28)(2A)(b) states that the Vice-President shall deputise, assist and advise the President in the performance of his or her duties as may be required by the President, to whom he or she shall be accountable. The third Constitutional amendment (Act No. 8 of 2014:7) Article (36) provides that the Prime Minister shall be the leader of Government business in Parliament, shall co-ordinate the work of the Cabinet as head of administration, and shall [advise and assist] perform other functions as may be assigned by the President or the Vice-President in the execution of the functions of Government.

In addition, Article (41) of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, provides that “[a]ll Ministers shall be accountable individually for the administration of their own ministries and collectively for the administration of the work of the Cabinet, both to the President and to the Parliament” (Republic of Namibia, 1990a). In terms of Articles 27, 28, 36 and 41 of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, accountability is ensured at the political and not only the administrative levels. The PMS is one of many tools that may facilitate the realisation of an effective accountability across the public service.

The implementation of a PMS requires financial support at the national level. Article 126(1) mandates the Minister in charge of the Department of Finance to, at least once every year and thereafter at such interim stages as may be necessary, to present for consideration by the National Assembly estimates of revenue and expenditure for the prospective financial year. However, it is imperative for the purposes of this investigation to ascertain whether the budget is approved on time in order to ensure that all Government programmes start on 1 April of each financial year. It was also important to find out how monitoring is built in the ministers’ accountability reports to Cabinet and Parliament and how this cascades to the administrative arm of the executive branch.

In Namibia, the Prime Minister (PM) is the political head of administration (see Article 36 above). In the context of this study, it was important to determine whether the Prime Minister was involved in the design and implementation of the PMS in the public service because strong political support is critical for the

successful implementation of a PMS. An effective PMS is expected to bring about improvements in the public service in terms of the planning processes, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation which eventually contribute to the provision of quality public goods and services.

In addition, the lessons from other African countries (African Union Commission, 2011:12) indicate that the PMS implementation framework should be linked to a country's National Vision and Development Plans. The Namibian Constitution, in Article 129(1) makes provision for the establishment of a National Planning Commission (NPC) which shall be tasked with planning the priorities and direction of national development. Article 129(2) of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, provides that there shall be a director-general of Planning, appointed by the President, and who shall be the head of the National Planning Commission and adviser to the President in regard to all matters pertaining to economic planning and who shall attend Cabinet meetings at the request of the President (Republic of Namibia, 1990a).

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (Article 40), as amended, the members of the Cabinet shall carry out the following functions (Republic of Namibia, 1990a:26-27):

- To direct, coordinate and supervise the activities of Ministries and Government departments, including parastatals, and to review and advise the President and National Assembly on the desirability and wisdom of any prevailing subordinate legislation, regulations or orders pertaining to such parastatals, regard being had to the public interest;
- To initiate bills for submission to the National Assembly;
- To formulate, explain and assess for the National Assembly the budget of the State and its economic development plans and to report to the National Assembly;
- To carry out such other functions as are assigned to them by law or which are incidental to such assignment;
- To attend meetings of the National Assembly and to be available for the purpose of any queries and debates pertaining to the legitimacy, wisdom, effectiveness and direction of Government policies;

- To take such steps as are authorised by law to establish such economic organisations, institutions and parastatals on behalf of the State as are directed or authorised by law;
- To formulate, explain and analyse for the Members of the National Assembly the goals of Namibian foreign policy and its relations with other States and to report to the National Assembly thereon;
- To formulate, explain and analyse for the Members of the National Assembly the directions and content of foreign trade policy and to report to the National Assembly thereon;
- To assist the President in determining what international agreements are to be concluded, acceded to or succeeded to and report to the National Assembly thereon;
- To advise the President on the state of national defence and the maintenance of law and order and to inform the National Assembly thereon;
- To issue notice, instructions and directives to facilitate the implementation and administration of laws administered by the Executive, subject to the terms of this Constitution or any other law;
- To remain vigilant and vigorous for the purpose of ensuring that the scourges of apartheid, tribalism and colonialism do not again manifest themselves in any form in a free and independent Namibia and to protect and assist disadvantaged citizens of Namibia who have historically been the victims of these pathologies.

The Constitution is clear about who should provide direction in terms of planning in the country. It was, thus deemed to be important to find out how the NPC was directing planning, including the PMS framework in terms of strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation. It is the researcher's opinion that the NPC should be fully involved in the design process of the PMS in order to ensure alignment in terms of the frameworks and timeline of all plans at all levels.

In short, the above discussion confirmed that the introduction of a PMS into the Namibian public service had its roots in the Constitution which is the Supreme Law of the country (see the third paragraph of this section). Above all, the analysis of

the Namibian Constitution, as amended (Namibian Constitution Third Amendment Act No. 8 of 2014) confirmed that proper accountability requires, among others, effective leadership at both the political and the administrative levels and also appropriate legal instruments to ensure compliance with the Constitution.

### **4.3 THE ACTS GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE IN NAMIBIA**

The Namibian public service is governed, inter alia, in accordance with the Public Service Act (Act 13 of 1995), Public Service Commission Act (Act No. 2 of 1990), Labour Act (Act 11 of 2007), State Finance Act (Act 31 of 1991), and Regional Council Act (Act No. 22 of 1992). The ultimate goal of the PMS is to transform the public service of Namibia into an efficient and capable organisation which will assist Namibia to achieve the national objectives of Vision 2030 (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:10). Hence, this section will analyse how these Acts support the introduction and implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service.

#### **4.3.1 The Labour Act No. 11 of 2007**

The Labour Act is very important for the purposes of this study because of both rewards and the issue of union involvement in terms of labour relations. Section 65(1) of the Labour Act (Act No. 11 of 2007) provides that “[a]n employer must not unreasonably refuse access to the employers’ premises to an authorised representative of a trade union that is recognised as an exclusive bargaining agent under section 64”. It is on that basis that the involvement of recognised unions in the design and implementation of the PMS in the public service of Namibia was inevitable because the success of the system depended on the support from both the government and the recognised trade unions for the public workers of Namibia.

Section 12 of the Labour Act, Act No. 11 of 2007, deals with deductions and other acts concerning remuneration, while section 16 provides an explanation of ordinary hours of work. The latter was critical during the design and implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service. Reward is one of the main components of the majority of PMS frameworks and, hence, the application of section 16 of the Labour Act played an integral role during the drafting of the

reward policy in order to facilitate the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service.

#### **4.3.2 The Public Service Commission Act No. 2 of 1990**

Apart from the Labour Act No. 11 of 2007, Article (112) of the Namibian Constitution made provision for the establishment of the Public Service Commission which shall be independent and which shall act impartially. The Public Service Commission was established in terms of Act No. 2 of 1990 (Republic of Namibia, 1990b). The Commission shall advise the President and Government on any matter related to the following (Republic of Namibia, 1990b): (a) the appointment of suitable persons to specified categories of employment in the public service with special regard to the balanced structuring thereof; (b) the exercise of adequate disciplinary control over such persons in order to assure a fair administration of personnel policy; (c) the remuneration and retirement benefits of any such persons; and (d) all other matters which by law pertain to the public service (Republic of Namibia, 1990).

In the context of this study, the researcher interviewed the Chairperson of the Public Service Commission (see Respondent 13) in order to ascertain whether the Public Service Commission was fully involved in the design and implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service. This was deemed to be important as the Commission could be required to deal with grievances arising from appraisal and rewards. According to section 7(1)(a) of the Public Service Commission Act (Act No. 2 of 1990), the Public Service Commission is empowered to summon any person who, in its opinion, may be able to provide material information concerning the subject of an inquiry held by the Commission in terms of section 8(2). It was, thus, crucial for the Public Service Commission to be involved in the design and implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service in order to advise on issues related to employment in the public service.

#### **4.3.3 Public Service Act No.13 of 1995**

The Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995) provides for the establishment, management and efficiency of the public service, the regulation of employment, conditions of service, discipline, retirement and discharge of staff members in the



public service, and other incidental matters (Republic of Namibia,1995a). Most importantly, sections 34 and 35 of the Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995) empower the Prime Minister to make regulations and issue staff rules on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission and that are binding on all Offices, Ministries and Agencies in order to promote efficiency. In addition, the Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995) provides that, notwithstanding any other powers conferred or duties imposed upon a permanent secretary by or under the Act or any other law, he or she shall be subjected to the control and directions of the President, the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned.

In the context of this study, section 11 of the Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995) provides for the following as functions of the permanent secretaries appointed in the Namibian public service:

- Advise the President, the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned, as the case may be, on policy formulation and the implementation thereof, and shall brief the President, the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned, as the case may be, on all major issues affecting the functioning of his or her office, ministry or agency; and
- Be accountable for:
  - The efficient management and administration of his or her office, ministry or agency;
  - The proper functional training and utilization of staff members in his or her office, ministry or agency;
  - The maintenance of discipline in his or her office, ministry or agency; and
  - The proper use and care of all property under the control of his or her office, ministry or agency.

In addition, Article 43 of the Constitution, as amended, makes provision for the President to appoint the Secretary to Cabinet who shall perform such functions as may be determined by law and also such functions as are, from time to time, assigned to the Secretary by the President or the Prime Minister.

Furthermore, section 10 of Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995) provides for the functions of the Secretary to the Cabinet which include, among others:

- Be the head of the public service and shall, subject to the control and directions of the Prime Minister, exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred or imposed upon him or her by or under this Act or any other law
- Coordinate permanent secretaries in the performance of their functions
- Be responsible to the Prime Minister for the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service, and
- Ensure that technical and administrative support is provided to the Commission to enable it to perform the functions entrusted to it by or under this Act or any other law.

It is against that background that the researcher decided to study progress reports and to interview the PMS coordinators and facilitators in order to determine the involvement of the Secretary to Cabinet in providing direction to and ensuring accountability in the design and implementation process of the PMS throughout the public service of the Republic of Namibia. It was deemed to be important to determine whether the slow implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service was due to a lack of leadership and accountability at both the political and the administrative levels. The researcher had no doubt that the PMS in the Namibian public service should have been successful, because it has a legal basis in terms of both the Constitution and the Public Service Act No. 13 of 1995 (Republic of Namibia, 1990a, 1995a).

#### **4.3.4 State Finance Act No. 31 of 1990**

An effective PMS requires both human and financial resources (African Union Commission, 2011). Thus, it is essential that the budget is shaped by and linked to plans of the organ of state (Van der Walddt, 2004:20). In Namibia the State Finance Act No. 31 of 1990 provides guidelines for budgeting and spending and the accountability thereof.

In the context of this study, an attempt was made to determine whether the budget was linked to the strategic plans of the public service and made available on time

and whether accountability was fully ensured throughout the public service (see § 7.3.2). In order to curb unauthorised expenditure, section 25(1)(b) of the Act mandates the Auditor-General to investigate, examine and audit the account books, accounts, registers or statements which are to be kept or prepared in terms of any law in connection with the collection, receipt, custody, banking, payment or issue of money, stamps, securities, equipment and stores by any statutory institution and which are, in terms of any law, to be investigated, examined and audited by the Auditor-General. Apart from the Auditor's functions, it was also important for the purposes of the study to find out if there was a balance between donor funding and the government budget because there is always a possibility of focus almost exclusively on one and underspending on the other.

#### **4.4 CHARTERS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY**

There are three important charters that provide standards or guidelines for service delivery in the Namibian public service, namely, the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration (2011), the Namibian Public Service Charter (2012) and a Customer Service Charter which is expected to be developed by each Office, Ministry and Agency (OMAs). The researcher's view is that the performance standards of each Customer Service Charter are very important for any PMS because they not only provide guidance in the development of KPIs for individual performance agreements, but they also help an organisation to respond to its customers' requirements.

##### **4.4.1 The African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration (2011)**

In an effort to modernise the administration and to strengthen capacity for the improvement of public service in Africa, the African Union (AU) Member States agreed to develop a charter on values and principles for public service and administration. This Charter was officially signed in 2011. Nairobi, Kenya and Namibia were all signatories with Namibia being represented by the Deputy Prime Minister, Hon. Marco Hausiku. According to Article 3 of the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, the Member States agreed to implement the Charter in accordance with the following principles:

- Equality of all users of public service and administration
- The prohibition of all forms of discrimination on any basis, including place of origin, race, gender, disability, religion, ethnicity, political opinion, membership of a trade union or any other lawful organisation
- Impartiality, fairness and due process in the delivery of public services
- Continuity of public service under all circumstances
- Adaptability of public service to the needs of users
- Professionalism and ethics in public service and administration
- Promotion and protection of the rights of users and public service agents
- Institutionalising a culture of accountability, integrity and transparency in public service and administration, and
- Effective, efficient and responsible use of resources (African Union Commission, 2011:4).

Article 20 of this Charter was deemed to be important for the purposes of this study as it focuses on the performance management of public service agents and provides that: (a) State parties shall institute a performance culture within the public service and administration; (b) Public service agents shall undergo a process of performance management based on clear and measurable criteria; and (c) State parties shall carry out continuous monitoring and evaluation to assess the performance of public service agents in order to determine their promotional requirements, development needs, levels of efficiency and productivity (African Union Commission, 2011:10).

It is against that background that this study attempted to determine whether the Namibian Government was implementing the Charter as agreed, including the design and implementation of a PMS in the public service. It would appear that the need for a PMS in public service is recognised throughout the African continent (African Union Commission, 2011).

#### **4.4.2 The Namibian Public Service Charter (2012)**

Article (95) of the Namibian Constitution, as amended, provides that the State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people. The Namibian Public Service Charter, which contains nine general principles, was launched by

the Founding President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, in 1997. The Namibian Public Service Charter has since been reviewed and now consists of ten general principles. These principles were part of the wider programme of reform designed to provide professional, efficient, effective and economic public services (Republic of Namibia, 2012b). The ten general principles of the latest version of the Namibian Public Service Charter are discussed below:

- **Standards.** Set, publish and monitor clear standards of service which a public servant should uphold.
- **Courtesy and helpfulness.** Provide a courteous and helpful service suitable to the convenience of those entitled to the service.
- **Accountability.** Provide details of performance against targets and identify who is responsible. Such services are being provided by public servants who may be identified readily by their customers as they should be wearing name badges. To ensure that public servants are accountable for their actions at all times.
- **Non-discrimination.** Ensure that services are available and provided equally and fairly to all.
- **Value for money.** Provide efficient, effective and affordable public services.
- **Information.** Provide information about public services in a prompt, straightforward and open manner that is readily understandable.
- **Consultation and participation.** Ensure that there is regular consultation and communication with service users and, taking their views and priorities into account, provide a choice wherever possible.
- **Transparency.** Disclose how public services are managed together with the cost and performance of specific services which are open to public scrutiny in all actions taken in public office.
- **Quality of service.** Publicise straightforward feedback procedures. Where errors have been made, provide an apology, a full explanation and an early correction of the error.
- **Accessibility.** Ensure accessibility to public service by accommodating the service needs of our service users (Republic of Namibia, 2012).

The researcher is of the opinion that the above ten principles of the Namibian Public Service Charter are important in terms of the new culture which public servants are expected to demonstrate as they execute their duties and also to guide Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) in the selection of the core values for their strategic plans. In addition, the principles provide guidelines for the public service practices that are critical for the attainment of the National Vision 2030. For example, it is essential that the public service observe both equity and accessibility in terms of resources allocation in the country.

#### **4.4.3 The Customer Service Charter (2011)**

Discussions with the staff members in the Office of the Prime Minister (20 January, 2015) revealed that only a few of OMAs have developed Customer Service Charters in the Namibian public service. These documents are expected to set out the specific standards of service which each OMA promises to deliver to its customers. These Charters draw on the ten general principles of the Public Service Charter (Republic of Namibia, 2012c:1). *The pocket guide: Being a public servant* (Republic of Namibia, 2011b:90) indicates that each Customer Service Charter should highlight the following:

- What services are offered by the OMA concerned
- What standards of service each OMA aims to meet
- What OMAs expect from the public to ensure that service standards may be met as promised in the Customer Service Charter in question.

The Customer Service Charter also explains to whom the customer should speak if s/he wishes to compliment or complain about the standard of service rendered by the OMA concerned (Republic of Namibia, 2011b:91). For the purpose of this study, Customer Service Charters were deemed to be crucial because they provide the performance standards that guide the development of KPIs.

#### **4.5 THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT POLICY (2011)**

The analysis of the existing legislation revealed that the introduction of the PMS in the Namibian public was guided only by what is termed 'The PMS Principles and Framework' document of 2006 and which combines both policy issues and

guidelines (Republic of Namibia, 2006). The implementation process of the PMS had started without a specific policy and all the PMS coordinators and facilitators interviewed were questioning its legality. The Performance Management Policy for the Namibian public service was only developed and approved in 2011. The Performance Management Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2011a) section (2)(2.1) contains the policy statement that “[i]t is the policy of the Government of the Republic of Namibia for each Office, Ministry, Agency and Regional Council to have a functional PMS in place. This is not only meant for managing performance, but also for the public service of Namibia to be able to account to the citizenry in respect of the delivery of effective and efficient public service” (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:8).

As regards section (2)(2.2) of the Performance Management Policy, the purpose of the policy is:

- To enforce and support the implementation of the PMS as an integral part of a performance culture in the public service. The PMS Policy:
  - Formalises the PMS as a core business process and competency
  - Provides directives on how to manage the PMS within each Office, Ministry, Agency or Regional Council
  - Protects both parties to the employment contract, namely, management and employees, in terms of their mutual rights and obligations, and
  - Creates and ensures consistency in the practice of performance management at all levels in the public service (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:8).

Most importantly, the policy provides directives on its management within each Office, Ministry, Agency or Regional Council (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:8). Furthermore, section (5)(5.1) of the Performance Management Policy (2011) outlines a generic performance management process which is based on a progressive cascade from national to individual objectives, and covering the following:

- Vision 2030, which drives Namibia’s long-term development strategy

- National Development Plans, which define the five yearly objectives in order to implement Vision 2030
- Strategic and Annual Plans, which are aligned to National Development Plans and the Medium-term Expenditure Frameworks
- Performance Agreements and Personal Development Plans
- Quarterly reviews and annual assessments, and
- Continuous leadership of staff and management of performance (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:10–11).

In the context of this study, the Performance Management Policy (2011) of the Namibian public service did not, however, make any provision for individual performance agreements at the political executive level. However, section 10 of the PMS Policy does make provision for the accountabilities and responsibilities of the Prime Minister, Ministers and accounting officers in the implementation process of the PMS. For example, subsection 10.1 provides that the Prime Minister is responsible for reporting to Cabinet on the annual performance of the public service while sub-section 10.2 provides that Ministers are individually accountable for reporting on the performance of their respective Office, Ministry and Agency (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:15-16).

In short, the PMS policy was approved four years after the commencement of its implementation process and, thus, this study attempted to discover whether the absence of such policy had contributed to the slow implementation process (see § 7.5.4.4).

#### **4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The review of the existing legislation, policies, acts and charters revealed that there had been no PMS policy in place at the introduction of the PMS in the Namibian public service in 2006. The implementation process did, however, have legal support in terms of the Constitution and the Public Service Act (Act No. 13 of 1995), because they both make provision for both political and administrative accountabilities through Cabinet and Parliament. Although a PMS did have support from the Namibian Constitution, as amended, Article (41) and the new notion was introduced at the political level, it was found that there had been



inadequate discussion and that no policy was in place to regulate the practice at the political level.

The existing PMS Policy and frameworks (Republic of Namibia, 2006) tend to focus on the administration arm of the Government, namely: the Secretary to Cabinet, supervisor of all permanent secretaries, permanent secretaries (PSs) and Chief Regional Officers (CROs) who are the heads of administration in each Office, Ministry, Agency and Regional Council in the Namibian public service. The Public Service Act, Act 13 of 1995, section 10(b) did not confer on the Secretary to Cabinet the power to supervise the permanent secretaries but only to coordinate their functions. The signing of the performance agreements for the permanent secretaries by the Secretary to Cabinet as their supervisor may require an amendment to the act in order to enforce the practice and to provide it with legality in a competent labour court.

Chapter 5 focuses on the research design and methodology that was used in the study.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter outlines the research design and methods which the study used in accordance with the research process and theoretical framework (Saunders et al., 2003:139). Saunders et al. (2003:139) define the research process as “a way of depicting the issues underlying your choice of data collection method or methods which peeled away the outer two-layer research philosophies and research approaches”. The purpose of this study was to identify achievements, constraints and success factors in the implementation process of the PMS for the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. It was anticipated that the study would make a contribution to the existing scholarship on both policy implementation and PMSs (see § 8.2.5). In order to understand and determine the issues underlying the PMS implementation process, the study focused on all 44 government institutions, namely, OMAs and RCs, during phase one while nineteen respondents were purposively selected during the second phase of the data collection process of the study (see § 5.5).

The study involved implementation research (process) and used the mixed methods approach during the data collection and data analysis processes. Although the word ‘methodology’ has been defined differently, the researcher supports the view that it refers to a body of practices, procedures, and rules used by those who work in a discipline or engage in an inquiry or a set of working methods (Saunders et al., 2003; Strauss et al., 1998). The five layers that underpinned this study included the research paradigm, research design, time horizons, sampling strategy and methods for data collection and data analysis (Saunders et al., 2003).

#### **5.2 PRAGMATIC RESEARCH PARADIGM**

The term ‘paradigm’ refers to “a general organising framework for theory and research that includes basic assumptions, key issues, models of quality research and methods for seeking answers” (Neuman, 2011:94). The researcher defined a

paradigm as a way of thinking or viewing the world. Some of the research paradigms identified include positivism, realism, interpretativism or constructivism and pragmatism (Saunders et al., 2003:138, Neuman, 2011:94). This study adopted the pragmatic research paradigm. Denscombe (2010:117) defines pragmatism as “the philosophical partner for the mixed methods approach which provides a set of assumptions about knowledge and enquiry that underpins both the positivism and interpretivism philosophy”. Several implementation researchers have adopted the pragmatic philosophy approach, for example Mutahaba (2011), Saetren (2005), Hu (2012), Rosse (2000) and Palinkas et al. (2010). This study adopted a pragmatism paradigm (mixed methods) in order to understand and determine all the issues regarding the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service during 2006 to 2014.

### **5.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN**

This section addresses the following question: What type of study is undertaken in order to answer the research question? (Mouton, 2001:49). This study involved implementation research which focuses on process. Process evaluation examines the elements involved in the actual delivery of an intervention (Watson & Platt, 2000:2). Werner (2004:1) indicates that implementation research focuses on the question “What is happening?” in the design, implementation, administration, operation, services and outcomes of social programmes. The main roles of implementation research were discussed in chapter 1 (see § 1.8).

Although the majority of the writers mentioned above (see § 1.8) made valuable contributions to implementation research, the researcher found that they had tended to focus on their research design rather than on methods. A study on “Mixed methods design in implementation research” conducted by Palinkas et al. (2010:44) find that the mixed method design is being increasingly used to develop a scientific base for understanding and overcoming barriers to implementation. The research question is considered to be a cornerstone in implementation research (Peters et al., 2013:2).


Thus, in view of the main research question and the research objectives of this study, it was decided to adopt an implementation research design using a mixed

method approach. As indicated in section 1.8, the study was divided into two phases during the data or information collection process.

During phase one, data or information was collected using a diagnostic tool. The PMS Director in the Office of the Prime Minister was the sole respondent in consultation with colleagues and all the PMS coordinators throughout the Namibian public service. Despite the fact that this phase involved one respondent (the PMS Director) only, the results were representative due to the involvement of the PMS Director's colleagues (PMS facilitators) and all the PMS coordinators throughout the public service. The results of this phase met the following objectives, namely: to determine the status of the PMS implementation during 2006 to 2014; to provisionally identify the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs in the implementation of the PMS across the Namibian public service during 2006 to 2014; and also to assist in identifying the respondents for phase two.

In phase two, data was collected using face-to-face interviews conducted with 18 respondents who were purposively selected from the following groups, namely: the PMS facilitators from the Office of the Prime Minister, the PMS coordinators from some of the most successful and some of the least successful OMAs and RCs, politicians, and senior managers in the Namibian public service.

In addition, the researcher used documentary sources that had been pre-reviewed in order to support both phases of the data collection process. The documentary sources included the mid-term review reports of both the EU and the ACBF (2007–2015), as well as those produced by various committees (EU, 2008, 2015, ACBF, 2005, 2010). The research was also presented in phases although one data analysis only was conducted. The figure below presents the empirical process followed in the study.



**Figure 5.1:** The empirical process of the study

**Source:** Researcher

The key to figure 5.1 is as follows:

**Theory** – studying relevant theories related to the study.

**Data** – the results as obtained from different sources with minimal interpretation.

**Meanings** – the meaning of the information after analysis, interpretations and discussions.

**New knowledge** – the contribution of the study to the existing body of scholarship in the fields of policy studies, implementation studies and PMSs.

## 5.4 TIME HORIZONS

A time horizon usually refers to either a cross-sectional or a longitudinal design (Bless, Smith & Kagee, 2006:74). A cross-sectional design refers to a research design where all the data is collected at a single point in time while a longitudinal design refers to a research design where the data collection is spaced over a period of time (Bless et al., 2006). For the purposes of this study, a cross-sectional research design with an element of longitudinal design was used because the data

was collected once off (in two phases) and covering the period 2006 to 2014 of the PMS implementation process in Namibia. Babbie (2008:111) states that “a cross-sectional study involves observations of a sample, or cross-section, of a population or phenomenon that are made at one point in time. Exploratory and descriptive studies were often cross-sectional. A single US census, for, instance, was a study aimed at describing the US population at a given time”.

In contrast, “longitudinal studies are designed to permit observations of the same phenomenon over an extended period, and data is collected at different points in time” (Babbie, 2008:112). The same viewpoint is expressed by Bless et al. (2006:34) who state that “longitudinal design refers to research designs where data collection is spaced over a period of time”. The study did not use a longitudinal research design because there was no extended period between the two phases of the data or information collection processes (see § 1.8).

## **5.5 PURPOSIVE SAMPLING STRATEGY**

Sampling is “the technique by which a sample is drawn from the population” (Bless et al., 2006:185). A purposive sampling was deemed to be appropriate for the purposes of this study because it is suited to in-depth investigations which are aimed at gaining a deeper understanding (Neuman, 2011:242). The study was conducted in two phases (phase 1 and 2). As already pointed out, during phase one the study used a mini survey and indirectly targeted all 44 government institutions (OMAs and RCs) of the Namibian public service through the Director Performance Improvement in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). This include the uniformed staff (Ministries of Defence and Safety and Security) but excluded the Kavango West Regional Council (see § 1.8).

In addition, purposive sampling was used during phase two to select respondents who were judged to meet the requirements set for the study. In other words, the researcher “handpicked” respondents on the basis of their involvement in or experience of the central phenomena being studied (Denscombe, 2010:17). The study used the purposive sampling method because only the PMS coordinators in the eight government institutions (OMAs and RCs) selected, five PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister, three senior public servants, and two politicians

were selected. The initial sampling size was 14 but, due to the emergent result design, the final sampling size comprised 19 respondents. The researcher's view was that the implementation process of the PMS could only be understood through the eyes of those involved in the process.

The process followed to purposively select eight of the 44 government institutions (31 OMAs and 13 RCs) during phase two of the data or information collection process involved, firstly, the researcher analysing the results of phase one, as presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2, as well as in the narrative, in order to determine the status of the PMS from 2006 to 2014.

Secondly, the researcher identified the most successful institutions. It was found that two OMAs and two RCs only had conducted the quarterly performance reviews as discussed in chapter 6 (see table 6.1 in § 6.2.6.1 and table 6.2 in § 6.2.6.2) of this study. The four institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) that were deemed to have been the most successful in implementing the PMS were purposively selected for phase two data of the information collection process. For the purposes of this study the most successful OMAs and RCs refer to those that had conducted quarterly reviews. It was discovered that four OMAs and RCs only (see tables 6.1 and 6.2) had, in fact, conducted quarterly reviews.

Thirdly, the researcher identified the four least successful institutions from the results of phase one. It was accordingly found that three OMAs only had managed to develop a strategic plan but that they had not drawn up either annual plans or performance agreements (see table 6.1), while two RCs only had in place strategic plans and annual plans but not performance agreements (see table 6.2). The researcher then purposively selected two of the three OMAs that had in place only strategic plans and the two RCs that had in place both strategic and annual plans. These four institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) were then deemed to be the least successful for the purpose of the study.

Fourthly, the remaining 36 institutions (27 OMAs and 9 RCs) were deemed to fall into the intermediate category and nobody was interviewed from this category during phase two of the data or information collection process as the main focus of the study was on the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs in

the Namibian public service. The definitions of most successful and least successful OMAs and RCs refer to the explanations provided above.

The next section identifies and discusses the research instruments and data collection methods used in the study.

## **5.6 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

### **5.6.1 Methodological Triangulation**


The study adopted methodological triangulation as a method for data collection. Robson (1993:291) warns researchers that “[y]ou need not to be a prisoner of a particular method or technique when carrying out an inquiry, there is much to be said for multi-method enquiry”. The researcher’s understanding was that ‘multi-method enquiry’ is the same as ‘mixed method’.

Methodological triangulation refers to the use of different methods, different sources of data or even different researchers in a study. Thus, the study findings may be corroborated or questioned by comparing the data produced by the different methods (Denscombe, 2010:134–135). In other words, methodological triangulation refers to the combination of different methods during the data collection process. The advantage of triangulation is that it allows the researcher to view matters from the perspective of as many different sources as possible (Denscombe, 2010:135).

Accordingly, this study used methodological triangulation to examine a single phenomenon from the perspective of more than one source, namely: a mini survey (using a diagnostic tool), unstructured interviews, and a document study. The diagnostic tool referred to in the study was designed to cover all the PMS milestones as well as the time frame (2006 to 2014) targeted by the study to determine the number of OMAs and RCs that had met a specific PMS milestone (see Appendix 1).

It is worth noting that methodological triangulation is used to validate the data collected and to improve the accuracy of the data – see figure 5.2.





**Figure 5.2:** Methodological triangulation

It is clear from figure 5.2 (devised by the researcher) that the study adopted three methods for the data collection process. This process is referred to as “methodological triangulation” because the data relating to the phenomenon under study is derived from three main sources in the form of a triangle. More details on the use or application of the instruments as indicated in figure 5.2 are presented in the next section.

### **5.6.2 Data Gathering Techniques**

The research questions and research objectives of the study determined the data gathering techniques, namely: mini survey, document study and unstructured interview. These techniques play a very important role in the data collection process in implementation research (Palinkas et al., 2010:44). Much of the previous implementation research on PMS, for example, the studies conducted by Sabatier and Mazmanian (2005), Dzimbiri (2008), De Waal (2002), Aguinis (2009), Mutahaba (2011), Saetren (2014) and Barrett (2004) apply the survey, document study and interviews as methods of data collection. The data collection techniques used in this study are discussed in detail below in terms of how they were applied. As stated in chapter 1, section 1.8, the data collection process in this study was divided into two phases, namely, phase one and phase two.

#### 5.6.2.1 A Mini Survey

As already indicated several times, a mini survey using a diagnostic tool was used during phase one of the data collection process in this study (see Appendix 1). The study used the term 'mini survey' because the survey covered only a small but very important scope of the study. The diagnostic tool of the mini survey was completed only by the PMS Director in the OPM in consultation with colleagues (the PMS facilitators) and all the PMS coordinators throughout the Namibian public service. This phase was limited to the PMS Director because it was felt that he/she was in the best position to provide accurate statistics on the degree of success, failure and causes or reasons of such perceived success or failure in the Namibian public service. In his study on the status of the PMS implementation in African countries in 2011, Mutahaba (2011) also uses this method. The PMS Director completed the mini survey in consultation with staff members who were allocated to various institutions in the public service. This is in line with what Denscombe (2003:7) states, namely, "surveys usually relate to the present state of affairs and involve an attempt to provide a snapshot of how things are at the specific time at which the data are collected".

Although the mini survey was limited to the OPM, it did, in fact, cover the whole public service as per its design (see Appendix 1). It is for this reason that the researcher used this mini survey to determine the state of the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service during phase one of the study. The researcher hand delivered the diagnostic tool to the PMS Director in the Office of the Prime Minister through the office of the permanent secretary. The information from the mini survey was used to guide the selection of respondents for the data collection process during phase two of the study.

#### 5.6.2.2 The Art of the Research Interview

Apart from the mini survey and document study, the study depended mainly on the interview as a method of data collection. It is for this reason that the researcher presented a discussion on the art of the research interview in order to clarify the development of the interview guide and its implementation. The interview is a data collection method which involves a direct conversation between the researcher and respondent(s) (Bless et al., 2006; Denscombe, 2010; Babbie, 2008).

Denscombe (2010:175) argues that, in research, interviews are used primarily to collect data. Interviews are intended, firstly, to obtain opinions, feelings, emotions and experiences on the phenomenon under study. Secondly, when there are sensitive issues, a careful and considerate approach may encourage participants to discuss personal and sensitive issues in an open and honest manner. Thirdly, interviews can help to obtain privileged information because the justification for interviews is based on the value of contact with key players in the field who are able to provide privileged information. This was the case in this study because the researcher interviewed only key players in the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service.

For example, De Waal (2007) wanted to understand the future of the balanced scorecard and, thus, he interviewed Kaplan because “he was and remains the player in the field”. The researcher was of the view that, apart from the ‘what’ and ‘why’ interview as discussed above, the design of the interview or the manner in which it is conducted is critical for its success.

The following key points that were taken into account by previous researchers (e.g. De Waal, 2002, Van Schalkwyk, 2008) include a clear introduction to the interview in terms of its purpose, who are involved, as well as the date and place where it is taking place. The signing of the consent form by the interviewee is also imperative. This may also include a consent agreement to use a recording device during the interview.

The researcher should also introduce broad issues for discussion and allow flexibility. The list of issues or broad questions may be shared with the interviewee beforehand in order to allow for effective preparation. Sarantakos (2005:278) is of the opinion that probing is very common during interviewing, either to make it easier for the respondents to answer questions or to encourage them to continue with their responses.

With regard to ending the interview, Sarantakos (2005:277) warns that “[c]are should be taken to end the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent smoothly and in a friendly atmosphere, in a spirit of trust, cooperation and mutual respect. So that the respondent feels that the contribution made to the research

and to society in general has been appreciated". Van Schalkwyk's interview with Mutahaba on 20 November 2008 ended with the words, "We are planning to first make it available online, so other people in your position in other countries can read or listen to what you have to say and perhaps gain something from the experience" (Van Schalkwyk, 2008:8).

#### 5.6.2.2.1 *The unstructured interview*

The second phase of the data collection process involved the unstructured interview as a method of data collection. The researcher conducted unstructured interviews with all nineteen respondents (19) who had been purposively selected for phase two. The respondents came from four different groups, namely: the PMS coordinators in the selected OMAs and RCs, the PMS facilitators at the Office of the Prime Minister, some senior managers who were key to the rollout of the PMS throughout the public service of Namibia (see § 5.5), and politicians. The interview guides contained preliminary questions to facilitate the discussion (see Appendices 2, 3 and 4). The literature review on the topic was the main source in the development of the interview guide. The main questions in the interview guide referred to what various writers had identified as success factors and constraints regarding policy implementation and PMSs (see §§ 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 3.4 and 3.5). The interview guide was flexible in the sense that questions could be rephrased or changed in terms of order in the light of emerging issues.

In conducting an interview, Denscombe (2010:176) advises that the interviewer should have a clear list of issues to be addressed and questions to be answered. However, flexibility in terms of the order of questions or topics should be considered and, perhaps more significantly, the interviewees should be given the opportunity to develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised by the researcher. It is important that the questions are open-ended and that there is emphasis on the interviewees elaborating on points of interest (Denscombe, 2010:176).

Although a tape recorder may distract the attention of the participants from the main points of the interview, for the purposes of this the researcher used a tape recorder and also made notes during the interviews. The recorder is useful because the researcher was able to replay it and to hear exactly what was said by

the participants. Both the recorded data and all the notes will be retained for one year after the submission of the thesis as stipulated by the Ethics Policy of the University of South Africa (UNISA) (2012).

#### 5.6.2.3 Document Analysis

The sources of documentary information included books, journals, website pages, the internet, letters, memos, diaries, government publications and official statistics (Africa Intellectual Resources, 2009). The study used documentary data because this enabled the researcher to obtain facts about the phenomenon under study (Creswell, 2003:187). The language and words used in the written documents (government publications) were used to obtain insights into the interpretations, opinions and underlying assumptions that had underpinned the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service. The study used government publications and official statistics to complement the data obtained from the survey and the interviews. The study used government publications for the following reasons (Denscombe, 2010):

- Authoritative. The data have been produced by the state which employs extensive large resources and expert professionals and, thus, it tends to have credibility.
- Factual. In the case of the statistics numbers are amendable to computer storage/analysis and also constitute 'hard facts' around which there can be no ambiguity. A list of Government documents or publications deemed relevant to the phenomenon under study was drawn up and adjusted in accordance with issues which emerged during the research process (see Appendix 6). This list consisted of already known documents and also those that were identified as the process unfolded.

### 5.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS

The term 'analysis' comes from the Greek verb *ánálusis* which means "to break apart or to resolve into its elements" (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to analyse the data because the study had adopted a mixed methods approach. Phase one used elementary quantitative techniques to analyse the data obtained from the diagnostic tool (see

Appendix 1, Question 3 and 6). Qualitative methods were also applied to analyse the data arising from some of the questions contained in the diagnostic tool in terms of themes as they emerged from the data. The procedures for the data analysis during phase one was as follows:

1. Code the diagnostic tool (questions 3 and 6) and design the data capturing sheet in Excel.
2. Enter the data into the data sheet as designed.
3. Make sure that everything has been captured correctly.
4. The rest of the questions in the diagnostic tool subjected to the qualitative procedures as explained in phase two.

Phase two used mainly qualitative data analysis methods (thematic and categories) as the themes and categories emerged from the interviews between the researcher and the respondents. The documentary information was used to supplement both phases (1 and 2). The procedures for the data analysis during phase two was as follows:

1. Data preparation, which included the organisation of the data in terms of themes or main topics of the study as well as emerging themes and topics.
2. The researcher familiarised himself with the data in order to conduct the coding and categorisation.
3. The data interpretation and discussions then happened in accordance with meanings and understanding derived from the data as supported or otherwise by the literature. This involved making sense out of the text which, in turn, included moving deeper and deeper into understanding the information, representing the results and making an interpretation of the larger meaning of the data (Creswell, 2003:190).
4. The analysis was considered to be complete when the research findings had answered the main research question and met the objectives of the study.
5. Results verification during which stage the researcher shared the findings of the study with the participants to enable them to comment on such findings.

## **5.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The issue of research ethics is very pertinent in social science research, especially where individuals are involved. Accordingly, the researcher applied for ethical clearance to conduct the study from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the College of Economic and Management Science at UNISA before the data collection process commenced. The purpose of this process was to make sure that the research would be conducted with the highest integrity and taking into account UNISA's Policy on Copyright, Infringement and Plagiarism (University of South Africa, 2012). The researcher ensured that the study was conducted ethically in terms of data collection, data analysis and dissemination of the findings by respecting the rights and dignity of the participants involved in the research project and conducting the study with honesty and integrity (Denscombe, 2010:141). In addition, at the beginning of the study the researcher was granted permission to conduct the study by the Secretary to Cabinet who was also the head of the public service (administrative level) at the time of the study (see Appendix 12). In addition, the respondents were not identified by name while a consent form was used to ensure that their rights were protected (see Appendix 5).

## **5.9 VALIDITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS MEASURES**

The researcher is of the opinion that there are quality requirements in both quantitative and qualitative studies. Accordingly, quality measures for both approaches were considered during the study which investigated the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service (Babbie & Mouton, 2011: 277; Shenton, 2004:64; James, 2008:1).

The measures for validity in the quantitative phase of the study were ensured by taking the following points into account. Firstly, with regard to the internal and external validity of the research design, the researcher took care to ensure that the methods used were suitable for the type of the study. For example, the instrument (diagnostic tool) asked what needed to be answered (research question) by the right respondents (those managing the process and who had accurate records at their disposal). The main objective of the study was not to generalise the study

results to the whole population but to obtain ideas, issues and meanings regarding the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014 (see §§ 5.5 and 5.6.2.2.1).

Secondly, the validity of the data gathering instrument is important. Accordingly, the researcher made sure that the data gathering instrument (diagnostic tool) had been pre-tested and that it covered all the key areas of the study as well as all the government institutions of the Namibian public service to ensure a link between the data collection instruments and consistency in their application (see § 5.6.2.1).

The researcher also took care that the qualitative phase or aspects took into account complied with a number of criteria to ensure the trustworthiness of the study findings.

Firstly, credibility; to ensure the credibility of the study the researcher employed well-recognised research methods and triangulated the mini survey (using a diagnostic tool), unstructured interviews and document study. The majority of the key informants had been involved in the PMS implementation process as part of their daily jobs in the public service. A list of documents was drawn up and only government publications or documents that were subjected to review were considered as authentic for the purposes of the study (e.g. minutes of meetings, annual reports, policies and so forth).

The second criterion to take into account is dependability. This entails ensuring the reliability or the stability of the data over time and in different context and conditions. The researcher used triangulation as discussed above as well as an in-depth methodological description to help future researchers to obtain similar findings.

The third criterion related to conformability. To ensure objectivity or an agreement between two or more people reviewing the findings for accuracy and meaning, the researcher again used methodological triangulation as well as an in-depth methodological description. Most importantly, elements of the thesis were validated by some of the respondents.



Finally, authenticity is important. To ensure that the participants' experiences were faithfully and fairly described, the researcher applied the techniques as described above. Authenticity is achieved only if the participants objectively agree with what has been reported in the study about their lived experiences.

## **5.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter outlined the research design or plan which guided the investigation into the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service. The study was guided by the pragmatic research paradigm and employed a mixed method approach. The phenomenon of a PMS is a sensitive issue in developing countries in terms of the readiness level to give and receive both positive and negative feedback about implementation. An effective investigation required the researcher to apply various research methods (triangulation) in order to determine issues underlying the implementation process of the PMS in Namibian public service. Accordingly, this study used different data or information collection techniques to investigate this implementation process.

As already indicated in the previous sections, the data collection techniques used included a mini survey using a diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1), documentary sources (see Appendix 6), and unstructured interviews (see Appendices 2, 3 and 4). The questions that were posed during the interviews were aimed at obtaining information on the following: achievements, constraints, success factors or driving forces in the implementation process, requirements for an effective PMS implementation and the inclusion of political executives in the existing PMS framework through individual performance agreements.

The next chapter, chapter 6, presents the results of the study as obtained from the three research methods used.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS**

#### **6.1 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter 5 discussed the research design and methods used in the study. Chapter 6 presents the research results from phases one and two using tables, graphs and narratives as was discussed in chapter 5. The results from phase one were obtained from a mini survey which was conducted using a diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1) while the results from phase two was obtained from both interviews (see Appendix 2, 3 and 4) and from documentary study that complemented both the phases (see Appendix 6).

The results from phase one were used to determine the status of the PMS implementation from 2006 to 2014 and to identify the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs that were then purposively selected for the purpose of the unstructured interviews that were conducted during phase two of the data or information collection process. The unstructured interviews were conducted with respondents drawn from the following groups, namely: senior managers who occupied positions in relation to the PMS coordinators in the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs as determined by phase one results and politicians. A brief profile of each respondent is presented before the presentation of the phase two results. Documentary sources supported the results of both phase one and phase two.

Based on the general introduction to and background of the PMS as discussed in chapter one (see §§ 1.1 and 1.2), it was not known at this stage of the study whether it had met the requirements of an effective PMS implementation. The main research question of the study was: “What are the main constraints and success factors in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014?” This main research question as well as the inadequate discussions on the performance agreements of politicians (in terms of the design) provided the framework for presenting the results in this chapter.

## **6.2 PRESENTATION OF PHASE ONE RESULTS**

The presentation of the results in this section starts with the documentary sources (e.g. government publications) followed by the data which was obtained from the diagnostic tool which was used to determine the status of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 until 2014. The next section presents a brief overview of the Namibian public service in order to ensure the logical presentation of the research results.

### **6.2.1 Brief Overview of the Namibian Public Service**

The Namibian public service evolved from the traditional, colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid administrations. The structures, systems and policies of those administrations varied because of the different visions and missions as experienced by various ethnic groups of Namibian people. At the time of the study the Namibian public service employed approximately 98 550 employees (Republic of Namibia, 2013a:12).

The Namibian public service is underpinned by the democratic principles and rule of law as enshrined in the Constitution which is the supreme law of the Republic of Namibia - see chapter 4. The public service is a constitutional body which is part of the executive arm of the Government of the Republic of Namibia. Guided by the Public Service Act (Act No 13 of 1995), the Namibian public service is expected to be impartial, apolitical and professional in the discharge of its functions. At the time of the study the Namibian public service comprised 44 government institutions, namely, 31 OMAs and 13 RCs.

The main role of the public service is to serve the people of Namibia, regardless of their political affiliation, race, age, gender, ethnicity and religion (Republic of Namibia, 1995:2). The OPM Mission Statement states that “Namibia can only become a developmental or entrepreneurial state if its public service is efficient, effective and accountable” (Republic of Namibia, 2005:5). It is on this basis that the introduction of the PMS in the Namibian public service became both inevitable and central in terms of both the political and the administrative levels.

### **6.2.2 Historical Overview of the PMS in the Namibian Public Service**

The PMS in the Namibian public service originated during the colonial era using a system termed 'The Merit Assessment and Efficiency Rating' under the Government Act of 1980 (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:3). At independence on March 21, 1990, the Namibian public service inherited this system. However, it was suspended in 1996 due to its perceived colonial connotation and the lack of fairness in its application. A Performance Appraisal System (PAS) was introduced in 1996 on the recommendations of the Wages and Salary Commission (WASCOM). The new performance appraisal was, however, suspended in 1998 as a result of the lack of a supporting organisational culture as well as insufficient training in the system prior to its implementation (Kapofi, 2009:3). The suspension of the PAS culminated in the development of a new (third) PMS which was endorsed by Cabinet in 2002 and was deemed to be ready for implementation in 2006 (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:4).

The next section focuses on the primary objectives of the PMS in the Namibian public service.

### **6.2.3 The Primary Objectives of the PMS in the Namibian Public Service**

The primary objectives of the PMS in the Namibian public service were informed by the context as provided by the Executive Board meeting of the ACBF in 2004 which states that "Namibia faces an institutional and human resource capacity constraint in general as well as specifically for establishing such a performance management system. Performance standards are virtually non-existent, unsystematic or poorly defined" (ACBF, 2004:iii). The initial specific objectives of the PMS, as stipulated by the ACBF, were as follows (ACBF, 2004:iii):

- To develop an enhanced performance management system (PMS) policy framework including a review of the Offices, Ministries and Agencies (OMAs) mandates and organisational strategic plans, the installation of a customer-service, performance-oriented, transparency and accountability culture with all classes of public employees, and to align public service rule, regulations and practices with the new culture as inputs to operationalise a public sector PMS.

- To align the evolving performance management system with ongoing reform initiatives and, in particular, initiatives aimed at updating, mainstreaming and implanting Customer Service Charters in the Offices, Ministries and Agencies.
- To develop mechanisms and a complementary information system to measure, monitor and evaluate corporate and individual performance, and to make valid decisions on reward and sanction.
- To formulate and implement a human/institutional capacity building strategy specifically in pursuance of the performance management objectives (ACBF, 2004:iii).

The above were the initial specific objectives as discussed and approved by the Executive Board meeting of the ACBF in 2004. The ACBF was one of the donors which provided financial support for the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service. The initial specific objectives of the PMS were summarised in the PMS Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2011a) of the Namibian public service to the effect that “the primary objectives of introducing a PMS in the Namibian public service were to ‘ensure an effective and efficient delivery of services across the public service; and ensure performance accountability, both on an individual and organisation level’” (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:8). In addition, the PMS Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2011:8) states that the aims of the PMS in the Namibian public service were to:

- Promote a performance culture in the public service of Namibia
- Convey strategic plans to everyone in the organisation in the form of Performance Agreements which align individual and organisational objectives
- Create a platform for constructive dialogue between supervisors and their subordinates
- Inform an Office, Ministry, Agency or Regional Council’s human resources practices
- Manage service delivery against agreed targets and intended outputs
- Enable the early identification of unsatisfactory performance and the taking of corrective action

- Identify learning and development needs and appropriate interventions at organisational and individual levels
- Provide feedback to staff members on their performance, and
- Recognise and reward good performance.

The specific objectives of the PMS, as per the ACBF (2004) and the PMS Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2011a), were similar and, as stated in the first paragraph of this section, took into consideration the contextual problems of the Namibian public service at the time of this study. However, the poor implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service has been cited in various reports (Republic of Namibia, 2009:4, 2012d:9, 2013a:16). This situation, as reported in different publications, underpinned the main research question as restated in the introduction of this chapter (see § 6.1), while the analysis of the research results aimed at finding answers to this question (see chapter 8).

The next section investigates the management and implementation structure of the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

#### **6.2.4 The PMS Management Structures in the Namibian Public Service**

The PMS management structures, as defined in chapter 1, refer to the units and oversight bodies established at both the national and the organisational levels to ensure the effective implementation of the system. The ACBF and GRN Grant Agreement (2005:21) refers to the financing agreement 149 of 2015 and signed between the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) to support the PMS implementation process. It further states that “the project will be organised, governed and managed as a special unit endowed with financial and budgetary autonomy in the Department of Public Service Management, Office of the Prime Minister under the overall authority of the Secretary to Cabinet. The governance structure will include an Executive Committee, a Steering Committee and two-person project administrative staff, headed by a Project Coordinator. As the need arises consultancy services will be contracted to undertake specialised activities (e.g. strategic planning and training) for a limited duration to buttress the service of three (3) project specialists who will assist in the coordination of specific aspects

of the programme (including training)” (ACBF and GRN, 2005:21). This information is provided in order to be able to determine compliance with the structure agreed upon between the ACBF and the GRN in 2005 and later with the proposal made by the AU in 2011. The following structure was the structure as cited in the ACBF and GRN Financing Agreement (ACBF and GRN, 2005:21):

**The Executive Committee (EC)** was to be chaired by the Secretary to Cabinet and was to include representatives from women’s organisations, the National Planning Commission, the Bank of Namibia, the Ministry of Finance, and permanent secretaries from three key public sector ministries, representatives of two major trade unions and the Under-Secretary of the Department of Public Service Management (ACBF and GRN, 2005:21).

In respect of the above requirements, the study found that the Executive Committee for the Namibian PMS consisted of representatives from the following institutions (Republic of Namibia, 2013a:6):

- Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)
- Ministry of Finance
- National Planning Commission
- Representative of the Office of the President
- Representative of the Bank of Namibia
- Representative of NAPWU (trade union)
- Representatives from women’s organisations.

In addition, the ACBF and GRN (2005:21) stated that

**The Steering Committee (SC)** will be chaired by the Under-Secretary of the Department of Public Service Management and will include the Under-Secretary of the Public Service Commission Secretariat, the Directorate of Human Resources Management, the Directorate of Human Resources Development, the Directorate Management Services, the Directorate of the Efficiency and Chart Unit, and the Directorate Human Resources Planning. Each Office, Ministry and Agency will have an

assigned team to assist in the implementation and coordination of the project within their respective precincts.

In terms of the above requirements, the minutes of the Steering Committee meeting, which took place on 20 February 2014, cited the following as members (Republic of Namibia, 2014a:1):

- Permanent secretary – OPM: Chairperson
- Under-secretary: Department Public Service Management (DPSM)
- Under-secretary: Department Public Service Information Technology Management (DPITM)
- Under-secretary: Public Service Commission Secretariat (PSCS)
- Director: Human Resources Development and Planning (DHRDP)
- Director: Efficiency and Charter Unit (ECU)
- Director: Benefits and Industrial Relations
- Director: Performance Improvement
- The National Planning Commission (NPC)
- The Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) and the European Union (EU).

The information contained in the minutes of the meeting as indicated above differed from the stipulation of the ACBF and GRN (2015:21) for the chairperson of the Steering Committee. The minutes indicated that the permanent secretary of the OPM as the chairperson (Republic of Namibia, 2014a:1), while the ACBF and GRN (2015:21) had proposed the Under-Secretary of the Department of the Public Service Management as chairperson.

The review of existing progress reports revealed that each OMA and RC was supposed to established two support teams, namely: the Ministerial Implementation Team (MIT) or Regional Implementation Team (RIT) and the PMS Internal Facilitators (Republic of Namibia, 2006b:2). The study found that all the OMAs and RCs had established Ministerial Implementation Teams (MITs) and Regional Implementation Teams (RIT) (Republic of Namibia, 2013a:10, 2014b:2). During phase one of the data collection process it was discovered that the Chairperson of the MITs and RITs were known as 'PMS coordinators' and that



they served as a link between the OPM and its OMAs and RCs regarding the PMS implementation process (Republic of Namibia, 2014a:3).

In addition, the study found that a Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI) had been established at the OPM in 2012 after the Mid-Term Review and Fiche Feasibility Study conducted by the EU between December 2007 and February 2008 (EU, 2008:30). The DPI had evolved from the PMS Secretariat established in 2005, the Performance Management Unit (PMU) established in 2009 and, finally, the integration of the two main divisions in the OPM, namely, the Performance Management Unit and the Consultancy Service Group (CSG) in 2012 in what is known today as the DPI (Republic of Namibia, 2014a:9).

The above information provided evidence of what the researcher refers to as 'a false start' in the policy implementation, namely: the chairperson of the Steering Committee was not the OPM permanent secretary but the Under-Secretary of the Department Public Service Management while the DPI had been established only in 2012 despite the fact that the roll out had started in 2006. The late establishment of the DPI was an indication that there had been fragmentation in the PMS activities in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). This could have resulted in what may be referred to as the 'poor coordination' of the implementing agents in the policy implementation (Matland, 1995:161).

The next section focuses on the criteria that were used to define and measure success and failure in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

#### **6.2.5 Criteria for Measuring the PMS Implementation**

As was discussed in chapter 5 the response from the survey instrument indicated the following as criteria that may be used to define and measure the success and failure of the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service namely:

- The number of OMAs or RCs with plans which met the required standards (Strategic Plan and Annual Plan)
- The number of staff members who had developed and signed performance agreements

- The number of OMAs and RCs that had conducted quarterly reviews of the signed individual performance agreements
- The number of OMAs and RCs that had conducted performance appraisals on the signed individual performance agreements
- The number of OMAs and RCs that had rewarded good performance.

The researcher took the above criteria into account when assessing or determining the status of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service as they were similar to the key milestones of the PMS process (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section discusses the PMS implementation status in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014 in line with the above list of criteria (see § 6.2.5).

## 6.2.6 The Status of the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014

### 6.2.6.1 OMAs Implementation Status

The information presented in table 6.1 was obtained from the diagnostic tool discussed in chapter 5 and the criteria listed above (see § 6.2.5). The main purpose of administering the diagnostic tool was to determine the status of the PMS implementation by all the OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. The status of the PMS implementation of OMAs is presented in table 6.1.

**Table 6.1:** Number of OMAs that reached the PMS milestones from 2006 to 2014

Year	Strategic Plan	Annual Plan	Performance Agreement	Reviewed quarters				Appraisal	Rewarded Performance
				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		
2006/7	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2007/8	9	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008/9	31	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009/10	31	16	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010/11	31	19	7	0	1	1	1	0	0
2011/12	31	20	8	1	2	2	1	0	0
2012/13	31	24	19	2	3	2	2	0	0
2013/14	31	28	13	2	3	2	2	0	0

Table 6.1, as devised by the researcher using the information obtained from the diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1), shows the number of OMAs that either had or had not reached the various milestones in the PMS process in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. Each financial year is presented with its progress in terms of the PMS milestones, namely, Strategic Plan, Annual Plan, Performance Agreement, Quarterly Reviews (Q1–Q4), Appraisal and Performance Reward. Table 6.1 indicates that there had been sound progress in terms of planning at the organisational level (strategic and annual plans) because the number of OMAs with strategic and annual plans in place increased every year from 2006. The review of the relevant documents revealed that the success in respect of the development of strategic plans could be attributed to the support provided by a pool of consultants (Republic of Namibia, 2013a:9).

Although individual performance agreements were first developed during the financial year 2009/2010, their implementation was poor as a result of a lack of reviews. It was further found that six OMAs only had been selected to pilot the system during the financial year 2009/2010 (Republic of Namibia, 2009:4). Although no review had been conducted by the six pilot OMAs during 2009/2010, there was a slight increase in the number of OMAs with individual performance agreements in place during the subsequent financial years. Good progress was observed during the financial year 2012/2013 as a result of the fact that the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) had introduced the Rapid Result (RR) approach into the PMS implementation process (Republic of Namibia, 2013b:1). Furthermore, phase one results indicated that the last two milestones in the PMS process (appraisal and performance reward) were not implemented at all during the period under investigation (see table 6.1). This is an indication that the PMS had not been implemented fully at the time of the study. The primary reasons for this needed to be confirmed by the phase two results that are presented in the next sections (see §§ 6.2.6.1.1 and 6.2.6.2.1).

There was, however, a dramatic decrease in terms of individual performance agreements during 2013/2014 among the OMAs. The documentary study (Republic of Namibia, 2014b:1) revealed that OPM teams had been helping the OMAs and RCs to realign their strategic plans with the Fourth National

Development Plan (NDP 4). As a result, the focus had shifted to organisational rather than individual planning during that financial year (2013/2014). Nevertheless, it was evident that little had been achieved in terms of reviewing individual performance agreements (Republic of Namibia, 2014c:2). The overall conclusion was that the PMS had not been fully implemented at the time of the study. The reasons for such the poor implementation that had to be confirmed during phase two of the data collection are listed in the next sections (see §§ 6.2.6.1.1 and 6.2.6.2.1).

The next section focuses on the most successful and the least successful OMAs in the PMS implementation process from 2006 to 2014.

#### *6.2.6.1.1 The PMS implementation in the most successful and the least successful OMAs*

Although the PMS was not implemented fully across the Namibian public service at the time of the study, the information obtained from the diagnostic tool indicated that nineteen OMAs had made remarkable progress and were, in fact, at different levels of the process (see table 6.1). However, although they were reported to have made remarkable progress two only were considered to be the most successful because they had conducted performance reviews up to the fourth quarter although they had not conducted appraisals and rewarded performance (see table 6.1). The two most successful institutions were then purposively selected for the purpose of interviews between their PMS coordinators and the researcher during phase two of the data collection process. In line with question four of the diagnostic tool, the main reason why these two OMAs were deemed to be the most successful was as a result of the fact that they had taken ownership of the PMS process. The names of the two selected institutions were not mentioned due to ethical considerations.

In addition, three of the 31 OMAs had only managed to develop strategic plans and had also not reached milestones and, as a result, they fell into the category of least successful. The researcher then purposively selected two of these three OMAs as the least successful OMAs in implementing a PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014 (see table 6.1). The remaining 26 OMAs fell into an intermediate category. Although they were all categorised as intermediate they

were at different levels in terms of the PMS implementation process. The information obtained from the diagnostic tool revealed that poor implementation in the two least successful OMAs had been caused by the following, namely: no point of coordination, lack of ownership, structural challenges, uncooperative management confusion in terms of the plans developed by private consultants. The names of the two least successful OMAs were not mentioned due to ethical considerations.

The next section focuses on the progress made by all 13 Regional Councils (13 RCs) in implementing a PMS from 2006 to 2014.

#### 6.2.6.2 RCs Implementation Status

The information presented in table 6.2 was obtained from the diagnostic tool as discussed in chapter 5. The main purpose of this process was similar to that discussed in section 6.2.5.1. The status of the PMS implementation of all thirteen Regional Councils (13 RCs) from 2006 to 2014 is presented in table 6.2.

**Table 6.2:** Number of RCs that reached the PMS milestones from 2006 to 2014

Year	Strategic Plan	Annual Plan	Performance Agreement	Reviewed quarters				Appraisal	Rewarded Performance
				Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		
2006/7	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2007/8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008/9	13	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2009/10	13	8	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
2010/11	13	10	5	1	1	1	1	0	0
2011/12	13	12	6	1	2	2	1	0	0
2012/13	13	13	5	2	2	2	2	0	0
2013/14	13	13	11	1	2	2	2	0	0

Table 6.2 was devised by the researcher on the basis of the results obtained from the diagnostic tool (see Appendix 1). Table 6.2 illustrates the number of Regional Councils (RCs) in the Namibian public service that either had or had not reached the various milestones of the PMS process from 2006 to 2014. There were 13 RCs at the time of the study and all of them had been expected to implement the PMS fully. Good progress was observed on the first three milestones of the PMS process, namely, strategic plans, annual plans and performance agreements. The

process of completing the strategic planning was finished earlier than either the completion of the annual plans or that of performance agreements. This success was the result of the support from the pool of consultants contracted by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) during the ACBF financing agreement (Republic of Namibia, 2009:12).

However, the implementation process in terms of quarterly reviews as observed on the part of the RCs from 2006 to 2014 was poor (see table 6.2). This situation was very similar to that of the OMAs (see table 6.1). The researcher observed very sound efforts in respect of organisational planning but not in respect of individual performance agreements throughout the Namibian public service. However, the number of OMAs and RCs with individual performance agreements in place was higher than the number that had conducted quarterly reviews (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). The small number of government institutions namely, four (two OMAs and two RCs) that had conducted quarterly performance reviews (see tables 6.1 and 6.2) was an indication that the PMS had been poorly implemented at the time of the study.

The PMS Acceleration Update Report (Republic of Namibia, 2014b:1) indicated the following as challenges that had hampered the PMS implementation process in both the OMAs and RCs of the Namibian public service at the time of the study, namely: some of the senior managers did not agree with the OPM planning process, late approval of the PMS Policy, the majority of the lower-level managers were not very enthusiastic about the process, the majority of the PAs for staff members were not implemented as a result of a lack of commitment to signing the PAS as well as conducting reviews and there appeared to be no buy-in on the part of senior management to the PMS rollout.

The next section provides more details on the most successful and the least successful RCs in respect of the PMS implementation from 2006 to 2014.

#### *6.2.6.2.1 The PMS implementation in the most successful and the least successful RCs*

The responses to question seven of the diagnostic tool revealed that four of the thirteen Regional Councils only had made significant progress in implementing the

PMS from 2006 to 2014 (see table 6.2). In addition, the responses to question eight indicated that two of the four RCs only could be considered the most successful in their implementation of a PMS at the time of study because they had managed to conduct quarterly performance reviews (see table 6.2 § 6.2.6.2). The success of the two RCs was the result of the fact that they had taken ownership of the process (see question seven of the diagnostic tool). This reason was similar to that behind the most successful OMAs (see question four of the diagnostic tool).


However, two of the thirteen RCs had not managed to move beyond an annual plan and, as a result, they were considered as the least successful for the purposes of this study (see table 6.2 § 6.2.6.2). The researcher then purposively selected the two least successful RCs for phase two of the data collection process. The remaining nine RCs were all at different levels in terms of their progress and, thus, these RCs fell into an intermediate category. Nobody from this category was interviewed because the focus of the method was on the most successful and the least successful OMAs and RCs. As regards question eight of the diagnostic tool, the following include some of the reasons for the least successful RCs, namely: not responding to communication from the OPM, lack of ownership and buy-in, change of leadership and prolonged acting capacity of senior positions in the public service.

In short, there was an agreement on the part of those who were consulted during the administration of the diagnostic tool that the success of the most successful OMAs and RCs could be attributed to internal ownership of the PMS as opposed to the externally driven experience which was evident in the least successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.


The next section presents a comparison between the OMAs and RCs in terms their progress from 2006 to 2014.

**6.2.6.3 Comparison between the Progress of OMAs and RCs from 2006 to 2014**  
Graphs 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 present the comparison made between the progress made by OMAs and RCs. The information from tables 6.1 and 6.2 was used for this purpose. The comparison was made in terms of terms of the strategic plans, annual plans and performance agreements developed by the OMAs and RCs from

2006 to 2014. The explanation of graphs 6.1 and 6.2 is presented below graphs 6.2 and 6.3.



**Graph 6.1:** Number of OMAs and RCs with strategic plans




**Graph 6.2:** Number of OMAs and RCs with annual plans

Both graphs 6.1 and 6.2 depict a reasonable increase in the development of strategic and annual plans by the OMAs and RCs from 2006 to 2014. Graph 6.2 further depicts an increase in the number of OMAs with annual plans from 2011/2012 to 2013/2014. The review of the documents related to the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service indicated that, despite the high staff turnover at the OPM, annual plans for both OMAs and RCs had been developed by the internal staff without the involvement of external consultants. On the other



hand, the implementation of the annual plans was very poor, because they were applied in a few individual performance agreements only (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section focuses on the comparison between OMAs and RCs as regard the development of individual performance agreements from 2006 to 2014.



**Graph 6.3** Number of OMAs and RCs with performance agreements

Graph 6.3 was devised by the researcher and was based on the information from tables 6.1 and 6.2 showed a comparison between the OMAs and RCs in terms of the development of individual performance agreements from 2006 to 2014. Although many OMAs and RCs had made good progress in terms of strategic and annual plans (see graphs 6.1 and 6.2), it was found that the number of OMAs and RCs that had developed individual performance agreements increasing in some financial years and decreased in others (see graph 6.3). In addition, graph 6.3 depicts a greater increase in the number of OMAs with individual performance agreements as compared to RCs from 2012 to 2014.

However, during the financial year 2013/2014 there was a marked increase in the number of RCs that had developed individual performance agreements as compared to OMAs (see graph 6.3). The researcher's view, which did have to be confirmed during phase two, was that the system was not compulsory throughout the public service and, in fact, it appeared that a 'willing buyer willing seller' approach had been adopted. It was also interesting to analyse the capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to support the entire public service because of

the bottleneck depicted in graph 6.3. This bottleneck may be attributed to a lack of internal capacity at the central office. For example, one needs to understand the number of OMAs and RCs per OPM staff numbers and the readiness of the OPM staff to provide the required support to all OMAs and RCs throughout the public service of the Republic of Namibia from 2006 to 2014.

#### 6.2.6.4 Performance Agreements of Political Executives

The responses to the diagnostic tool as discussed in chapter 5 provided the following answer to the issue of individual performance agreements for political executives (ministers): “Yes, as the Political Heads of the Ministries, they should be held accountable to deliver on the mandates of the Ministries. It will also reduce or minimise the political interventions that are not in line with the planned activities” (Respondent 1, December 2014).

The following response was made to the question as to whether political executives should be part of the same system or not, namely, “Yes, same system of signing performance agreements and be reviewed same like accounting officers” (Respondent 1, December 2014). The responses from phase one of the data collection process indicated general agreement among those who were consulted (PMS facilitators) about extending the current PMS to political executives. This issue was explored further during phase two of the data collection process in order to obtain either confirmation, disagreement and modalities as compared to the findings from phase one (see § 6.3.2.4.3).

In short, the findings from phase one confirmed that, as per the problem statement of the study (see chapter 1), the implementation process of the PMS throughout the Namibian public service had been either slow or poor. The system was officially launched in 2004 and was reported to be ready for rollout in 2006. However, it was not until 2014 that it was fully implemented. The progress of the planning at the organisational level in respect of strategic and annual plans was reported to be better than at the individual level in terms of performance agreements, periodic reviews and end of year appraisals and reporting. Although some OMAs and RCs had made progress in respect of individual performance agreement development, this had been poorly implemented because a few only had been reviewed (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section presents the results of phase two of the data collection process – see chapter 5. The main sources of this data were interviews and the document study.

### **6.3 PHASE TWO RESULTS**

The results presented in this section were obtained from the nineteen interviews that were conducted and from the review of documents related to the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 until 2014. The first section presents brief descriptions of the nineteen respondents and then the results in themes.

#### **6.3.1 Brief Descriptions of the Respondents**

As stated above the results for phase two were obtained from the interviews conducted by the researcher and supported by the documentary search. The majority of the documents were documents published by Government departments on the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. The researcher conducted face to face interviews with individuals from the following groups, namely: the PMS facilitators (PMS team) in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), politicians, selected key senior managers in the public service, and the PMS coordinators of four RCs and five OMAs.

The initial sample size comprised 14 respondents but an emergent research design element was then considered as a result of the need to include other respondents, namely, politicians and the PMS coordinator from the line Ministry for all the Regional Councils. Thus, the final sample size comprised 19 respondents. All the interviews were recorded while the researcher also took notes during the interviews. The researcher read through these notes after each interview in order to ensure the correctness of the notes and also to make sure that the notes were a true reflection of the recorded interview. A brief description of each respondent is presented below but without identifying the respondent.

#### **Respondent 1**

Respondent 1 was an acting Director of the DPI in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and one the PMS facilitators at the time of the study. Respondent 1 was interviewed on 02 February 2015.

## **Respondent 2**

Respondent 2 was one of the senior managers in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). During the interview, it was found that respondent 2 had two main responsibilities in respect of the PMS, namely, to champion the PMS throughout the Namibian public service and to implement it fully in the Office of the Prime Minister. This respondent was interviewed on 03 February 2015.

## **Respondent 3**

Respondent 3 was one of the PMS facilitators in the Namibian public service and was employed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) as a deputy director for the PMS division. This respondent was interviewed on 03 February 2015.

## **Respondent 4**

Respondent 4 was a politician and had been a cabinet member in the Namibian Government for the 25 years prior to the time of the study. This respondent was serving as a Minister and Prime Minister (PM) in the Government of the Republic of Namibia at the time of the study. Respondent 4 was interviewed on 04 February 2015.

## **Respondent 5**

Respondent 5 was a PMS coordinator in one of the most successful Regional Councils (RCs) in the Namibian public service. In addition, respondent 5 was a deputy director and responsible for organisational planning at the time of study. Respondent 5 was interviewed on 05 February 2015.

## **Respondent 6**

Respondent 6 was a PMS coordinator in one of the most successful Regional Councils (RCs) in the Namibian public service at the time of the study. This respondent was a deputy director for human resources and also an assistant to respondent 5 in the same Regional Council. Hence, two respondents 5 and 6 decided to be interviewed at the same time. The interview took place on 05 February 2015.

### **Respondent 7**

Respondent 7 was one of the founders and drafters of the third PMS framework for the Namibian public service. The same respondent was involved in the rollout of a PMS in one of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) before being employed at the Office of the Prime Minister on a similar assignment. Respondent 7 was interviewed on 07 February 2015.

### **Respondent 8**

Respondent 8 was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful Regional Councils (RCs) in the implementation of the PMS at the time of the study. This respondent was a Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO) and, at the same time, had been given the responsibility of spearheading the PMS implementation process in the said Regional Council. Respondent 8 was interviewed on 09 February 2015.

### **Respondent 9**

Respondent 9 was a PMS coordinator in one of the most successful Regional Councils in the Namibian public service. The respondent was a deputy director for Human Resources in the said Regional Council and had also played a role in the previous PMSs. Respondent 9 was interviewed on 11 February 2015.

### **Respondent 10**

Respondent 10 was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful Regional Councils in the Namibian public service. This respondent was a deputy director for Human Resources in the said Regional Council. Respondent 10 was interviewed on 11 February 2015.

### **Respondent 11**

Respondent 11 was a PMS coordinator in one of the most successful Offices, Ministries and Agencies in the Namibian public service. This respondent was a Personal Assistant to the permanent secretary (PS) and was interviewed on 12 February 2015.

### **Respondent 12**

Respondent 12 was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful Offices, Ministries, and Agencies in the Namibian public service. Respondent 12 was interviewed on 17 February 2015.

### **Respondent 13**

Respondent 13 was a former Ambassador and Chairperson of one of the regulating bodies in the Government of the Republic of Namibia at the time of the study. This respondent had played a role in the previous PMSs that had been replaced by the one under investigation in this study. Respondent 13 was interviewed on 19 February 2015.

### **Respondent 14**

Respondent 14 was one of the PMS facilitators in the Namibian public service and was employed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) as a Chief Policy Analyst in the PMS division at the time of the study. This respondent was interviewed simultaneously with respondent 15 on 20 February 2015. The aim of the interview was mainly to confirm certain issues that had emerged from the interviews with the PMS Coordinators in the Regional Councils.

### **Respondent 15**

Respondent 15 was one of the PMS facilitators in the Namibian public service and employed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) as a Policy Analyst in the PMS division at the time of the study. This respondent was interviewed simultaneously with respondent 14 on 20 February 2015. The aim of this interview was mainly to confirm certain issues that had emerged from the interviews with the PMS Coordinators in the Regional Councils.

### **Respondent 16**

Respondent 16 was a politician and former Cabinet member in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. This respondent served as the Minister of Works and

Transport and as Chairperson of a Parliamentary Standing Committee. This respondent was interviewed on 23 February 2015.

### **Respondent 17**

Respondent 17 was a PMS coordinator in one of the most successful OMAs in the Namibian public service. This respondent was responsible for Information Technology (IT) functions in the organisation and was interviewed on 23 February 2015.

### **Respondent 18**

Respondent 18 was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful OMAs. Respondent 18 was also a link person between the RCs and OPM regarding all the PMS related activities in the Ministry and all the RCs. The respondent was a chief human resources practitioner at the time of the study and was interviewed on 24 February 2015.

### **Respondent 19**

Respondent 19 was a one the senior managers in the National Planning Commission (NPC), Directorate Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E). The respondent indicated that the DM&E had been established in April 2012 because there had been no regular reporting during the implementation of the first three National Development Plans (NDPs). This respondent was the last respondent to be interviewed. The interview was held on 27 February 2015.

The next section presents the phase two results as obtained from the above respondents and supported by the documentary sources that were deemed to be both relevant and authentic for the purposes of this study. The section is organised in broad themes in line with the main research question and the research objectives (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4). In addition, the results are presented according to broad themes, namely: achievements, success factors, constraints, the inclusion of political executives and requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service.


### 6.3.2 Presentation of Phase Two Results

#### 6.3.2.1 The Achievements from 2006 until 2014

##### 6.3.2.1.1 *The design of the PMS framework*

The PMS investigated in the study was introduced in about 1996. An integrated framework was designed – see figure 6.1 below (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:12). This information was confirmed during the interviews held in February 2015. For example, respondent 2 stated: “We started around 1996 with the establishment of the division called ‘Consultancy Services Group’ (CSG) and over the years, there have been changes from the Logical Framework (1996-2005) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (2006-2008) and, around 2008, an instruction was given to simplify it and we came up with a Namibian model (2009-2014) adjusted to fit the budget, MTEF, strategic plan and other activities” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

The review of existing documents indicated that the PMS Framework for the Namibian public service was completed in 2006 and then revised during the development of the PMS Policy in 2011 (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:12; Republic of Namibia, 2011a:10) as illustrated in figure 6.1 below.



**Figure 6.1:** The PMS Framework by 2014

**Source:** Republic of Namibia (2011a:12)



As depicted in figure 6.1 above, the PMS framework for the Namibian public service was based on a progressive cascade from national to individual objectives. It included the following (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:12):

- Vision 2030 which drives Namibia's long-term development strategy (as stated in chapter 1)
- National Development Plans (NDPs) which define the five yearly objectives to implement Vision 2030
- Strategic and Annual Plans which are aligned to the National Development Plans and the Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (METFs)
- Performance Agreements and Personal Development Plans
- Quarterly reviews and annual assessment, and
- Continuous leadership of staff and management of performance.

However, the study found that the PMS framework, as presented in figure 6.1, did not mean all the tools required to implement it were in place in 2006. For example, eight respondents expressed that the PMS design was incomplete, because some of the tools or templates were not ready at the time of implementation. In support, respondent 13 stated that "We do not have all the tools needed for the PMS implementation and have established the Directorate in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to develop them" (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015).

More information in respect of the tools that were missing is presented in the section on the constraints which prevented the effective implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service (see § 6.3.2.3). In view of the above information, the researcher confirmed/agreed that an integrated framework for the Namibian PMS was available at the time of the study and that it was expected to guide the development of all the tools or templates required as well as the PMS implementation process.

The next section focuses on the achievements accomplished during the implementation of the third PMS in the Namibian public service.

#### 6.3.2.1.2 *The implementation of the PMS framework*

The PMS framework available, as presented in figure 6.1, guided the development of certain templates or tools aimed at supporting the implementation process, namely: the strategic plan, annual plan, performance agreements, personal development plan, quarterly review report, end of the year appraisal report and the PMS Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2014:10; EU, 2014:12). As indicated in tables 6.1 and 6.2 these templates were used by all the OMAs and RCs. The respondents expressed the following views on the achievements in respect of the implementation of the PMS framework from 2006 to 2014:

Three respondents (2, 3 and 7) indicated that the PMS Policy had been approved in 2011 and launched in 2014 and that staff rules were ready for approval at the time of the study. In addition, respondent 7 stated that “[w]e have legitimised the PMS in the public service” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

Four respondents (2, 3, 5, and 7) agreed that all the OMAs and RCs had achieved 100% in respect of the following milestones, namely: strategic plans and annual plans. This implied that all of the 31 OMAs and 13 RCs had strategic plans and annual plans in place at the end of the financial year 2013/2014. This information confirmed the results of phase one as presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2.

Both respondents 2 and 7 agreed that the PMS system had been piloted in six OMAs during the financial year 2009/2010 and that five PSs had signed performance agreements with the Secretary to Cabinet for the first time. Furthermore, respondent 2 stated that “[r]ight now about eight of them (OMAs and RCs) can do an annual plan, performance agreements and reviews on their own” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

There was a general feeling on the part of three respondents (2, 7, and 13) that the OPM had integrated the PMS into its structure by establishing a Directorate for Performance Improvement (DPI) located in the Department Public Service Management (DPSM).

“The 15 Modules for the PMS were reduced to five and they are available at NIPAM and about 2000 public servants have been trained” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

Four respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) agreed that the PMS staff rules had been ready to be presented for approval at the beginning of 2015.

“We were able to have a valid strategic and annual plan every year, and have signed the first performance agreements during the financial year 2012/13” (Respondent 5, 05 February 2015).

Two respondents (8 and 10) stated that they had been able to develop strategic plans, annual plans and performance agreements although these were not signed. This situation, as indicated by the two respondents, could have been one of the main reasons why quarterly reviews had not been conducted by many of the OMAs and RCs (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). Procedurally the performance reviews can take place only if the performance agreements have been signed and implemented. The reviews are aimed at identifying achievements, challenges and the way forward and must be based only on what has been agreed as part the performance agreement.

Five respondents (5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) indicated that they had achieved 100% in respect of the following milestones, namely, strategic plan, annual plan, performance agreement and quarterly reviews. However, no appraisals had been conducted at the individual level at the time of the study. The views expressed by these five respondents confirmed the results obtained during phase one of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). Furthermore, it was confirmed that the PMS had not been implemented fully at the time of the study because these respondents (5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) were from the most successful OMAs and RCs, as discussed in chapter 5 and as shown in the phase one results (tables 6.1 and 6.2).

“We have only managed to have a strategic plan and our annual plan was not presented to the Council Management for approval and, as a result, we could not do performance agreements” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015).

“Many staff members have been attending several workshops and about 98% of our staff members are trained on the PMS except those who were on study leave or absent for other reasons” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015).

The EU (2012:30) identified the following as achievements in PMS capacity building in respect of its effective implementation throughout the Namibian public service:

- The PMS Training Toolkit comprising 15 modules was developed and rolled out in the public service from 2006-2007;
- A total number of 135 public servants were trained and specialised as follows: 68 in facilitation, 33 in liaison and 34 in logistics from 2007–2008;
- The 15 PMS modules were reduced to five by NIPAM while approximately 2000 public servants had been trained in the new curriculum at the time of the study; and
- About twenty (20) MIT members from different OMAs were trained in project management by an OPM consultant in 2007.

In view of the above, it is clear that efforts were made to build the PMS implementation capacity throughout the Namibian public service. However, the quality of such interventions remained a concern because slow implementation was continuing at the time of the study (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). Muthaura (2009:10) argues that “capacity building is critical in creating the critical mass, sustaining change and to cascade strategic intents at all levels in the public institutions”. The responses from the participants who had attended the PMS training conducted by the Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) (2014:3) includes the following: “We are halfway way (PMS Policy, strategic plan and annual plan) pending some items and various challenges; the following documents are in place, namely, PMS Policy, strategic plan and annual plan, but implementation is at a slow pace; not much has happened, strategic plan was recently launched; and we are doing reviews but have not done appraisal yet” (NIPAM, 2014:2).

In short, the views expressed by all the respondents and the documentary study indicated positive progress in respect of organisational planning (strategic and annual plans) although also confirmed that not one of the OMAs or RCs had either conducted appraisal and/or rewarded performance. It was also confirmed the argument that the PMS had not been fully implemented in the Namibian public service at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section (6.3.2.2) focuses on what respondents viewed as success factors or driving forces in respect of achievements mentioned above. Most of the success factors were identified and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4) of the study.

#### 6.3.2.2 Success Factors in the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014

The success factors or driving forces which played a role in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service include the following:

##### 6.3.2.2.1 *Financial resources*

Five of the respondents (5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) from the most successful OMAs and RCs indicated that they were budgeting for the PMS activities. For example, respondent 11 stated that “we used our budget to train everybody on the PMS through NIPAM” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015).

In addition, existing documents, namely, those of the ACBF and GRN (2005); EU and GRN (2006) and Republic of Namibia (2012a:13) indicated that the introduction of the PMS in the Namibian public service had been backed by financial resources. The first financial support for the PMS came from the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in terms of Financing Agreement 149 and which was signed between the ACBF and the Government of the Republic of Namibia on 18 August 2005. This amounted to U\$ 1,580,096 for a period of four years. The Financing Agreement 149 between the ACBF and the Government of the Republic of Namibia included the following five main components and their related activities (ACBF and GRN, 2005:17):

- **Component 1:** Integration of Strategic Planning and Management Processes
- **Component 2:** Organisational Culture Audit and Reorientation
- **Component 3:** Review, Extension and Entrenchment of Customer Service Charters across OMAs
- **Component 4:** Design and Implementation of an Information Strategy in Support of Performance Management
- **Component 5:** Provision of HR and Training Services in Support of Performance Management.

**Expected outputs:** The following were the expected outputs of the agreement. These outputs were not amenable to quantitative measurability although they were characterised by qualitative success factors that were discernible via some quantification through organisational culture audits, perception studies, measurable productivity gains as reflected in output or product statistics, personnel audits, and budget and loss management studies (ACBF and GRN, 2005:20):

- Final text of the performance management principles and policy framework
- Performance indicators and standards for various functions and service delivery categories
- Revised mission statements and customer service charters for government institutions and service delivery teams
- Revised (individual but team-oriented) job descriptions
- New policy guidelines on recruitment, promotion, discipline, motivation and incentives for effective, results-oriented management of performance
- Validated performance agreements and performance instruments for the various categories of public employees
- Specified training programme with the requisite training materials, including relevant documents, reports and policy guidelines produced under the various components of the project as well as a training needs assessment
- Existence of a critical mass of trained persons, including both male and female, with an enhanced understanding of the PMS and with the relevant skills and knowledge to manage it and to transfer the acquired capacity to others, and
- Systems operational procedures and guidelines and relevant advisory service.

The next financial support came from the European Union (EU) which contributed an amount of EUR 2 million toward the PMS capacity building for a period of three years (EU, 2006). The main beneficiary was the Government of Namibia as the money was used for the PMS implementation by the Department of Public Service

Management at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The three key result areas (KRA) in respect of the EU support to the Namibian PMS included the following (EU, 2010):

**KRA 1: Strengthened management, coordination and institutional/financial sustainability of PMS**

This KRA included the following: recruitment and appointment of employees to a permanent Performance Management Unit (PMU) of Public Service Management, development and training of the staff at the Performance Management Unit, provision of equipment and job aids to the Performance Management Unit, in particular with regard to management and information systems, and the planning and management of PMS activities including the design of the M&E system (EU, 2010:7).

**KRA 2: PMS implemented at management levels in OMAs and RCs.**

This KRA included the following: develop PMS implementation plans in line with the administrative dispositions at all levels of the OMAs and RCs, build capacity for the implementation of the PMS in all the OMAs and RCs, and coach the managers in the implementation of PMS (EU, 2010:10).

**KRA 3: Coordinated performance management monitoring and evaluation at all levels.**

This KRA included the following: ensure that all programmes and activities relating to the PMS for both state and donor funds are properly integrated and compliant with the PMS, evaluate results on job performance and organisational levels on the basis of the lessons learnt, carry out employee satisfaction assessments, collect baseline data and evaluate customer and citizen satisfaction (EU, 2010:10).

The Government of the Republic of Namibia agreed to make a contribution of EUR 1.2 Million to the implementation of the PMS for the same period of the EU financing agreement. Accordingly, the Government of Namibian paid the salaries and travelling expenses, and provided job aids (e.g. computers, office space,

stationery, cars and telephones) during the period of the financing agreement (EU, 2010:10). There was a general feeling expressed by five respondents (5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) from the most successful OMAs and RCs that the donor funding was not enough to cover the costs of all expenses and, as a result, they had started budgeting for PMS activities.

The next section focuses on the PMS implementation structure as one of the success factors or driving forces in respect of the most successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service.

#### *6.3.2.2.2 The PMS implementation structures*

The establishment of different structures to support the PMS implementation was identified as one of the achievements discussed in the previous section (see § 6.3.2.1.2). The views of various respondents on how such structures had contributed to the achievements are discussed below:

Four respondents (2, 3, 7 and 13) were clearly aware that a permanent and central Directorate for Performance Improvement (DPI) had been established in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Department Public Service Management (DPSM) and that staff members were busy developing the necessary tools and, at the same time, supporting the PMS implementation process throughout the public service.

Respondent 7 described the process as follows: “The DPI was established in 2012 by combining staff members from different units in the Office of the Prime Minister, namely, the Performance Management Unit (PMU), Consultancy Service Group (CSG). The DPI had three divisions, namely: Business Process Re-engineering, Performance Management System and Charters. All three divisions are headed by staff members at the level of deputy director (DD) and six staff members are allocated to the rollout of the PMS under the division performance management system” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015). Respondent 7 also stated that “[o]ur role is to drive and facilitate and not to implement the PMS in OMAs and RCs” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

There appeared to be general feeling among four respondents (2, 3, 7 and 13) that a dedicated directorate (DPI) had been established in 2012 in the Office of the



Prime Minister (OPM) in order to improve the coordination of the PMS activities throughout the Namibian public service.

Nine respondents (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) attributed the achievements made at the time of the study to the support provided by the PMS Implementation Committees, that is, the 'Ministerial Implementation Team (MIT) or Regional Implementation Team (RIT)' which were established in each OMA and RC in the Namibian public service. For example, respondent 9 indicated that "there is a PMS Implementation Committee to support the CRO" (Respondent 9, 11 February 2015). In addition, there was a general feeling expressed by nine respondents that the MITs were very supportive of the PMS implementation process.


The review of documentary sources on the PMS indicated that a Ministerial or Regional Implementation Team (MIT or RIT) had been established in each OMA and RC in the Namibian public service and that their functions included the following (Republic of Namibia, 2006f:1–2):

- Become fully knowledgeable on the PMS Principles & Framework for the public service of Namibia
- Ensure full senior management ownership of the process
- Raise awareness, understanding, support and buy-in across the OMA and RCs for the PMS and its implementation
- Develop an implementation plan in consultation and signed off by key stakeholders, including the senior management of the OMA, Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) PMS Project Office, internal facilitators, external consultants and other OPM technical units
- Project manage the rollout of the PMS Principal and Framework and Implementation Toolkit in the OMA
- Facilitate the identification and oversee the development and operations of internal facilitators from within the OMA. This includes the administering of quality control measures regarding the operations of internal facilitators
- Be the custodian of the logistics, including event management and funding, for the rollout of the PMS implementation plan of the OMA.

Logistical support to the MIT for events management needs to be provided by the Training Officer within the OMA

- Be the custodian of liaison between internal units, facilitators from within the OMA, the PMS Project Team, technical units in the OPM and external consultants (where needed) towards the accomplishment of the OMA implementation plan
- Together with the PMS Project Coordinator and OPM: Directorate Human Resources Development (DHRD) representative decide on the scope, mandate and funding of work done by external consultants under the PMS Project
- Render support to internal facilitators in the presenting of the PMS Implementation Toolkit and the accomplishment of milestones under the PMS
- Facilitate the provision of technical advice, through internal facilitators, the technical units in the OPM and the PMS Project Office, towards the accomplishment of milestones under the PMS
- Actively facilitate the management of the change and the development of a performance culture in the OMA, and
- Be the custodian of the achievement of the milestones under the PMS, that is, monitor, control and oversee both the OMA implementation plan and be responsible for quality assurance of the rollout (Republic of Namibia, 2006f:1–2).

The Republic of Namibia (2006f:2) also cited the following as qualities to be considered in the appointment of the MIT or RIT members: “A passion for performance, improvement and service; values, integrity and be accepted as role models; energy, pro-activeness and self-direction; resilience; analytical, systems and practical thinking skills; and liaison, communication and project management skills.”



**Figure 6.2:** PMS Toolkit overview

**Source:** Republic of Namibia (2006a)

In addition to the MIT and RIT, the documentary sources indicated that “a team called ‘internal facilitator’ was established in the Namibian public service and staff members were nominated and trained on the PMS Toolkit which consisted of 15 modules. These 15 modules covered all strategic, human resources, technical and soft skills required for performance management in the public service of Namibia” (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:4) (see fig. 6.2 above).

Figure 6.2 above presents an overview of the PMS Implementation Toolkit which was used to train internal facilitators (IFs) in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2007 and for a period of 40 days (Republic of Namibia, 2006c:5). These staff members were trained by external consultants who had been recruited by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) working closely with the Directorate Human Resources Development (DHRD). The PMS Training of Trainers (ToT) included three areas of specialisations, namely, facilitators or trainers, liaison and logistics (Republic of Namibia, 2006b:1). After the final module, a test was administered in order to select trainees for the above mentioned three categories. The functions of

the three categories are set out in the PMS ToT Implementation Complement as follows:

- **PMS Liaison** focuses on information flow and related communication needs for the implementation of the PMS:
  - Enable flow, e.g. through e-mails, letters, telephone calls, and meetings
  - Convey information/news/messages, e.g. briefings during meetings, leaflets, pamphlets and newsletters
  - Encourage sharing, e.g. through embodying the message of the PMS, collegueship, conversations and ensuring PMS included in staff meeting agendas
  - Strengthen links, e.g. within the OMA as well as with consultants, OPM project office and technical team
  - Connect people with information, e.g. be linked to the PMS website and serve as a helpdesk (Republic of Namibia, 2006b:1–2).
- **PMS Logistic** focuses on the logistics of the PMS implementation process:
  - Provide operational support to the MIT in the project management of the rollout, e.g. by drafting action plans and compiling budgets
  - Arrange liaison logistics, e.g. booking of venues and obtaining quotations
  - Arrange and prepare event facilities, equipment and materials
  - Arrange liaison logistics, e.g. printing of PMS materials (Republic of Namibia, 2006b:1–2).
- **PMS Facilitation** focuses on the facilitation of the PMS process:
  - Present the 15 module of the PMS Implementation Toolkit to staff (especially below management level)
  - Work together with the contracted consultants in rolling out the PMS Implementation Toolkit among senior managers

- Facilitate and participate in the implementation and achievement of the PMS milestone
- Work together with the relevant technical units from the OPM in implementing the respective PMS milestones
- Provide technical advice to staff on the practical implementation of the PMS and the achievement of the PMS milestones (Republic of Namibia, 2006b:1–2).


In addition, each group attended a full course of fifteen modules and, on completion of the ToT, were trained in their areas of specialisation, i.e. logistics staff attended a project management course, liaison staff a course on liaison skills and internal facilitators an instructors course (Republic of Namibia, 2006d:2).

The Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) was established in terms of Act No. 10 of 2010 section (2). The NIPAM is responsible for the following four main functions, namely: training, operational research, capacity evaluation and consultancy (Republic of Namibia, 2010b:4). At the time of the study, the 15 modules had been reduced to 5 and were available at the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM). The five modules include (NIPAM, 2014:2):

- Module 1: PMS Overview for Senior Managers (1 day)
- Module 2: Strategic and Annual Plans (2 days)
- Module 3: Performance Agreement and Reporting (2 days)
- Module 4: Managing Others' Performance (2 days)
- Module 5: Managing Own Performance (2 days).

The review of the NIPAM training documents indicated that module 3 was the module requested the most often by OMAs and RCs because, at the time of the study, approximately 2000 staff members had been trained on this module (NIPAM, 2015a:10). The quality of the training offered under the NIPAM at the time of the study is illustrated in pie chart below. The training was based on the revised framework and training materials and differs from the training offered during 2006–2007 (see table 6.1).

Figure 6.3 presents the overall impression of the PMS training provided by the NIPAM as generated from the evaluation forms completed by the participants in 2015.



**Figure 6.3:** The quality of the PMS training in 2015

Figure 6.3 above devised by the researcher presents the overall impressions of the PMS training as expressed by the participants who attended the PMS training offered by NIPAM from 30-31 March 2015. Overall, the revised PMS training was perceived to be very good with 40% of the participants rating it as very good. It is important also to note that the quality of the training was apparently good in view of the 0% rating of it as very poor and the 24% rating as excellent.

The final structure of the PMS implementation comprised the PMS coordinators in each of the OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service. The term 'PMS Coordinator' refers to a staff member in either the OMA or RC who served as a focal person or point of contact with the PMS facilitators from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in the implementation of the PMS. The study found that the majority of the PMS coordinators were either MIT or RIT Chairpersons or any other individual who had an interest in the PMS. At the time of the study one Ministry only had a person who was fully employed to coordinate all the activities related to the PMS and the progress reports from all the SOEs that formed part of the Ministry. Nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18) were the PMS

coordinators in their respective OMAs and RCs at the time of the study. They described their responsibilities as follows:

Nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18) indicated that they had made sure that their OMAs and RCs had both plans and performance agreements in place. Although there were differences in terms of conceptualisations, the nine respondents indicated that they had worked together with the human resources divisions in supporting all the heads of the directorates in their respective OMAs and RCs.

Respondent 8 stated that “I also provide advisory services to all line managers; but I can say I was vocal in ensuring that staff members are properly trained in the PMS. In 2012 I approached the OPM to conduct training and it was conducted by a strong delegation from the OPM and the mother Ministry in order to ensure that the staff members of the Council are aware of the system in place and the strategic plan. As part of human resources, we conduct in-house workshops that include the importance of the PMS” (Respondent 8, 9 February 2015).

Respondent 18 indicated “In consultation with other divisions, I make sure that each staff member has a performance agreement and reviews are conducted” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

Nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18) indicated that they had also facilitated the signing of the performance agreements and carried out the planning process with the support of the OPM.

For example, respondent 11 stated that “I am a focal person for the PMS in the Ministry and employed as Personal Assistant to the permanent secretary, I coordinate the PMS and ensure that reporting is done accurately and I arrange the PMS meetings that are chaired by the permanent secretary” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015).

Respondent 12, who was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful OMAs, indicated that “I am supposed to coordinate the

activities of the MIT and task team in consultation with OPM” (Respondent 12, 17 February 2015).

Although there was no official job description for the PMS coordinators in the Namibian public service, the above responses indicated that the roles of the PMS coordinators were critical in terms of coordination within their OMAs and RCs and that they served as a link with both the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and senior managers in their respective OMAs and RCs. The appointment of the PMS coordinators or focal persons in each OMA and RC was also clearly one of the success factors or driving forces underlying the achievements made from 2006 to 2014.

The next section focuses on leadership as a further category of success factors or driving forces underlying the PMS achievements recorded in the Namibian public service for the period covered by this study.

#### *6.3.2.2.3 Leadership commitment*

Leadership commitment was identified as one of the success factors or conditions for an effective policy implementation as well as an effective PMS (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4.2). The following statements were obtained from various respondents and relate to leadership commitment as one of the success factors or driving forces underlying the PMS related achievements recorded from 2006 to 2014:

Respondent 9 indicated that “our CRO is taking the PMS very much seriously and he is a focused person. He is the driving force behind our success, and he only talks to the managers, then we take it down” (Respondent 9, 11 February 2015).

Respondent 11 stated that “the PS is into it and he wants to champion it. He was pushing it and other follow (leading by example)” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015).

Respondent 17 maintained that “the PS is driving the system and it is a standing item in our management meetings. We budgeted for strategic plan activities and, as a result, we do not have problems conducting PMS workshops” (Respondent 17, 23 February 2015).



Respondent 2 indicated that “by walking the talk, because it was bad to tell others to do it and we are not doing it” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Three respondents (9, 11, and 17) indicated that the PMS was a standing item in their management meetings.

Seven of the respondents (1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11 and 17) in the most successful OMAs and RCs believed that the achievements resulted from the commitment and determination of their senior managers, especially the PSs and CROs. For example, respondent 11 indicated that “I organised the MIT meetings that are chaired by the PS” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015).

Thus, the researcher observed a general feeling among eight respondents that the achievements made in their respective OMAs and RCs could be partly attributed to the leadership commitment and dedication.

The next section focuses on the implementation approach used as one of the success factors or driving forces underlying the achievements discussed in this chapter.

#### *6.3.2.2.4 Implementation approach*

The various schools of thought on policy implementation were discussed in chapter 2 of this study (see § 2.2.2). It was concluded that there is no single, best approach (top-down or bottom-up). The following views were expressed by the respondents on how the implementation approach had contributed to the achievements made in the PMS implementation process from 2006 to 2014:

“We started with the senior managers whereby we made presentations to senior managers in order for them to be able to drive the implementation process” (Respondent 1, 02 February 2014).

“Team learning by sharing experience from different OMAs and RCs” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

“Using the Secretary to Cabinet’s positional power e.g. by requesting him to sign letters and circulars to the OMAs and RCs regarding the PMS implementation process because the OPM PS is on the same level as that of the other PSs” (Respondents 1, 2, 3 and 17). In support of this statement Respondent 7 indicated that “all PMS related circulars are signed by the Secretary to Cabinet because our PS is on the same level as that of other PS” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

“We have a schedule for the review meetings and it is given to all managers and staff members” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015).

“It was not taken as punitive yet” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015). This implied that, although there sanctions were attached for poor performance there was more emphasis on development.

“We make use of the OPM status to move the process internally because we could only make progress if we have a letter from OPM” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

“We worked together with senior managers in order to help them to understand the values or benefits of the PMS” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

“We try to make use of other OMAs’ and RCs’ achievements in order to get the rest on board and our PS is on top of things” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

The researcher observed elements of the top-down approach that may be considered to be one of the success factors underlying the PMS achievements recorded from 2006 to 2014. It is important to note that the top down approach was based on the seniority mind set which was dominant at the time of the study. For example, respondent 18 indicated that “[w]e use OPM status to move the process internally” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

Based on the above, the key words identified by the researcher were ‘start with the top managers and use positional power to get buy-in’ in order to implement the

PMS. These words resembled the elements of the success factors and conditions for both the policy and the PMS implementation (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4.2). The level of the PMS implementation also depends on the capacity of both its designers and its implementers (Aguinis, 2009).

Accordingly, the next section focuses on the PMS capacity building as one of the success factors or driving forces underlying the achievements in the Namibian public service.

#### 6.3.2.2.5 *The PMS capacity building*

The following views on the PMS capacity building were expressed by respondents during the interviews:

Two respondents (3 and 17) attributed the PMS achievements to the support provided by the short term consultants (both local and international) recruited during period of the EU and ACBF financial agreements. These two respondents were the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) at the time of the study.

Two other respondents (1 and 18) indicated that the workshop conducted for all PSs and which had taken place at Mokuti Lodge in 2013 had given them an understanding of the implementation process and, thus, enhanced the level of their support.

Nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18) indicated that they had actually been in ensuring that their staff members were trained and that everybody understood the process. All nine (9) of the respondents were the PMS coordinators in their respective OMAs and RCs at the time of the study.

Respondent 11 stated that “My understanding of the PMS, the support from the PS and management contributed to our success” (Respondent 11, 12 February 2015). This respondent was a PMS coordinator at the time of the study. Two respondents (11 and 17) indicated that they were trained and that they then implemented it (the PMS) themselves.

Five respondents (5, 6, 9, 11 and 17) attributed the achievements made in their respective OMAs and RCs to an understanding of the benefits of the PMS on the part of staff members and managers and that this had resulted in ownership of the process. This argument was also confirmed by the post training report of the NIPAM on the question: “Why is the PMS worth time and money?” (NIPAM, 2014).

The following responses were provided by different groups as reported by the NIPAM (2014:13):

- Maximum outputs and service delivery
- Goal oriented performance, effective time management and budget planning to realise the set goals
- At national level it improves service delivery, effectiveness and outcome-based results
- All work done must demonstrate a level of value for money and be completed within a stated framework
- Self-development and maintain a positive image of the Ministry
- To ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the public service (NIPAM, 2014:13).

The above views as expressed by various respondents and in documents confirmed that the PMS capacity building provided was one of the success factors or driving forces that contributed to the PMS achievements as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The next section focuses on the regulatory framework as one of the success factors or driving forces contributing to the PMS achievements as presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 at the beginning of this chapter.

#### *6.3.2.2.6 Regulatory framework*

The legality of the PMS was identified in chapter 3 of this study as one of the success factors in the effective implementation of a PMS (see § 3.4.3). The following were some of the views expressed by various respondents during their interviews:

Four respondents (6, 9, 11 and 17) attributed the achievements recorded in their respective OMAs and RCs to the PMS documents provided by the OPM because these documents had helped them to compile performance agreements and various departments were able to do this by themselves.

Four other respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) were of the opinion that the approved PMS Policy (2011) provided the PMS with a legal basis. Respondent 3 also stated that “the roles and responsibilities were unclear and only get clarified in the PMS policy which was approved in 2011” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

The review of relevant documents indicated that the OPM had developed a PMS Principles and Framework document at the beginning of the process (Republic of Namibia, 2006a:20).

Four respondents, who were all from the Office of the Prime Minister, indicated that the OPM was in the process of developing the reward and retention policy at the time of the study (Respondents 1, 2, 3 and 7).

The above statements confirmed that some documents related to the PMS process and the PMS Policy had been approved by Cabinet in 2011. However, it would also seem that the PMS Policy had been approved at a very late stage. Moreover, the availability of the PMS Principles and Framework document (2006) had helped in the drafting of the PMS Policy which was approved by Cabinet in 2011. The notion of a reward policy or even a draft reward policy had not been shared with the stakeholders at the time of the study because it was mentioned only by the respondents from the Office of the Prime Minister. This, in fact, had had a significant impact on the rate of the PMS implementation as discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.4). Aguinis (2009) identified the quality of the PMS design as one of the success factors or driving forces in the implementation of the system.

Accordingly, the next section focuses on the design of the PMS for the Namibian public service as one of the success factors or driving forces for some of the achievements made from 2006 to 2014.

#### 6.3.2.2.7 *The design of the performance management system*

The completeness and simplicity of the PMS system were some of the success factors discussed in chapter 3 of this study (see § 3.4.1). Various respondents expressed the following views on the way in which the design of the PMS had contributed to the achievements recorded from 2006 to 2014:

“[O]ver the years there had been changes from the Logical Framework (1996-2005) and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (2006-2008) and, around 2008, an instruction was given to simplify it and we came up with a Namibian model (2009-2014) adjusted to fit the budget, MTEF, strategic plan and other activities” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015). In other words, it is possible to attribute the achievements made from 2009 to 2014 to the fact that the system had been simplified.

“The design is simple, it just needs somebody to understand it and commitment from top leadership” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015). This respondent was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful RCs at the time of the study.

In the same spirit, two other respondents (5 and 6) indicated that the OPM had assisted them in 2014 and that they were confident that they were able to do it themselves.

Three respondents (9, 11 and 17) from the most successful Regional Councils indicated that they were familiar with the PMS and that they had been conducting reviews on their own without the assistance of the OPM.

Three other respondents (9, 11 and 17) also stated that it had been more complicated at the beginning and especially for the operational staff but that, with the changes made and support from the OPM, they had been better able to do it.

It is clear from the views expressed above that there was a general feeling among the seven respondents that the system had been complicated at the beginning but that it had undergone various changes. The revision of the PMS framework during 2008 was also one of the factors that had contributed to the achievements made in respect of the development of the individual performance agreements and quarterly reviews as depicted in tables 6.1 and 6.2. The increase in the number of

OMAs and RCs with performance agreements in place was evidence that the PMS framework and templates had been simplified. Most importantly, the simplicity of a system had also been identified in chapter 3 as one of the success factors for an effective PMS (see § 3.4.1).

The views expressed on the driving forces or success factors focused primarily on leadership (taking the lead and making it part of management meetings (institutionalisation), resources, expertise, policy and the simplicity of the system and structures (supportive MIT). Chapter 7 contains more detailed discussions on these key topics. It is, however, important to note that, although remarkable achievements were recorded, it was also confirmed that the PMS had not been fully implemented in during the period from 2006 to 2014.

The next section focuses on what the respondents who were interviewed considered as constraints in the realisation of an effective PMS in their respective OMAs and RCs.

#### 6.3.2.3 The Constraints of the PMS Implementation from 2006 to 2014

Some of the constraints experienced during the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service include the following:

##### 6.3.2.3.1 *Inadequate financial resources*

Although as discussed at 6.3.2.2.1 the PMS had been funded by the EU, ACBF and GRN it would appear that the duration of the funding had not been adequate and that this had hampered the PMS implementation process from 2006 to 2014. For example, six respondents (1, 3, 8, 11, 12 and 14) were of the opinion that the approved budget was not always sufficient to implement the strategic plans while the Regional Councils were unable to pay for the PMS workshops.

The views expressed above may be linked to what is called 'poor budgeting and a lack of alignment', because if those who were responsible for the budgeting did not do a proper costing of activities, then this becomes apparent during the implementation process. It also appeared that the budgeting process had not been in line with the implementation plans.

The next section focuses on the PMS implementation structures as one of the constraints that had hampered the implementation process of the PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service.

#### *6.3.2.3.2 The PMS implementation structures*

Although positive achievements were, to some extent, attributed to the PMS implementation structure (see § 6.3.2.2.2), 17 respondents (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19) expressed their concern about the absence of permanent structures for the PMS in the OMAs and RCs because the core functions of the MIT and RIT members and the PMS Coordinators were at variance with the PMS process for which they had been employed.

In addition, three respondents (1, 7 and 13) indicated that the Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI) had only been established in 2012 by combining the CSG and PMU teams in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). This was also part of the recommendation made by the EU (2008:10) and ACBF (2009:8) that a dedicated unit should be established to improve the coordination of the PMS activities in the OPM. The researcher was of the opinion that fragmentation of the PMS activities had been a feature before the establishment of the DPI.

Respondent 3 stated that “the office of the Secretary to Cabinet is underequipped in terms of human resources to help with the PMS process” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 6 from one of the most successful RCs indicated that “the current structure of the Regional Council cannot allow you to recruit the people you need as per its mandate and the expectations of the inhabitants are very high” (Respondent 6, 05 February 2015).

In addition, NIPAM (2014:3) reported that “unclear reporting lines and a lack of information in the public service are some of the constraints that hampered the PMS implementation because staff members who are decentralised to the Regional Councils (e.g. those from the Ministry of Works) are in between the Ministry and the Regional Councils”.



The statements above confirmed the DPI in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) had been established very late and the structure of the Regional Councils was inadequate to implement the strategic plans while unclear reporting lines and the absence of a dedicated unit for the PMS in each OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service were some of the main constraints in an effective PMS.

#### 6.3.2.3.3 *Inadequate leadership commitment*

Apart from the leadership commitment as discussed under success factors, it was clear that the leadership had not been adequate, because adequate leadership commitment leads change and achieves results (Aguinis, 2009 & Saravanja, 2011). This argument was supported by the following statements made by various respondents:

Two respondents (3 and 7), who were the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), expressed their concern about the level of leadership commitment at the time of the study. The two respondents indicated that the Secretary to Cabinet and the permanent secretaries never met to review progress on the performance agreements signed as per the PMS Policy requirements. They also mentioned the five PSs who had signed performance agreements in 2009 but that no reviews had been conducted. In addition, respondent 3 indicated that “a PS can be ready for review but the engagement with their supervisor is very limited” (Respondents 3, 03 February 2015).

“We were not walking the talk and it was bad to tell others to do it and you are not doing it” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015). This respondent was a senior manager in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and was accountable for the implementation of the PMS both in the OPM and throughout the entire public service. This statement by respondent 2 clearly showed that the Office of the Prime Minister was not doing what it expected others to do.

In support of this view Respondent 3 stated that “[w]e had been in the habit of signing performance agreements but there has been no review done. Ministers would have asked their permanent secretaries or the OPM about what happened to the signed performance agreements for their PSs” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 3 also raised a concern that the “OPM has been pushing others without it leading by example and, as a result, we could not feel the content of the system” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

In addition, four respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) attributed the poor implementation of the PMS in the least successful OMAs and RCs to the following factors, namely: No point of coordination, lack of ownership and buy-in, management not cooperating with the OPM facilitators and not responding to communication from the OPM and also the prolonged acting capacity of leadership position. Similarly, respondent 8 indicated that “[o]ur annual plan for 2014/2015 is not approved because it was never presented to the Council” (Respondent 8, 05 February 2015).

Respondent 7 cited the “lack of commitment by the PMS Executive Committee because, over nine years, it only met three times” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

Respondent 5 indicated that the “time taken to fill the senior management positions (e. g. CROs) in the public service is a challenge to the implementation process of the PMS” (Respondent 5, 05 February 2015). Respondent 5 also stated that “last year we did not sign performance agreements because the one acting was undermined by others” (Respondent 5, 05 February 2015).

It emerged from the above that the leadership commitment, as discussed in subsection 6.3.2.2.3, was not present in all the OMAs and RCs. Four of the respondents (5, 9, 11 and 17) who were from the most successful OMAs and RCs attributed their achievements to leadership commitment as one of the success factors. However, the opposite view was expressed by four respondents (8, 10, 12 and 18) from the least successful OMAs and RCs.

The next section focuses on the PMS implementation capacity as one of the constraints on an effective PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibia public service.

#### 6.3.2.3.4 *Inadequate PMS implementation capacity (skills) in officials*

Although funds had been made available to strengthen the management and coordination of the PMS (EU and GRN, 2006:10), the PMS implementation capacity in terms of the knowledge and skills development of public servants was identified as one of the constraints to an effective PMS. Various respondents expressed the following views:

Fourteen respondents (1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 18) shared the same experience that they had not attended any professional training on the PMS. Five of them (1, 3, 7, 14 and 15) were the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The researcher was very concerned about the quality of the advice they would have given to the OMAs and RCs if they had not attended any professional training on the PMS at the time of the study.

Respondent 7 indicated that “In 2006 we started with the training of 40 days on 15 modules. It was considered to be too theoretical, too long and, in most cases, staff members were trained but their OMAs or RCs did not have a strategic plan for implementation to take place” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015). Five respondents (1, 3, 7, 14, and 15), who were the PMS facilitators at the time of the study, indicated that they had only attended the same PMS training which they were providing to others.

Accordingly, respondent 3 indicated that “I cannot claim that we are capacitated at a level of a driver” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

In addition, respondent 7 indicated that “the training was mostly given to the junior staff members and, on completion, they were unable to implement the system from the bottom” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015). Seven respondents (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14 and 15) indicated that they had observed an over-dependency on the part of the OMAs and RCs on the OPM for performance planning and reviews.

Two respondents (14 and 15) indicated that they had had to learn on the job and by their own reading. These two respondents (14 and 15) were the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) at the time of the study.

Respondent 1 stated that “[t]he Chairpersons of the Regional Councils who are expected to sign and review the performance agreements of the Chief Regional Officers are not ready because we had a workshop with them and they indicated that they do not know what to do. All Chairpersons are politicians and they may not have met administrative requirements because they come in from the political arena” (Respondent 1, 02 February 2015).

Similarly, respondent 10 indicated that “[u]nfortunately, some of our political leaders do not have a proper understanding of the PMS and, when you speak to managers and politicians, you may only speak to one group due to lack of understanding of the PMS process and level of education. Some of our politicians do not have post grade 12 qualifications to understand the PMS and its implementation” (Respondent 10, 11 February 2015).

Respondent 7 mentioned that “[h]igh turnover in the public service and among the PMS team in the Office of the Prime Minister contributed to inadequate PMS capacity” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

The documentary study revealed that the training had been criticised in the EU mid-term review conducted in 2008 because it was found to be too theoretical and complicated (EU, 2008:12). In addition, respondent 8 stated that “the current mind-set and perception regarding the PMS may require some time and effective contribution from the NIPAM in terms of transformation through capacity building” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015).

In addition, a mid-term review conducted by the ACBF in 2010 reported the following responses from staff members who had attended the PMS ToT during 2006-2007 (ACBF, 2010:4).

**Table 6.3:** The quality of the PMS ToT developed in 2006

Categories of questions	Responses
Relevance of the content of the PMS Training.	Relevant
Length of the training period	Too long
Knowledge of facilitators	Not knowledgeable
Evaluation form after training	Yes
Recommending training to colleagues	Mostly no

**Source:** ACBF (2010:4)

It is evident from the responses presented in table 6.3 that even those who had attended the PMS ToT did not support it because it was too long and the facilitators were not sufficiently competent. In addition, they were not prepared to recommend it to their colleagues.

As a result, the PMS Toolkit was suspended at the end of 2007. The total of 135 public servants had been trained and specialised: 68 in facilitation, 33 in liaison and 34 in logistics (Republic of Namibia, 2007a:1–10).

In support of the above, various respondents expressed the following views about the PMS capacity building towards an effective PMS:

“In 2013, I was one of the appointed members of the MIT and we were trained by OPM staff” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

“The only training I attended was given by the OPM in 2010 and I do not have real experience of a PMS as such” (Respondent 12, 17 February 2015).

“We had a lot of training from the OPM at the launch of the system” (Respondent 17, 23 February 2015).

“I only received training from the OPM and NIPAM, and limited experience on the PMS before, but it is a process” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015).

“I did not really get proper training because I joined the RC in 2013, and had had no experience of the PMS before” (Respondent 9, 11 February 2015).

“I attended the same training with colleagues which was given by the staff members from the OPM and the mother Ministry. It was a strong delegation” (Respondent 8, 09 February 2015).

Two respondents (15 and 16) indicated that they had not attended any formal training but had learned during the strategic and annual planning workshops conducted by the OPM (23 February 2015).

Two respondents (5 and 6) shared the same experience that they had only attended the PMS training provided by the OPM and NIPAM. These two respondents were PMS coordinators in one of the most successful RCs at the time of the study and were interviewed at the same time (05 February 2015).

The above responses indicated that most of the training had been given by the OPM and NIPAM. However, the PMS facilitators at the OPM clearly doubted their level of readiness to support the OMAs and RCs in the implementation process due to a lack of PMS capacity (see § 6.3.2.3.4). It is worth noting that six of the 19 respondents (1, 2, 3, 7, 14 and 15) (OPM facilitators) indicated that they had not undergone any professional training. The main issue appeared to be the capacity of the capacity builders (the PMS facilitators) because, if their knowledge was limited in terms of their understanding of the PMS, then it would be very difficult for them to create a better understanding among others.

The next section focuses on the issue of stakeholder involvement as a constraint in the design and implementation of the PMS.

#### *6.3.2.3.5 Poor stakeholder involvement and communication*

Stakeholder involvement was identified in both chapters 2 and 3 as one of the success factors in the effectiveness of both a PMS policy and a PMS (see §§ 2.2.3 and 3.4.5). However, the views expressed below highlighted poor stakeholder involvement in the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014:

Although they differed in terms of conceptualisation, nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, and 18) shared the same experience that:

- They had not been involved in the design at all but just given the system to implement.
- They were given only the tools to implement.
- They did not know whether the Unions had been consulted in the process.

All nine respondents (same as above) were the PMS coordinators in their respective OMAs and RCs at the time of the study. The views expressed above

were clearly linked to what is termed 'a lack of stakeholders' involvement' by Aguinis (2009) and could also be linked to the lack of ownership discussed in section 6.3.2.3.3.

This argument was supported by the following statements made by various respondents and as cited in documentary sources:

Respondent 3, who was one of the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), indicated that "stakeholder involvement has been neglected because even the current Steering Committee is more of the OPM and, when we change or redesign something, it was only the OPM" (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). Respondent 3 also indicated that lack of stakeholder involvement had resulted in derogatory terms such as "Your PMS" or "OPM PMS" (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

The NIPAM (2014:4) had reported that "lack of consultation and information" were key challenges which were experienced in the implementation of the PMS throughout the Namibian public service.

Lack of consultation had also clearly occurred in the OPM itself because respondent 14 indicated that "internal decisions are made without consultation with us. For example, the decision to allocate three days to each OMA and RC for the planning workshop, even though they are not at the same level of understanding of the process" (Respondent 14, 20 February 2015).

A workshop on stakeholder consultation conducted by the OPM in 2010 reported that "[i]t is good to come together, but it is unfortunate that the things we are supposed to do first are being done last. I am very sorry that junior people are driving this crucial process. The policy was supposed to be the first thing to do" (Republic of Namibia, 2010c:3).

This argument was also supported by respondent 1 who stated that "most of the PMS documents were presented to the permanent secretaries during their meetings. The PMS Policy had already been developed but the staff rules, yes, they were presented to the Cabinet Committee on Public Service, Public Service Commission and permanent secretaries' Meetings" (Respondent 1, 02 February

2015). This clearly indicates minimal stakeholder consultation and primarily at the strategic level of the public service.

In addition, the review of existing documents found that “the PMS project lacks a strategy for communications and disseminating information to stakeholders. Generally, OMAs and RCs were unaware of EU support for the rollout of the PMS and communications between the OPM and OMAs and RCs are a significant weakness and risk to the sustainability of the PMS” (European Union, 2015:4). Furthermore, the EU (2015:4) indicated that the “PMS as designed does not facilitate ownership by OMAs and RCs as it is based on directives and instructions from the OPM, with limited consultations and feedback from stakeholders”.

The above provides evidence of a lack of stakeholder involvement in the design and implementation process of the PMS as perceived by twelve respondents. This may be linked to a lack of ownership and the eventual poor implementation recorded from 2006 to 2014 (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section focuses on the issues related to the implementation approach to the PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

#### *6.3.2.3.6 Implementation modality*

With regard to the achievements discussed in sub-section 6.3.2.2.4, the top down approach had clearly contributed to the successful implementation of the PMS in the most successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. However, the opposite was true in the least successful OMAs and RCs. Their lack of success was clearly linked to poor implementation as is expressed in the views below:

Seven respondents (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10 and 18) were of the opinion that the bottom up approach followed in the implementation of the PMS in their OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service, had been one of the constraints which had contributed to the poor implementation recorded from 2006 to 2014. In support, respondent 3, who was a PMS facilitator in the Office of the Prime Minister, indicated that “most of the staff members trained by the OPM from 2006-2008 were at the lower level and the implementation process was left in their



hands” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). This point clearly indicates a bottom-up approach which had an impact on policy implementation as discussed in chapter 2 (see § 2.2.3).

Ten respondents (2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 18), including four (8, 10, 12 and 18) from the least successful OMAs and RCs, raised a concern regarding the signing and management of the Chief Regional Officers’ performance agreements by the Chairpersons of the Regional Councils who were also politicians. Level of education does not play a very significant role in politics in Namibia. In this vein, respondent 4 indicated that “even ministers who are heads of different OMAs have different backgrounds in terms of education and experience” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015).

Furthermore, eight respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 17) shared a similar sentiment that there was nothing to motivate staff members to comply with the PMS because they were seeking a monetary reward. The same respondents also indicated that the system was not integrated with other aspects of human resources, for example, recruitment, promotion and payment.

Six respondents (2, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 18) indicated that the interviewing system in the Namibian public service at the time of the study was not good and, as a result, wrong people were sometimes appointed in key positions.

Three respondents (1, 2 and 3), who were the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) at the time of the study, indicated that there had been too many changes to the PMS framework over the years.

Furthermore, respondent 2 indicated that “we have different frameworks in one public service (e.g. Ministry of Health and Justice) and those frameworks do not fit with all the requirements” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 3 stated that “[w]e have not pressed the issue too much because we wanted to use others’ success for them to come on board on their own” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Three respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) agreed that performance standards were not in place and indicated that they were busy reviewing all the Customer Service Charters in the public service.

Finally, respondent 19 stated that “[i]n the absence of a Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Framework, there is a reporting fatigue in the public service because different institutions (OPM, NPC and MoF) have different needs and use different reporting formats” (Respondent 19, 27 February 2015).

The views expressed above referred to both the policy and the technical levels. Moreover, there was general agreement among the above respondents that the implementation approach had been poor. The focus of the approach had been mainly on junior staff members and that had resulted in the bottom up approach which had not made any positive contribution to the effective implementation of the PMS in the four least successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service. Another constraint was that the CROs were expected to sign their performance agreements with the Chairperson of Regional Councils who were politicians and political appointments are not always based on the level of education and experience.

The next section focuses on different issues related to the PMS regulatory framework as expressed by various respondents in their interviews.

#### *6.3.2.3.7 The PMS regulatory framework*

The views cited below demonstrate how the PMS regulatory framework had contributed to the poor implementation of the system in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014:

There was a general understanding among nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, and 18) that the PMS Policy had been very late because it had only been approved in 2011 and distributed towards the end of 2014.

In addition, there was also a general feeling among these nine respondents (5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17 and 18) that the PMS Policy (2011) had not been seen by many staff members and that the absence of certain tools (e.g. the Reward Policy and the PMS Staff Rules) constituted an obstacle to an effective PMS. Four

respondents (6, 9, 10 and 11) indicated that the absence of some of the tools required to manage performance had made it difficult for them to provide support to line managers in managing either good or poor performance on the path of staff members.

In support of this view, respondent 13 stated that “we do not have all the tools or supporting documents needed for the PMS implementation” (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015). This respondent was the Chairperson of one of the main regulatory bodies in the Namibian public service at the time of the study. This point is related to the issue of implementing an incomplete system as raised by Aguinis (2009) and discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.5).

Respondent 18 indicated that “the approved PMS Policy was given to us in September 2014 and it was almost the time many people were going on leave” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

Ten respondents (1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 18) indicated during their interviews that, in the absence of legal instruments, they had been unable to answer all the questions on the PMS as raised by their colleagues or supervisors. For example, “what happens if one refused to sign a performance agreement?” (Respondent 18, 24 February 2015).

Apart from the PMS policy, respondent 19 stated that “we do not have a National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Framework yet” (Respondent 19, 27 February 2015). Respondent 19 also indicated that “a technical committee was established to spearhead the development of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework which would provide standards procedures and harmonise key terminologies” (Respondent 19, 27 February 2015).

Respondent 6 was of the opinion that “the current generic structure of the Regional Councils cannot allow you to recruit the people you need as per the mandate and the expectations of the inhabitants are very high” (Respondent 6, 05 February 2015). Similarly, respondent 2 indicated that “[i]nstitutions such as the National Assembly and National Council did not make any progress because they are in the process of moving out of the public service after the amendment of the Constitution which established a Judicial Service Commission” (Respondent 2, 03

February 2015). Furthermore, two respondents (6 and 7) indicated that the job descriptions of staff members were not aligned to the performance agreements because the job descriptions were generic by design.

A documentary source indicated that, in one of the least successful Ministries, staff members were transferred without proper procedures being followed and that this often resulted in apathy and a lack of staff supervision (NIPAM, 2014:4).

On the issue of the inclusion of political executives, respondent 4 indicated that “public service management which includes the PMS is in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). However, the Prime Minister (PM) can only achieve something through persuasion because he/she is not the appointing authority. The PM cannot sanction Ministers but permanent secretaries (PSs) whom he/she appoints on the recommendations of the Public Service Commission (PSC)” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015). At the same time respondent 4 was also concerned about the appointment of Ministers because of their different backgrounds in terms of education and experience.

Three respondents (4, 13 and 16) raised a concern regarding the separation of power between the executives and the legislature in the Namibian Government. For example, respondent 13 stated that “our current situation compromised some of the Constitutional provisions because the executive members are in parliament full time and that makes it difficult to ensure proper checks and balances. We do not really have three branches of the Government” (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015).

The views expressed above highlighted several issues related to the regulatory framework for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. For example, the late approval and distribution of the PMS Policy, the appointment of political executives, the role of the Prime Minister in ensuring accountability, the absence of the reward and sanction system, the absence of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Framework in the public service and the absence of a true separation of power between the legislature and executive.

The next section focuses on the design of both the PMS framework and relevant tools and their contribution to the poor implementation process of a PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

#### *6.3.2.3.8 The performance management system design*

Simplicity and completeness in the design of any PMS was identified in chapter 3 (see § 3.4.1) as one of the success factors in effective PMS implementation. However, the following views were expressed during the interviews on the design of the PMS for the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014:

Though different in terms of conceptualisations, sixteen respondents (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19) shared a similar observation at their interviews that the design of the system was incomplete because some of the tools or templates were not ready at the time of implementation. This emerged from utterances such as: “We were supposed to have all these tools at the beginning because they are delaying the process as staff members and supervisors cannot do it without guidelines; the system is not yet integrated with other human resources aspects such as recruitment and reward, the PMS Policy was approved in 2011 and distributed towards the end of 2014, staff rules were to be presented to the Public Service Commission for approval at the beginning of 2015 and the reward policy is still under development” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 13 confirmed the above argument stating that “[y]es, we do not have all the tools and have established the Directorate in the Office of the Prime Minister to develop them” (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015). The EU (2008:13) had indicated that “the concept was too ambitious, complicated and different PMS activities were scattered in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)”.

Moreover, four respondents (1, 2, 3, and 7) agreed that the design had been complicated at the beginning and later simplified but that there had been too many changes to the framework. For example, respondent 2 stated that “over the years there had been changes from the Logical Framework (1996–2005), Balanced scorecard (BSC) (2006–2008) and a Namibian Model (2009–2014) adjusted to fit the budget, strategic plan and other activities” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

In the absence of all the necessary tools and policies, four respondents (1, 2, 3, and 7) indicated that the roles and responsibilities of the various role players had not been properly clarified before the PMS Policy (2011) was approved.

Four respondents (6, 9, 11 and 17) shared a similar experience about the challenges involved in completing the performance agreements, reviews and appraisal (self-assessment) forms with individuals who are not able to read and write English. In addition, the same respondents expressed a concern about the use of the terms such as 'personal objectives and operational objectives' on the performance agreements because they did not provide an understandable meanings. For example, under 'personal objectives' column staff members are expected to indicate developmental areas and under 'operational objectives' column staff members are expected to indicate their outputs for the year under review.

A concern about the fairness of the PMS was expressed by all nineteen respondents and also cited in the documentary sources (Hlahla, 2015; Tuyapeni, 2015:2; Mabengano, 2015:2). For example, this question appeared in many reports: "How fair is the system or will it be similar to the previous systems in which colour played a major role?" (Hlahla, 2015; Tuyapeni, 2015; Mabengano, 2015).

Finally, respondent 12, who was a PMS coordinator in one of the least successful OMAs, stated that "[i]t is difficult to tell the simplicity and fairness of the current PMS because it has not been implemented fully" (Respondent 12, 17 February 2015).

The above information indicated that an integrated PMS framework for the Namibian public service was in place (see figure 6.1) but that not all the tools and policies were in place to support its implementation from 2006 to 2014. The absence of certain tools and policies confirmed that the design was incomplete at the time of the study. In addition, the NIPAM (2014:2) indicated that some staff members (e.g. cleaners and drivers) experienced difficulties with certain of the forms (e.g. performance agreements, reviews and ratings). It was not easy to determine the fairness of the PMS process because it had not been fully

implemented at the time of the study. Finally, the PMS framework had been changed three times and that had delayed the actual implementation process.

The next section focuses on other factors that contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

#### 6.3.2.3.9 *Other factors*

In addition to the factors identified above, the following factors also contributed to the poor implementation process of the PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014. These views were expressed by various respondents and were also found in documentary sources:

Social factors (e.g. divided families) – “How can I concentrate if I am far from my family and it is killing people as a result of HIV/AIDS among public servants” (NIPAM, 2014:10).

“Junior staff members are not involved in the planning and budgeting process” (Hlahla, 2015:2).

“There are different understandings about the PMS in terms of its purpose and benefits and, as a result, those who understand its benefits welcome it but is not viewed positively by those who see it as punitive” (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015).

“Shortage of cars inhibits staff members’ performance in executing their performance agreements” (Respondent 14, 20 February 2015).

“The time taken to fill the senior management positions (e.g. CROs) is a challenge in the implementation process of the PMS” (Respondents 5 and 6, 05 February 2015).

The views expressed above identified certain factors that had played a role in the poor implementation of the PMS in the selected OMAs and RCs, namely: incomplete design of the PMS due to the absence of certain tools and policies, inadequate implementation capacity in terms of human resources and financial

resources, inadequate leadership commitment, inappropriate implementation approach factors.

The next section focuses on the inclusion of the Namibian political executives in the PMS implementation process as discussed in chapters 1 and 3.

#### 6.3.2.4 The Inclusion of Namibian Political Executives in the PMS

Although the existing PMS frameworks were found to be integrated in terms of their design, the review of the scholarship on the PMS revealed that there had been inadequate discussion on the individual performance agreements of political executives (see § 3.3). Countries such as South Africa and Rwanda had made attempts to include their political executives although, in South Africa, there was no policy to regulate it (Akhalwaya, 2015:4) while Rwanda's parliament was expected to issue a Prime Minister's order to make this mandatory (Musonera, 2015:5). In Namibia the PMS Policy (2011) was applicable only to administrators and excluded the political executives in terms of individual performance agreements. Moreover, the PMS Staff Rules indicated that Ministers were required to co-sign the performance agreements of their accounting officers (Republic of Namibia, 2015:20). However, this co-signing did not render them fully accountable for their performance as individuals because the assessments applied only to their permanent secretaries. Accordingly, this study attempted to make a contribution to the discussion on individual performance agreements for political executives in the context of the Government of the Republic of Namibia as a unitary state.

The next section focuses on the functions and performance of the political executives in the Namibian Government as expressed by various respondents and as found in documentary sources.

##### 6.3.2.4.1 *The functions of the political executives in the Namibian government*

The following views on the functions and performance of the political executives in the Namibian Government were expressed by various respondents:

"They are assigned as Ministers and heads of Ministries and are guided by the national policies and those of their sectors. I am guided by the ... Act ..." (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015).



Three respondents (4, 13 and 16) mentioned that the President appoints Ministers who then become responsible and accountable to him/her and parliament – see chapter 4, section 4.2.

Respondent 16 indicated that “[m]inisters are also accountable for the governance of State Owned Enterprises under their OMAs” (Respondent 16, 23 February 2015).

It is worth noting the general feeling among three respondents (4, 13 and 16) that Namibian Ministers were not supposed to attend parliament full time because this compromised the provision of the Constitution in terms of checks and balances and full accountability at all levels.

In support of this view, respondent 16 stated that “in some countries (e.g. Kenya) Ministers are not full time in Parliament but participate through the Parliamentary Standing Committees by way of feedback” (Respondent 16, 23 February 2015).

The functions of the political executives as stated above were in line with the Constitution as discussed in chapter 4, section 4.2 of this study. Three respondents (4, 13 and 16) were of the opinion that Namibian Ministers should not be full time members of parliament but rather executives in order to ensure checks and balances and accountability at all levels.

The next section focuses on the performance mechanisms used by the appointing authority in Namibia in respect of political executive at the time of the study.

#### *6.3.2.4.2 The existing performance mechanisms for the Namibian political executives*

In reference to the functions of the Cabinet members in the Government of the Republic of Namibia as discussed in chapter 4 and presented in the previous section, the respondents cited the following as mechanisms that were used to measure the performance of political executives at the time of the study:

Respondent 4 stated that “that question is for the appointing authority and not for me” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015). After this interview, an attempt was made to interview one of the former Presidents but it was not successful. Furthermore,

respondent 4 indicated that “[i]t is only done through re-appointment or not. For the past 25 years I received appointment letters with terms of references” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015).

Three respondents (4, 16 and 19) mentioned that each Minister was required to submit an annual report in line with the approved budget in order to report back to both the appointing authority and parliament on the status of the PMS implementation. “These reports go to Cabinet of which the President is the Chairperson” (Respondents 4, 16 and 19).

Respondent 16 commented that “the appointing authority can go physically and see for him/herself and by that they (political executives) are measured. The same reports go to Parliament and members of parliament (MPs) can ask questions” (Respondent 16, 23 February 2015).

Respondent 19 stated that “[m]inisters are expected to sign off the bi-annual progress reports of their OMAs on the NDP 4 targets” (Respondent 19, 27 February 2015).

Respondent 16 indicated that “the Auditor General Reports are used in this regard and the Minister(s) and his/her senior management can be summoned by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts to explain. In Namibia, one of the parliamentary committee’s roles is to monitor the work of Ministers and, if the Minister fails to convince parliament with his/her answers, then the committee has the power to recommend action to the President” (Respondent 16, 23 February 2015). The same respondent (16) made reference to the practice in Kenya that “parliament can make a submission to the President recommending that the Minister in question be fired if his/her work continued to be not satisfactory” (Respondent 16, 23 February 2015).

In addition, Chapter 2, section (3) of the Anti-Corruption Act (Act No. 8 of 2003) mentions the functions of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). One such function is “to investigate any conduct of a person employed by a public body or private body which, in the opinion of the Commission, may be connected with or conducive to corrupt practices, and to report thereon to an appropriate authority

within the public body or private body” (Republic of Namibia, 2003:4). This is yet another existing mechanism aimed at ensuring accountability in the public sector.

Based on the above views and the references to relevant documents, it appears that there were certain mechanisms in place to measure the performance of government institutions and, to some extent, individual political executives. However, there is still a need for individual performance agreements in order to clarify and define expectations at the level of political executives within the broader context of their functions.

The next section focuses on the views on the development of individual performance agreements for the political executives (Ministers) in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

#### *6.3.2.4.3 The performance agreements of the political executives*

This section presents the views as expressed by various respondents on the proposal to develop individual performance agreements at the political executive (Minister) level or the political arm of the Government of the Republic of Namibia:

There was a general belief among all nineteen respondents that political executives should also sign individual performance agreements with the appointing authority in order to ensure accountability at all levels. For example, respondent 3 stated that “[t]he Prime Minister, who is the next President (Dr Hage Geingob), at one point asked a question: ‘Why are ministers not signing performance agreements?’” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 13 indicated that “political heads are the implementers and they need to be checked. The incoming President is requesting the CVs of new members of parliament (MPs) and, knowing him, I seeing that possibility and, if it happens, then it will be a very good policy” (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015).

Apart from the Ministers’ performance agreements, five respondents (5, 6, 8, 9 and 10) suggested that there should also be social contracts between the Constituency Councillors and the inhabitants of their Constituencies. All five respondents were the PMS coordinators in their respective RCs at the time of the study.

Although their explanations differed, three respondents (4, 13 and 16) shared the same sentiment that a performance agreement was effective in clarifying expectations at all levels because there were conflicting agendas between the Ministers and the permanent secretaries at the time of the study.

Most importantly, there was a general understanding among all 19 respondents (see § 6.3.1) that the performance agreements of political executives should take into account the NDPs' desired outcomes (DOs) which were covered in the sectoral and strategic plans of their respective OMAs at the time of the study.

With the exception of respondent 2, the other 18 respondents indicated that an independent team of experts should be established in the Presidency in order to manage the process. Respondent 13 indicated that "this team should be apolitical, consist of persons with integrity and sensitivity about national issues and development and speak truth to power" (Respondent 13, 19 February 2015). Three respondents (4, 13 and 16) further suggested that the NPC should be part of such a team in order to provide advice in line with Vision 2030 and the NDPs objectives/outcomes, KPIs and targets.

As regards the content of the Ministers' performance agreements all nineteen respondents were of the opinion that these performance agreements should not be detailed but that they should cover high level outcomes from Vision 2030 and NDPs because they were more concerned with outcomes at that level. Both output and outcome indicators at that level could be used. However, respondent 2 raised a concern that "outcomes take a long time before they are realised and it might be very difficult to measure them in a short time" (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Respondent 3 indicated that "[t]he SWAPO Manifesto and NDP 4 are very clear on the outcomes and only those key results should be considered" (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). In addition, documentary sources indicated that South Africa had included both outputs and outcomes in its Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (Akhalwaya, 2015:9).

In addition to the content of the Ministers' performance agreements, the respondents expressed two different views on the frequency of their reviews. Eighteen respondents (excluding respondent 16) were of the opinion that, like their

PSs, they should be reviewed bi-annually. However, respondent 16 stated that they should be reviewed quarterly because six months was too long in terms of problem identification and rectification.

Six respondents (1, 2, 3, 4, 13 and 19) indicated that the reviews of political executives (Ministers) should also consider the financial performance (budget execution rate) of their respective OMAs and that they should be required to provide reasons for either over- or under spending. Respondent 7 suggested that OMAs and RCs be ranked in terms of their levels of performance at the end of each financial year. The documentary review revealed a similar practice in both Rwanda and South Africa (Akhalwaya, 2015:20, Musonera, 2015:16). Furthermore, Musonera (2015:16) indicated that “Rwanda has a public accountability day whereby the best performing institutions are rewarded”.

However, respondent 2 indicated that “the ranking of OMAs and RCs may require generic KPIs or performance standards in key areas in order to do a comparative analysis” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

Most importantly, there was a general consensus among all nineteen respondents that the Ministers’ PMS should not be totally different from that of the administrative staff, because one becomes an input of the other. However, respondent 4 raised a concern that “[m]inisters have different background in terms of education and experience and, even if you ask them their CVs, they are likely to tell you what they want you to hear” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015). This concern was similar to that raised by five respondents regarding the signing of the CROs’ performance agreements with the Chairpersons of the Regional Councils who, at the time of the study, were politicians (see § 6.3.2.5).

In addition, the Minister in the Presidency responsible for National Planning was reported in the local media as saying that “there must be ‘consequences’ for government Ministries that fail to execute their development plans, including under spending their budgets” (Beukes, 2015:1).

It was clear from the above views that the notion to introduce measures to improve the performance of political executives was supported by all nineteen respondents (see § 6.3.1). In addition, there was a general understanding on the part of

eighteen of the respondents that Ministers should be measured on outcomes but without overlooking the outputs and that an independent body should be established in the Presidency. A citizen satisfaction survey conducted in one of the selected OMAs in the Namibian public service indicated “a below average to low satisfaction rating from both citizen and business customers” (Republic of Namibia, 2013c:6).

The next section focuses on the requirements for an effective PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

#### 6.3.2.5 The Requirements of an Effective PMS Implementation in the Government of the Republic of Namibia

This section presents the various respondents’ views on the requirements for an effective PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia at both the political and the administrative levels. In addition, the researcher also cites the views expressed in the documentary sources which were deemed relevant to the purposes of the study:

All nineteen respondents indicated that the PMS framework should have been implemented fully before changes were made and that both politicians and Accounting Officers (PSs and CROs) should have taken charge of the implementation process in their respective OMAs and RCs. There was a general feeling among all nineteen respondents (see § 6.3.1) that political executives (Ministers) should also sign performance agreements. In addition, respondent 4 suggested that “[m]inisters need to understand their responsibility as a public responsibility even though they were not elected directly by the people” (Respondent 4, 04 February 2015).

Six respondents (3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11) indicated that feedback sessions should be organised with stakeholders and that PMS units should be established in each OMA and RC.

Furthermore, two respondents (3 and 7) suggested that the PMS units should be located in the office of the accounting officer (PSs and CROs) and headed by a person at the level of deputy director (DD).

All nineteen respondents as well as the EU (2008) and the ACBF and GRN (2005) supported the need for continuous capacity building at all levels and proposed that OMAs and RCs should budget for PMS training. In addition, three respondents (1, 3 and 7) suggested that the PMS team in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) should be trained intensively to enable the team to drive the system throughout the public service.

Five respondents (2, 3, 7, 11 and 17) suggested that the office of the Secretary to Cabinet should be empowered to carry out the reviews of all permanent secretaries and that the PMS should become a permanent item on the agendas of all pre-scheduled management meetings in the Namibian public service.

Three respondents (1, 3 and 7) suggested that the Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI), which was in the Office of the Prime Minister at the time of the study, should be in the Presidency as is the case in Botswana. For example, respondent 7 indicated that “as it is now, our permanent secretary is at the same level as others and the Prime Minister (PM) is not the appointing authority of Ministers who are political heads of OMAs. We need to consider the lessons learnt as they were presented in different benchmarking visits undertaken before and during the implementation process” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015). At the same time, respondent 7 suggested that “a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resources should have a permanent agenda item about public service performance” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

Moreover, all nineteen respondents suggested that there should be sources of verification or supporting documents for both good and poor performance and Cabinet members should be trained in the PMS process. Respondent 7 supported this argument stating that “[w]e should make it part of the induction for the new members of Parliament (MPs) or a full course for them at NIPAM” (Respondent 7, 07 February 2015).

Two respondents (2 and 19) were of the opinion that it would not be expedient to start the budgeting process of the following year as this would be in the third quarter of the current budget. Furthermore, five respondents (1, 2, 3, 7 and 19) suggested that the alignment of both the planning and budgeting processes by the

NPC, OPM and MoF and at all levels and that there should be stakeholder involvement in the processes.

Ten respondents (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) were of the opinion that the approved PMS Policy, guidelines and performance standards should be popularised throughout the Namibian public service. In addition, respondent 18 suggested the review of the Regional Council Act 1992 in order to give more power to the PS in the Ministry of Regional Local Government Housing and Rural Development (MRLGHRD) over the administration of the Regional Councils.

Four respondents (6, 8, 9 and 10) suggested that both academic and political requirements should be considered at the political level (e.g. Constituency Councillors, Chairperson of Council and Ministers). In addition, three respondents (4, 13 and 16) indicated that there should be true separation of power between the executive and the legislature in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

Three respondents (3, 14 and 15) suggested that OPM should consider the readiness level of an OMA and RC before it reduced its support. This means that the OPM staff members allocated to each OMA and RC should provide the OMAs and RCs with the required support until they were ready to implement the PMS on their own.

Respondent 2 suggested that “a PMS should not just become a system to chase the numbers but to consider other things (e.g. development, self-assessment and stretching the targets)” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015).

All nineteen respondents recommended that outstanding tools and policies be completed and that the PMS should be integrated with all the human resources aspects (e.g. recruitment, training and development, promotion, reward, recognition and sanction).

The main suggestions that emerged from the above discussion include, namely: locating the PMS unit in the Presidency; intensive training for the PMS facilitators and all staff members including political executives; the consideration of both academic and political requirements in the appointment of Ministers and the Chairpersons of the Regional Councils; performance agreements for political



executives (Ministers); implementing the system fully and changing it a later stage; that public service performance should become a permanent item on the agenda of the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Human Resources; fostering awareness of the PMS policy; guidelines and performance standards throughout the Namibian public service; stakeholder involvement at all levels; all the requisite policies or tools should be in place; minimum academic requirements in the Namibian body politic; a review of the selection and interview system in the public service and the introduction of a social contract between the inhabitants of each Constituency and their Councillor. The next section contains the concluding remarks to chapter 6 as a whole.

#### **6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In short, this chapter presented the data from the two phases of the study, namely: phase one which used the diagnostic tool (limited to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the second phase during which interviews were conducted with respondents from various groups, namely: the PMS facilitators, PMS coordinators, senior managers and politicians. The chapter also included the views expressed in the documentary sources which were deemed relevant to the purposes of the study. The study was guided by the pragmatic research paradigm and used the mixed method approach and an emergent research design.

The key findings presented in this chapter confirmed the fact that there had been major problems in the implementation process of the PMS in the Namibian public service. The most cited problems included, but were not limited, to the following: lack of training, absence of all required tools and policies for the PMS processes, the PMS policy (2011) was approved and distributed very late, unclear reporting lines in the public service, inadequate leadership commitment, absence of a meritocracy appointment process at both the administrative and the political levels, lack of stakeholders involvement, lack of a performance culture and the absence of a dedicated unit for the PMS in both OMAs and RCs.

The most frequently cited requirements for an effective implementation of the PMS included and were not limited to, the following: accountability at all levels including performance agreements for Ministers and social contracts for Constituency

Councillors, motivation or reward, fairness, an inclusive and participatory process, availability of all the tools required to manage performance in the public service, the establishment of a PMS unit in each OMA and RC, regular reviews of Government policies, effective training at all levels and reward and sanction underpinned by fair assessment.

The next chapter, chapter 7, contains an analysis of the data, includes interpretations and discussions of the data which was presented in chapter 6 and based on of the main research question as stated in chapter 1 (see § 1.3) and the literature review (chapters 2 and 3) which was conducted.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **INTERPRETATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS**

#### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter (chapter 6) presented the research results as which emerged from the diagnostic tool, interviews and documentary sources during the data or information collection process. This chapter contains on the analysis, interpretations and discussions of the results which was presented in chapter 6 of the study. The aim of the analysis, interpretations and discussions of the results was to provide possible answers to the research questions, to attempt to realise the research objectives and to make a contribution to the existing scholarship on policy implementation and PMS theories as discussed in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

In attempting to answer the research questions and realise the objectives of the study the main sections of this chapter include the introduction, the criteria for measuring the success and/or failure of the PMS in the Namibian public service, the achievements during the implementation the PMS from 2006 to 2014, the success factors or driving forces that contributed to such achievements, the constraints that contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service, the inclusion of political executives in the PMS implementation and the requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service.

In addition, the discussions and interpretations of the results in this chapter focus on the similarities and differences between the findings of this study and the findings of other studies, thus providing a basis for the conclusions drawn and the contributions of the study. The conclusion to this chapter draws the discussion together by identifying and interpreting the main findings or results, both positive and negative.

## **7.2 CRITERIA FOR MEASURING THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION**

In attempting to answer the main research question of the study, the researcher had to identify the criteria that were used to define and measure the success and/or failure of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. The researcher found that the success and/or failure of the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service could be defined and measured in accordance with the key milestones or the stages of the framework as presented in chapter 6 of the study (see figure 6.1). The criteria are restated below because they form the basis of many of the arguments presented in this chapter on the success and/or failure of the implementation process (see also § 6.2.5):

- The number of OMAs and RCs with plans which met the required standards (Strategic Plans and Annual Plans)
- The number of staff members who had developed and signed performance agreements
- The number of OMAs and RCs that had conducted quarterly review of the signed individual performance agreements
- The number of OMAs and RCs that had conducted performance appraisals on the signed individual performance agreements
- The number of OMAs and RCs that had rewarded performance.

It was found that these criteria also comprised some of the elements of an integrated PMS as suggested by various writers as discussed in chapter 3 (Mutahaba, 2011; Lawrie et al., 2005; Aguinis, et al., 2013). However, the researcher found that all the above criteria focused on a process rather than on the results of the PMS or on a combination of the two. For example, one of the primary objectives of the PMS is to promote a performance culture in the Namibian public service (see § 6.2.3). However, it becomes very difficult and also inappropriate to use the above criteria to measure this objective because they focus not on results but on process. However, the above criteria were deemed appropriate for the purpose of this study which focused on the implementation process. This simply means it was appropriate to use the PMS objectives when conducting an evaluation study that focused on the results or impact of the PMS on the Namibian public service.

Based on the criteria listed above, the next section lists and discusses the achievements in respect of the PMS design and implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

### **7.3 PMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ACHIEVEMENTS**

In reaching the first part of the first research objective, as listed in chapter 1 (see § 1.4), the researcher applied the criteria restated in section 7.2 in order to determine the achievements made in terms of the PMS design and implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 until 2014. The results presented in chapter 6 identified the following achievements, namely: an integrated PMS framework, financial resources from donors and Government, some implementation structures in place, the PMS Principles and Framework, the PMS Capacity Building Toolkit, and the availability of a planning framework for both organisational and individual plans.

The following sections provide a brief discussion of each of the above listed achievements as they relate to the first part of the research objective and the second research question as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

#### **7.3.1 The PMS Framework**

The analysis of the results found that an integrated PMS framework for the Namibian public service had been completed in 2006 and then revised during the development of the PMS Policy (Republic of Namibia, 2011a:12). This was an integrated framework because it includes the required elements as suggested by various authors and discussed in chapter 3 (Mutahaba, 2011; Aguinis, 2013; the 7th CAMPS, 2011; Lawrie et al., 2005). In addition, the framework included the PMS process as well as the financial and human resources processes (see figure 6.1). It was based on a progressive approach because it cascades from national to individual objectives. The PMS Framework for the Namibian public service complied with the characteristics of a good PMS framework as prescribed by the 7th CAMPS (2011:6) of the African Union. The elements of the generic PMS framework for the African Union (AU) member states include (Mutahaba, 2011:8–9): national vision, national medium term development strategy, organisational strategic plan linked to the budget in terms of a medium term expenditure

framework (MTEF), annual institutional plans, institutional performance agreement or contracting, monitoring of implementation, measuring results at the institutional level (output and outcomes), measuring results at the individual level, reward and sanction. However, no performance reward and sanction policy had developed for the Namibian public service at the time of the study.

In addition, the Namibian PMS framework included some elements of the PMS designed for the Singaporean public service, namely: Government-wide Outcomes, Ministry Reporting Mechanism and Individual Performance Management (Government of Singapore, 2008:3). The Namibian PMS framework was complete in terms of design and was in accordance with the views of various writers as discussed in chapter 3 (Mutahaba, 2011; Aguinis, 2013; 7th CAMPS, 2011). However, the fact that the design of the PMS framework was complete did not mean all tools or templates were ready at the time of the study.

The availability of a complete PMS framework for the Namibian public service was a notable achievement because this complete framework informed the development and testing of some of the tools required for its implementation. Finally, the design of the Namibian PMS framework was integrated with all the necessary processes (e.g. PMS processes, human and financial resources processes) as explained by various writers and discussed in chapter 3 (e.g. African Union Commission, 2011:10; Dzimbiri, 2008:46). Aguinis (2009:19) identified “congruencies” as one of the characteristics of an ideal performance system in terms of its design. Congruency refers to the linkage and alignment of all the PMS milestones in view of the inter-dependency between them.

For example, there would not be a strategic plan if there was no PMS framework which determined its implementation approach and there would not be performance reviews if there were no performance agreements. Thus, based on the characteristics of a PMS (an integrated framework) as identified and discussed by various writers in chapter 3 (Armstrong, 2006; Aguinis, 2009; Dzimbiri, 2008; Government of Singapore, 2008; Mutahaba, 2011) the PMS framework designed for the Namibian public service was exactly right and, therefore, it should have been possible to realise its ultimate objectives as discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.2.3).

The success of a PMS requires financial resource as an enabler (Aguinis, 2009). Accordingly, the next section focuses on financial resources as one of the achievement in respect of the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service.

### **7.3.2 The Availability of Financial Resources**

In line with the fifth research question and first part of the first research objective, it was found that there were financial resources available for the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. For example, money was made available from various sources, namely: the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), European Union (EU) and the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) (see § 6.3.2.2.1). This indeed, represented an achievement because the availability of financial resources is one of the conditions for an effective policy as well as the effective implementation of a PMS as identified by various writers and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this study (Aguinis, 2013, 2009; Armstrong, 2006; De Waal, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, 2010; Kreklow, 2006; Dzimbiri, 2008; Saravanja, 2011; Mutahaba, 2011; Cloete et al., 2006).

Thus, the fact that financial resources were available represented a major achievement because it helped to create an enabling environment for an effective PMS in the four most successful OMAs and RCs of the Namibian public service. However, it was also found that the funds from the EU and the ACBF were not sufficient to cover all the related costs and Government had to contribute through its annual budget to expenses such as employee salaries, office space, computers, transport, to mention but a few. However, the availability of financial resources, albeit limited funds, to support the design and implementation process of the PMS was an achievement.

The financial resources discussed above required that there be certain structures in place to carry out the implementation process. Accordingly, the next section focuses on the availability of appropriate implementation structures as one of the achievement in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service.

### **7.3.3 The Implementation Structures**

In line with the sixth research question and the first part of the first research objective, it was found that some structures had been established to support the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service (e.g. Executive Committee, Steering Committee, Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI), the Ministerial or Regional Implementation Teams (MIT), the PMS Internal Facilitators (IFs), the PMS Coordinators and the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) (see §§ 6.2.4 and 6.3.2.2.2). The study results supported the findings of various writers on policy studies and PMSs and as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of the study (Burke et al., 2012; Wessels & Van Jaarsveldt, 2007; Mutahaba, 2011; Aguinis, 2009; 7th CAMPS, 2011; Kaplan & Norton, 2010).

The Namibian PMS support structures were very similar to those of the AU generic framework. However, the Namibian PMS did not make provision for the President/Vice President/Prime Minister to chair the National Oversight Committee (PMSNOC) and there were no Independent Performance Evaluation Task Forces (7th CAMPS, 2011:23–24).

Nevertheless, it was crucial point that there were PMS supporting structures at the national, regional and organisational levels in the Namibian public service (see § 6.2.4) although the effectiveness of these structures was sometimes questionable. For example, despite the fact that some of the key supporting structures were in place implementation was, nevertheless, not driven by the highest authority as per the suggestion made by the African Union (7th CAMPS, 2011:23–24) (see previous paragraph). However, a dedicated central unit for the PMS known as the “Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI)” was established in 2012 and located in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Department Public Service Management (DPSM), in order to coordinate all the PMS activities throughout the Namibian public service.

The establishment of most, if not all of the required structures, was an achievement (see §§ 6.2.4 and 6.3.2.2.2). However, the fact that a central unit was only established in 2012 was an indication that the PMS in the Namibian public service had a false start (see § 6.3.2.2.2). The various activities related to the PMS



had been allocated to different units in the OPM and this had resulted in poor coordination, fragmentation and delays in the implementation process.

The discussions above indicated the existence of a strong relationship between the PMS expertise, the PMS governance structures and the implementation rate in the Namibian public service, because the level of understanding of the PMS among the core team members had informed its design and implementation structures. However, the absence of dedicated units for the PMS in each of the OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service at the time of the study was an issue of major concern (see § 6.3.2.5). The results of this study highlighted the need to establish implementation structures as discussed by the various writers and discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.4.6).

The legality of the PMS was identified as one of the requisite success factors in chapter 3 (see § 3.4). Accordingly, the next section focuses on the availability of the PMS Principle and Framework as one of the achievements recorded for the period covered by this study.

#### **7.3.4 The PMS Principles and Framework**

Public service reform involved moving people out of their comfort zones. It requires a regulatory framework both to enforce it and to give it a legal basis should it be challenged in a court of law (Maphorisa, 2010:6). In line with first part of the first research objection and research question eight of the study, it was found that a PMS Principles and Framework document had been developed in 2006 but that it had not been policy to make it mandatory in the Namibian public service. The PMS Principles and Framework informed the process followed during the formulation of the PMS Policy. However, this policy was only approved by Cabinet in 2011 and distributed at the end of 2014 while the approval of the PMS Policy in 2011 had informed the drafting of the PMS Staff Rules that were approved by Cabinet only in 2015.

It was, thus, clear that there were some regulations relating to the PMS process in place. The results of the study highlighted the argument of Mothusi (2009:121) that “the introduction of PMS Policy Framework in Botswana made it mandatory within the public service, the same applied in the US through the Government

Performance and Result Act of 1993”. Nevertheless, the researcher argued that efforts had been made both to legalise the PMS and to make it mandatory in the Namibian public service. Nevertheless, it appeared that the PMS Policy (2011) had been approved very late and also that it had not reached all everybody at the time of the study. In addition, not all the related policies were in place at the time of the study (e.g. the reward policy).

The next section focuses on the role of capacity building in the effective implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service at the time of the study.

### **7.3.5 The PMS Capacity Building**

In line with the fourth research question and the first part of the first research objective, it was found that efforts had been made to develop the expertise required for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service. The following findings indicate what had been achieved in terms of PMS capacity building:

- The PMS Training Toolkit of 15 Modules was developed and rolled out in the public service from 2006-2007 (see figure 6.2).
- A total number of 135 public servants were trained and specialised as follows: 68 in facilitation, 33 in liaison and 34 in logistics (see § 6.3.2.2.2).
- The 15 PMS Modules were reduced to five by the NIPAM and approximately 2000 public servants had been trained in the new curriculum at the time of the study (see § 6.3.2.2.2).
- The participants indicated that the revised PMS Modules were very good (see figure 6.3).
- About twenty (20) MIT members from various OMAs had been trained in project management by an OPM consultant in 2007 (see § 6.3.2.1.2).

In view of the above it is clear that efforts had been made to building a PMS implementation capacity throughout the Namibian public service. However, the quality of those interventions remained a concern because of the slow implementation which was continuing at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). Muthaura (2009:10) argues that “capacity building is critical in creating the critical mass, sustaining change and to cascade strategic intents at all levels in the public institutions”.

In addition, Saravanja (2011:2) advises that “especially emphasis should be given to the soft skills and behavioural aspects of performance”. The quality of the revised PMS module was particularly significant in this regard (see figure 6.3). It is worth acknowledging that positive efforts had been made in respect of PMS capacity building in order to support the implementation process. However, the impact of the training provided could not be matched with the absence of certain structures and implementation tools, the frequent changes made to the framework, the level of dependency of the OMAs and RCs on the OPM, the leadership style and the implementation approach applied, to mention but a few. Nevertheless, efforts were made by both the OPM and the NIPAM to build implementation expertise among officials (see § 6.3.2.2.2). However, the PMS had not been fully implemented at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

Planning at both the organisational and the individual level is a critical process in the PMS process. The next section focuses on the performance planning as one of the achievements for the period covered by the study.

### **7.3.6 Organisational and Individual Planning**

The results obtained from various sources and presented in chapter 6 indicated a positive achievement in terms of organisational and individual planning (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). At the time of the study a 100% of the OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service had managed strategic and annual plan development (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). It is also important to state that 19 OMAs had put performance agreements in place during the financial year 2012/13 (see table 6.1) and 11 RCs during the financial year 2013/14 (see table 6.2). However, only four out of 44 OMAs and RCs had conducted quarterly performance reviews at the individual level (performance agreements) (see tables 6.1 and 6.2 and paragraph 6.3.2.1).

In addition, the results of the study indicated that the PMS had been piloted in six OMAs during the financial year 2009/2010 and that five PSs had signed performance agreements with the Secretary to Cabinet for the first time (see § 6.3.2.1.2). However, approximately eight OMAs and RCs were able to devise annual plans and performance agreements on their own at the time of the study (see § 6.3.2.1.2).

The findings discussed above confirmed that the Namibian public service had achieved a 100% in terms of strategic and annual plans as the study found that all 31 OMAs and 13 RCs had in place strategic and annual plans for the period covered by the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). The 7th CAMPS (2011:9) states that “[t]he formulation of the medium term institutional strategic plans (MTISP) should be a major element of the PMS process because it clearly spells out the goals; objectives; results; activities; cross-cutting issues; implementation strategy; risks and risk mitigation monitoring, evaluation and reporting; institutional arrangements; summary work plan as well as budget and financing strategy”.

In short, the following noteworthy achievements were identified in the discussions above. First, the PMS framework was in compliance with the AU generic PMS framework and, most importantly, also with some elements of the Singapore’s public service which was well known for its excellent service delivery. Second, financial resources had been made available by the European Union (EU), the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN). Third, a dedicated PMS unit known as the ‘Directorate Performance Improvement’ and located in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Department Public Service Management (DPSM) had been established. Fourth, positive progress had been made towards the legalisation of the PMS in the Namibian public service. Fifth, the PMS implementation capacity was built, to some extent, in the Namibian public service (see § 6.3.2.2.2).

In line with the second research question and the second part of the first research objective, the next section focuses on the success factors that had contributed to the achievements as listed and discussed in section 7.3 for the period covered by the study.

#### **7.4 THE SUCCESS FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION ACHIEVEMENTS**

With regard to the achievements listed and discussed in section 7.3 above, the following were found to constitute the contributing success factors or driving forces, namely: leadership commitment, PMS expertise, the simplification of the PMS framework and the implementation approach adopted. The sub-sections in

this section contain a brief discussion of each of the success factors or driving forces which were identified and which referred to the second part of the first research objective and research questions 3, 4, 5 and 6 as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

#### **7.4.1 Leadership Commitment**

The successful installation and institutionalisation of a PMS presupposes a strong, committed and result oriented leadership (7th CAMPS, 2011:26). In line with research questions 3, 4 and 8 and research objectives 1 and 2, it was found that the achievements discussed in section 7.3 had been characterised by certain elements of leadership commitment, not only in the four most successful OMAs and RCs but, to some extent, the entire Namibian public service. These elements of leadership commitment included the following:

- The decision to implement a PMS for the third time after the suspension of the other two systems (see §§ 6.2.2 and 6.3.2.1) as well as the leadership in individual OMAs and RCs, especially in the most successful OMAs and RCs in the implementation of the system at the time of the study. For example, “[o]ur CRO is taking the PMS very seriously and he is a focused person. He is the driving force behind our success, and he only talks to the managers, then we take it down” (Respondent 9, 11 February 2015). In addition, the results supported the advice given by Meyer (2012:57) that it is incumbent on leaders provide the energy which an organisation and its people require in order to implement strategy.
- The PMS Principles and Framework document (2006) informed both the development of the PMS Training Toolkit and the formulation of the PMS Policy which was approved by the Cabinet of the Republic of Namibia in 2011. Although approved late, the PMS Policy (2011) must be regarded as an achievement because it gave the PMS the legal basis which is one of the conditions for both an effective policy and an effective PMS implementation as discussed in both chapters 2 and 3 of this study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4.3). Van der Waldt (2004:292) advised that “the policy framework needs to be as clear as possible in order to guide the design

and implementation process, clarify the system's aims for the users and provide the basis for the assessment and evaluation of the system".

- The efforts made by the top leadership responsible for public administration at the beginning of the third PMS in sourcing financial resources. For example, the Secretary to Cabinet and the permanent secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) were involved in mobilising financial resources from the EU and ACBF and in the allocation of the PMS budget for the same period as that of the donor funds (EU and ACBF) (see § 6.3.2.2.1). In addition, the leadership of the most successful OMAs and RCs had started to include the PMS activities in their annual budgets although the opposite was true of the least successful OMAs and RCs. In other words, the implementation process of the PMS in the least successful OMAs and RCs was externally driven as opposed to that of the most successful OMAs and RCs. In their study, Jooste and Fourie (2009:51) found that a lack of leadership, and especially strategic leadership, at the top of the organisation was one of the major barriers to effective strategy implementation.
- The approval by the Public Service Commission of Namibia for establishing a DPI in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in 2012 and also other implementing structures (see § 6.3.2.2.2). Although performance management is one of the functions of line managers, its effective implementation requires appropriate structures to spearhead its design and implementation process (7th CAMPS, 2011). The establishment of a DPI in the Office of the Prime Minister had contributed to the achievements recorded at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).
- The PSs and RCs of the most successful OMAs and RCs were driving the PMS implementation process internally (see § 6.3.2.2.3). In this vein, Pulakos (2004:22) stated that "[i]n the case of performance management, an organisation with a committed CEO, who models effective performance management with the executive team and establishes clear expectations around performance for all staff, will have a much high probability of success than one that does not have high-level support".

The above points confirmed the findings of other studies on the conditions for an effective policy implementation and PMS as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of the study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4.2). Cloete et al. (2006:301) indicated that “the success of the South East Asia Tigers can basically be attributed to the fact that they were all strong states with strong leaders driving clear, feasible developmental visions and good strategic governance”. Leadership commitment was available to some extent, but due to limited expertise in the subject, it was not kept alive throughout the process as a requirement in change management.

Furthermore, it was evident that leadership had been a key driving force behind the achievements discussed in section 7.3 because it was as a result of leadership commitment that money had been made available, the policy framework had been taken up for discussion, strategic and annual plans had been developed in OMAs and RCs and, most importantly, the PMS was a standing item on the agendas for the management meetings of three most successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service (see § 6.3.2.2.3).

However, it was also evident that leadership commitment was not present in all the OMAs and RCs because not all had performance agreements in place and neither had they conducted reviews. It is true that strategic plans had been officially launched due to leadership commitment shown by the political heads (Minister or Governor) in OMAs and RCs. However, only four (two OMAs and two RCs) had made positive progress at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

It was concluded in chapters 2 and 3 of the study that expertise was one of the success factors behind an effective PMS policy and its implementation (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4). The next section discusses how expertise had contributed to the achievements recorded from 2006 to 2014.

#### **7.4.2 The Role of Expertise in the PMS Implementation**

With regard to the fourth research question and the first part of the first research objective, as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), it was found that efforts had been made to build the expertise required for an effective PMS, for example, the training of staff members on 15 modules and the revised curriculum by the OPM and the NIPAM (see figures 6.2 and 6.3). The results further indicated that the

workshop which was held for all PSs at Mokuti Lodge in 2013 had given them an understanding of both the PMS and its implementation process and that this had improved the level of their support for the implementation process. This argument was confirmed by fact that nineteen OMAs had managed to develop performance agreements (see table 6.1).

The above results highlighted the findings of various writers on the need to build the required expertise as discussed in chapter 2 and 3 of the study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4). For example, Nyembezi (2009:27) advised that it is essential that training focuses on the process of managing, motivating and evaluating employee performance. Most importantly, the 7th CAMPS (2011:27) argued that “successful design and installation of a PMS require a critical mass of expertise of higher order”. The main aim behind the development of the PMS Training Toolkit had been to create the critical mass required, sustain change and cascade strategic intents to all the levels of the public institutions (Muthaura, 2009:10).

Burke et al. (2012:10) argued that effective policy implementation requires an implementation team of individuals with specific expertise in the policy, service or programme being implemented. This study found that the capacity building interventions conducted by the OPM and the NIPAM had contributed to an understanding of the benefits of an effective PMS (see § 6.3.2.2.4) and that this had motivated some of the staff members to drive the system internally. For example, respondent 17 had stated that the “PMS is a human resources function and mine started as an interest, then it becomes my baby” (Respondent 17, 23 February 2015).

The researcher concluded that successful implementation of the PMS requires dedicated staff members and senior managers who enjoy the process of implementation itself (self-regulation) rather than merely complying with the directives from the highest office in the public service. This argument is in line with what is referred to as internal motivation rather than external motivation. Hersey et al. (2008:43) advised that it is imperative that managers know their people in order to understand what motivate them and that they must not just make assumptions. It was also evident that the PMS capacity building interventions conducted by the OPM and the NIPAM were one of the success factors or driving forces that had



contributed to the achievements recorded from 2006 to 2014 and as displayed by tables 6.1 and 6.2.

The next section focuses on the simplification of the PMS framework in 2008 as one of the driving forces or success factors which had contributed to the PMS achievements discussed in section 7.3.

#### **7.4.3 The Simplification of the PMS Framework**

In line with the third research question and the research objectives 1 and 2, it was found that the performance management framework had been simplified in 2008 because it had been found to be complicated. This was confirmed by respondent 2 who stated that “over the years there had been changes from Logical Framework (1996-2005) and Balanced Scorecard (2006-2008) and, around 2008, an instruction was given to simplify it and we came up with a Namibian model (from 2009 to 2014) which was adjusted to fit the budget, MTEF, strategic plan and other activities” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015). This statement made by respondent 2 was confirmed by the implementation rate as depicted in tables 6.1 and 6.2 because it was only in 2009, after the simplification of the framework, that both the OMAs and the RCs had started to develop their own individual performance agreements and conduct quarterly reviews. This point confirmed the findings of both Aguinis (2009) and Saravanja (2011) that a PMS should be simple and practical by design. Similarly, Mbigi (2009) argues that the templates should be able to be completed by a person with five years of schooling.

The above confirmed that the simplification of the PMS framework in 2008 had helped six OMAs and two RCs to develop their first performance agreements during the financial year 2009/2010. It was only during 2009/2010 that six OMAs and two RCs had developed their first performance agreements (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). This was also confirmed by five respondents who stated that the OMAs and the RCs that they represented had achieved 100% on the following milestones at the time of the study, namely: strategic plans, annual plans, performance agreements and quarterly reviews (see § 6.3.2.1.2). These five respondents were from the four most successful institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) at the time of the study. These results further strengthened the findings of the literature as discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.4.1), namely, the simplicity, clarity

and practicality of the system impact on the success of the system. Thus, in line with the third research question, it was concluded that the simplification of the PMS framework had had an impact on the PMS implementation rate in the Namibian public service.

The review and discussion of the scholarship on implementation studies in chapter 2 had not identified the best implementation approach (see § 2.2.2). However, the next section focuses on the implementation approach which was applied as one of the success factors or driving forces behind the achievements as listed and discussed in section 7.3 of this study.

#### **7.4.4 The PMS Implementation Approach**

In line with the third research question and research objectives 1 and 2 as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), it was found that a top-down approach complemented by ongoing consultation had contributed to the good implementation rate observed among the four most successful institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) at the time of the study. However, the emphasis was more on a top-down approach rather than on a complete hybrid implementation approach. This approach was applied in the most successful OMAs and RCs. For example, respondent 1 indicated that “we started with the senior managers (top down approach) whereby we made presentations to senior managers in order for them to be able to drive the implementation process” (Respondent 1, 02 February 2015). Similarly, respondent 2 stated that “[w]e worked together with senior managers in order to help them to understand or get the value of the PMS” (Respondent 2, 03 February 2015). This was contrary to the approach adopted in the four least successful institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) which appeared to have applied the bottom up approach in their implementation of the PMS (see § 6.3.2.3.4).

Thus, in line with the third research question, it was found that the most successful OMAs and RCs had applied the top-down approach complemented by ongoing consultation as opposed to the least successful OMAs and RCs which had applied the bottom-up approach. In addition, it was also found that the bottom-up approach had been the dominant approach at the inception of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service because the implementation had

been left in the hands of the junior staff members who had attended the PMS training conducted by the OPM from 2006 until 2007.

The results of this study strengthened the findings of other writers as discussed in chapter 2 (see § 2.2.2) to the effect that policy implementation required a hybrid approach. However, the findings of this study also indicated that a top-down approach with an element of ongoing consultation was the best approach for an effective PMS in the public service because such an approach is top down by design while its success requires that it is owned and driven by the top leadership throughout the public service. For example, it was the accounting officers of the most successful OMAs and RCs who had driven the implementation process as opposed what had transpired in the least successful OMAs and RCs. These results complement the findings of other writers in the subject of PMS and who supported the top down approach because top leadership is responsible for the strategic agenda (Kaplan & Norton, 2010; Aguinis, 2009; Saravanja, 2011; Syrett, 2012; Muthaura, 2009; Kreklow, 2006). Pulakos (2004:22) argues that “starting at the top and getting the commitment of upper management to make performance management priority is a prerequisite for success”. For example, in Singapore, the Cabinet is responsible for all government policies and the day-to-day administration of the affairs of state (Government of Singapore, 2005:7). This argument also supports the discussions on individual performance agreements for politicians as indicated in the third and the ninth research questions (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

In line with the fourth research objective of the study, the study found consensus among the respondents that both the commitment of top leadership and the involvement of all staff members below management were crucial in respect of an effective PMS implementation in the Namibian public service or any other organisation.

In short, it was concluded that the PMS implementation achievements as identified and discussed in section 7.3 of this study could be attributed to, but were not limited, to the following driving forces or success factors: leadership commitment on the part of some but not all leaders at both the political and the administrative levels because it was through such commitment that support structures had been

approved, money was made available, the PMS Policy (2011) was approved by Cabinet, strategic and annual plans developed by all the OMAs and RCs and that the PMS became a standing item on the agendas of the management meetings in the most successful OMAs and RCs in the Namibian public service. In the same vein, Cloete et al. (2006:301) argue that “[c]ompetent and people-oriented leaders mobilise resources, enact laws, and establish implementation structures including oversight bodies to ensure accountability for public policy implementation”.

Therefore, it was not feasible that the rate of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service would be high with a commitment only in a handful of top leaders mostly in the identified four most successful OMAs and RCs. In addition, although remarkable achievements were identified, it was found that the PMS had not been fully implemented in the Namibian public service as not one of the 31 OMAs and 13 RCs, including the most successful, had completed the entire process at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The next section focuses on the constraints experienced in the implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014.

## **7.5 CONSTRAINTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE POOR PMS IMPLEMENTATION**

In line with the problem statement, main research question and the last part of the first research objective as stated in chapter 1 of this study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), it was found that the PMS had not been fully implemented at the time of the study. The following were the main constraints identified, namely: absence of full leadership commitment, minimal stakeholder involvement and consultation, the bottom-up implementation approach, inadequate supporting documents (e.g. the reward policy, performance standards and national monitoring and evaluation framework) and the complexity of the PMS framework. It is also important to note that some of the factors mentioned were regarded as achievements, success factors and constraints at different points in the study. The sub-sections in this section provide a brief discussion of each of the constraints identified in line with the last part of the first research objective and research questions 3 to 8.

### **7.5.1 Absence of Full Leadership Commitment**

In line with the last part of the first research objective and research question three as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4) of this study, it was found that there was an absence of full leadership commitment in the four least successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, in the entire Namibian public service. For example, four respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) from the least successful OMAs and RCs cited the following as factors that had contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS, namely: No point of coordination, lack of ownership and buy-in, lack of cooperation on the part of management with the OPM facilitators, lack of response to communications from the OPM and the prolonged acting capacity of leadership positions. In addition, respondent 3, who was one the PMS facilitators in the OPM, raised a concern that the “OPM has been pushing others without it leading by example and, as a result, we could not feel the content of the system” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). In addition, two respondents (3 and 7), who were the PMS facilitators in the OPM, indicated that, although the Secretary to Cabinet and permanent secretaries had signed the performance agreements, they had never met to review them as per the PMS Policy (2011).

The above findings support the conclusions of certain writers that the stronger the leadership commitment, the greater the potential for programme success (Pulakos, 2004:22; Kaplan & Norton, 2010:20). In their study, Jooste and Fourie (2009:51) found that a lack of leadership and, specifically, strategic leadership, at the top of the organisation was one of major barriers to effective strategy implementation. This conclusion of Jooste and Fourie (2009) both reflected and was relevant to the situation that had contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS in the least successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service of Namibia.

In reviewing the success factors and constraints which play a role in an effective PMS, it was found that it was possible to discern leadership in both the success factors and the constraints. This conclusion is supported by the scholarship on policy and PMS to the effect that leadership commitment may be a success factor while inadequate leadership may also operate as a constraint in effective PMS implementation (Cloete et al., 2006; Aguinis, 2009; Lawrie et al., 2005).

Stakeholder involvement and consultation are an integral component of any democratic and legitimate government (Heywood, 2007). The Government of the Republic of Namibia was established on the basis of democratic principles (Republic of Namibia, 1990a). The next section focuses on the lack of stakeholder involvement and consultation as one of the factors that had contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service.

### **7.5.2 Minimal Stakeholder Involvement and Consultation**

Despite the fact that the Government of the Republic of Namibia was established based on democratic principles the study found that minimal stakeholder involvement and consultation during the design and implementation process was one of the main constraints in an effective PMS in the Namibian public service. Respondent 3, who was a PMS facilitator in the OPM, indicated that “stakeholder involvement has been neglected because even the current Steering Committee is more of the OPM and, when we change or redesign something, it was the only OPM” (Respondent 3, 3 February 2015). In this vein European Union (2015:4) found that “[t]he Namibian PMS as designed does not facilitate ownership by OMAs and RCs as it is based on directives and instructions from the OPM, with limited consultations and feedback from stakeholders. Most importantly, the PMS project lacks a strategy for communication and information dissemination to stakeholders”.

The findings indicated that the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service had not complied with advice given by the African Union that “the exercise ought to involve all stakeholders, including politicians, senior public servants, nongovernmental organisations as well as members of the general public” (7th CAMPS, 2011:29). Therefore, in line with the seventh research question and the last part of the research objective, it was concluded that a lack of or minimal stakeholder involvement and consultation had been one of the constraints which had hampered the PMS implementation not only in the least successful OMAs and RCs but, to some extent, throughout the Namibian public service. The findings strengthened the findings by Burke et al. (2012:12) on the benefits of stakeholders’ involvement and consultation, namely, that “ongoing consultation with all relevant stakeholders is vital for successful implementation

because it creates awareness and buy-in and reduces resistance”. In addition, Lambeth (2007:6) advised that “involve and get support from people within the system as early, openly and as fully as possible”.

Namibia obtained independence 25 years ago. However, at time of the study the dominant type of leadership in the country was influenced primarily by the military or army command structure. In view of the fact that the majority of the senior managers had either been part of the colonial administration which had never consulted the people it governed and former SWAPO freedom fighters who had operated in command structures for many years before independence. Therefore, the situation in the Namibian public service requires an in-depth analysis in order to find a lasting solution, especially in view of Namibia’s Vision 2030 and beyond.

With regard to the fourth research objective of the study (see § 1.4), the situation requires ongoing transformational interventions by the Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM) in terms of both political and administrative leadership because it was established by Act 10 of 2010 and mandated to transform the Namibian public sector through capacity building. The results of this study support the existing scholarship on the value of stakeholder involvement in the interests of an effective PMS policy and also effective PMS implementation as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this study (see §§ 2.2.3 and 3.4.5).

The next section focuses on the PMS implementation structures in the eight selected OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service as one of the constraints in the effective implementation of the PMS.

### **7.5.3 The PMS Implementation Structures**

In line with the sixth research question and the last part of the first research objective as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), it was found that the PMS implementation structures had hampered the effective implementation of the PMS in the eight selected OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire Namibian public service at the time of the study. For example, seventeen respondents expressed their concern about the absence of a permanent structure (PMS unit) in the OMAs and RCs that they represented because both the MIT and RIT

members and the PMS coordinators were obliged to carry out the core functions for which they had been employed. In addition, three respondents (1, 7 and 3) indicated that the DPI had only been established in 2012 despite the fact that the PMS had been ready for implementation in 2006 (see § 6.3.2.3.2).

The results of the study did indicate that the Namibian public service had established some of the required oversight bodies (see § 6.3.2.2.2). However, certain gaps or differences between the AU generic requirements regarding the PMS oversight bodies and as discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.3) were observed. Firstly, the National Oversight Committee was not chaired by the President/Vice President/Prime Minister but by the Secretary to Cabinet. In addition, there appeared to be little or no commitment on the part of this body because it was reported to have met not more than three times over nine years (6.2.4).

Secondly, the Steering Committee did not consist of the permanent secretaries of the central ministries as per the AU suggestion in 2011 but, instead, of OPM senior managers and optional members from the NIPAM and NPC (see § 6.2.4). In addition, the Steering Committee was not chaired by the permanent secretary to the President as per the AU suggestion in 2011 but by the Prime Minister (PM) (see § 6.2.4).

Thirdly, the DPI was not staffed with staff members with a high level expertise because all of them had indicated that they had not been exposed to any professional training on the PMS but that they had learnt by doing and/or reading on their own (see § 6.3.2.3.4).

In addition, the implementation approaches (bottom-up and “willing buyer willing seller”) adopted by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) from 2006–2013 had wasted too much time and money (see § 6.3.2.3.5). It was only when the OPM had adopted the top-down approach with the launch of the PSs during 2013/14 that there had been a slight improvement in the PMS implementation (see § 6.3.2.2.4).

In view of the above, it was also concluded that the Namibian public service had had what the researcher referred to as a ‘false start’ in introducing and implementing the PMS. Furthermore, the results supported the suggestions made



by the 7th CAMPS (2011:23–24) on the structures and who should chair such structures, including the location of the PMS unit, because it is a transformative initiative by design (see § 3.3). Maphorisa (2010:9) states that reform requires pressure as well as the authority to hold public servants accountable for setting and achieving targets at all levels. The absence of a dedicated DPI from the beginning had resulted in a situation of what was referred to as ‘fragmented accountability’ by Parsons (2005) and DeGroff and Cargo (2009). Moreover, the results supported the findings of the studies by Jooste and Fourie (2009) and Saravanja (2011) that top leadership support is important because committees may sometimes be too unimportant or not sufficiently representative to be able to make decisions affecting the whole process.

The completeness of the system by design was one of the success factors identified and discussed in chapter 3 (see § 3.4). The next section discusses how an incomplete design was one of the constraints to an effectiveness PMS in the Namibian public service.

#### **7.5.4 Inadequate Supporting Documents (Incompleteness)**

In line with the last part of the first research objective and the second research question as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4) of this study, it was found that, although the PMS framework was complete, not all the supporting documents were in place during the implementation process or that some had been approved very late. The following documents or regulations were absent or had been approved late, namely: Reward Policy (absent), the PMS Policy (2011), the PMS Staff Rules (2015), the Performance Standards and Customer Service Charters (absent) and the National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (absent). Thus, the policy implementers had nothing with which to guide them during the implementation process. The absence or late approval of some supporting documents led to the researcher’s conclusion that the Namibian public service had implemented an incomplete system. The study also found that there was a relationship between leadership commitment, expertise and the completeness of the PMS design at the time of the study.

The next sections briefly discuss each sub-section on the absence or late approval of the documents as identified at the beginning of this section, namely: the

absence of the Reward Policy, the Performance Standards and the National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the late approval of the PMS Policy and Staff Rules.

#### 7.5.4.1 The Absence of a Reward Policy

The results of the study indicated that the absence of a reward policy in the Namibian public service had been one of the constraints that had hampered the effective implementation of the PMS. The study also found the prevalence of a monetary reward mind set at the time of the study. For example, eight respondents shared a similar sentiment that there was nothing to motivate staff members in respect of the PMS because they were looking for a monetary reward (see § 6.3.2.3.5). However, respondent 2, who was one of the senior managers in the OPM, indicated that the OPM was busy working on the reward and retention policy at the time of the study (Respondent 2, 3 February 2015). These findings were contrary to those of Apreku (2011:2) that reward and recognition as well as the attraction and retention of talent were critical in an effective PMS in the public or civil service. In support of this view, Armstrong (2006:20) argued that the aim of reward management is to “reward people according to what the organisation values and wants to pay; reward people for the value they create; develop a performance culture; motivate people and obtain their commitment and engagement; help to attract and retain high quality people that the organisation needs; develop a positive employment relationship; operate fairly; apply equitably; function consistently; and operate transparently”.

The researcher supports the argument that true motivation is driven by achievements and not by monetary reward and incentive and that it is strengthened the need to cultivate a culture of sacrifice and the love of serving others without monetary return. In their studies (Saravanja, 2011:2; Nghaamwa, Siamwanda, Hamuteta, Shilongo, Auwanga & Immanuel, 2014:8, Neilson et al., 2008:1) conclude that a lack of a reward or a motivation system was one of the main reasons why performance management failed in many organisations.

It was found that a servanthood spirit was low in the Namibian public service at the time of the study. Servanthood relates to the definition of the term ‘public servant’, namely, “any person who works for any part of the central, regional or local

government or parastatals” (Republic of Namibia, 2011b:4). This definition of the term ‘public servant’ should promote or instil a spirit of servanthood or sacrifice among public servants in the Namibian public service and, thus, money should not be their ultimate goal.

Accordingly, with regard to the fourth objective of the study (see § 1.4), the researcher’s view is that a change in the reward mind set would require exemplary leadership in Namibian society as a whole and not only in the Namibian Government. For example, the school curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary institutions should cultivate a sense of patriotism among the Namibian youth as these institutions prepare young people for their future roles in society. The dominant mind set of the public servants is the most vital factor in transforming in the Namibian public service because good thoughts result in good actions, repeated good actions, good habits and, eventually, good attitudes (NIPAM, 2015b:42). It may, thus, be concluded that, in order to bring about a positive or good attitude towards the PMS, it is necessary to shift the dominant mind set in the Namibian public service. According to Senge (2006:69), shifting a mind-set refers to changing the way of thinking among individuals or groups.

#### 7.5.4.2 The Absence of Performance Standards

The results of this study indicated that performance standards were not in place. The study also found that the OPM was in the process of reviewing all Customer Service Charters in the public service (see § 6.3.2.3.5). The United States America (2015:1) defines the term ‘performance standards’ as “[a] management-approved expression of the performance threshold(s), requirement(s), or expectation(s) that must be met to be appraised at a particular level of performance and a fully successful (or equivalent) standard must be established for each critical element and included in the employee performance plan”. An example of a performance standard at the operational level may be “[d]eliver the mails with 100% accuracy to each department by 10:00 daily” (Bussin, 2013:22). In the absence of both performance standards and Customer Service Charters in key service areas in the OMAs and RCs, there was a possibility that the KPIs contained in various performance agreements were not in line with the customers’ requirements or as compared to the best in the region, on the African continent and in the world. The

Government of Singapore (2008:3) advised that “review Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) annually to ensure relevance and keep them to a critical few to preserve clarity and focus”.

In line with the advice of the Singaporean Government (2008), this study found that the strategic and annual plans in the Namibia public service stipulated too many objectives and also that the majority of the KPIs were more quantitative (e.g. number of policies formulated) and less qualitative (e.g. number of policies formulated in line with the approved standards) in their design. The study also found that there was a relationship between the absence of performance standards and Customer Service Charters and the quality of the KPIs in the various plans at the time of the study.

The conclusion drawn, which may also form part of the future research, was that an absence of performance standards makes it difficult, if not possible, for supervisors to develop and manage the performance agreements of their staff members, especially at the operational level. This situation is likely to cause problems when a PMS is fully implemented and is also linked to monetary reward because of the potential for inconsistency in the system’s application.

Accordingly, in line with the fourth research objective of the study, the researcher recommends the establishment of the performance standards or Customer Service Charters in all key service areas in the Namibian public service in order to ensure an effective PMS in terms of process and also results to the beneficiaries of the system. The study suggested that key performance standards must be in place before a PMS is implemented fully and then be adjusted in consultation with the service or products users.

#### 7.5.4.3 The Absence of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

The results of this study indicated that the design of the Namibian PMS framework had made provision for the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework (M&E) (see figure 6.1). The study also found that the M&E framework was being developed by a committee under the supervision of the National Planning Commission (NPC). In this vein respondent 19 indicated that “in the absence of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Framework, there is a reporting fatigue

in the public service because different institutions (OPM, NPC and MoF) have different needs and use different reporting formats” (Respondent 19, 27 February 2015).

In addition, it was also found that there was no common understanding of the key concepts that were used in the various plans (e.g. strategic initiatives, programmes and projects). The absence of a common understanding of key concepts had created problems with the type of data that were collected and how the data was fed into the next level. In addition, in the absence of a national monitoring and evaluation framework, it was difficult for both the Government and institutions to determine the effectiveness of their plans in respect of the three main aspects of development, namely: the social, economic and political aspects of the country. The most serious issue in this respect was also the absence of a dedicated unit for M&E in each OMA and RC in the Namibian public service.

Thus, in line with the last part of the first objective of the study as stated in chapter 1 (§1.4), the researcher interpreted the above situation as follows:

Firstly, there was clearly a relationship between leadership commitment, expertise and the absence of relevant units (e.g. M&E and PMS unit) throughout the Namibian public service. The establishment of structures and the speedy development of an M&E depended on the level of understanding and commitment of the leadership at both the national and organisational levels. At the time of the study, the Republic of South Africa had in place a Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) in the Presidency, while quarterly reports provided Cabinet with a strategic agenda which focused on achieving the key priorities of the government (Republic of South Africa, 2012:3).

Secondly, the absence of an M&E framework in the Namibian public service may also have influenced the quality of the debates or discussions at both the Cabinet and Parliament levels as a result of the quality of the available data or information. In the absence of a national M&E, it was difficult to determine which OMAs and RCs in the public service Namibia were performing well and which were performing poorly. For example, in the Republic of South Africa it (M&E) had resulted in a higher level understanding of both the challenges each department

faced and also how the work of the various departments affected other departments (Republic of South Africa, 2012:15).

Thirdly, the study found a low level of compliance with the PMS framework of the African Union because, according to the African Union Commission (2011:15) the monitoring, measurement and evaluation of performance should be a critical stage in the overall process of performance management in general and performance agreements in particular.

Finally, the absence of an M&E framework in the Namibian public service had not only hampered the PMS implementation process but it had also constituted a risk to the electorate's trust and confidence in the government of the day as it was not able to report accurately on the progress and impact of its development programmes on the various OMAs and RCs. In their study Low and Tan (2008:2) found that "[s]ervice delivery is among the most commonly acknowledged factors affecting citizens' trust in the government's ability to deliver public service effectively and efficiently".

#### 7.5.4.4 Late Approval of the PMS Policy and Staff Rules

As reported by Muthaura (2009:4), the following lesson was learnt from Kenya, namely, that "the absence of a legal framework to steer reform throughout the public sector was one of the main constraints [to implementation]". In line with the last part of the first research objective and research questions 2, 3 and 8, it was found that the legal basis of the PMS was questionable because the PMS Policy and Staff Rules had been approved very late. For example, the PMS Policy was approved by Cabinet in 2011 and distributed to OMAs and RCs at the end of 2014 while the Staff Rules were only approved and distributed to the entire public service at the beginning of 2015.

This finding was confirmed by respondent 13 who was the chairperson of one of the regulatory bodies at the time of the study. Respondent 13 stated that "we do not have all the tools or documents needed for the PMS implementation". This finding supports the conclusion drawn by Saravanja (2011:1) that applying an incomplete system leads to "a loss of credibility, time, financial and human resources, and increase(s) resistance to change and a low acceptance of the new

PMS". In addition, the late approval of the Staff Rules (2015) was an indication that the PMS had not been integrated with other human resources aspects such as appointment. This supported the conclusion drawn by Nghidinwa (2007:20) that appointments of management carders were not based on merit but on political basis. This type of appointment method may result in poor policy implementation as a result of the limited expertise and increased mismatch rate in the public service.

Thus, in line with question eight of this study, it was concluded that the legal basis of the system was questionable and also that it was difficult to make it mandatory because the PMS policy and Staff Rules had been approved very late. In addition, the absence of the PMS Staff Rules at the beginning of the process had made it difficult for both human resources and supervisors to guide the process. This was also one of the reasons why even the four most successful OMAs and RCs had not completed the process at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

The above discussions focused on the incompleteness of the PMS in the Namibian public service as one of the main constraints which had contributed to its poor implementation. The next section focuses on the complexity of the PMS framework and how this had contributed to the problem statement and main research question of the study as stated in chapter 1 (see § 1.3).

### **7.5.5 The Complexity of the PMS Framework**

In reference to the third research question of the study as stated in chapter 1 (see § 1.3), it was found that, initially, the PMS framework and templates for the Namibian public service had been complex. The PMS had been simplified in 2008 after it was found to be complicated. In this vein four respondents (1, 2, 3 and 7) had indicated that the situation had resulted in an overdependence on the OPM facilitators on the part of OMAs and RCs in terms of strategic planning, annual planning, performance agreements and reviews. Despite the fact that training was provided by the NIPAM and OPM, four OMAs and RCs only had been able to do it on their own. However, the most successful OMAs and RCs had not completed their implementation of the system while a lack of understanding of the appraisal and rating process were some of the problems identified.

Accordingly, the study concluded that the system was not that simple. Even after it had been simplified in 2008, the rate of implementation had remained a problem – see tables 6.1 and 6.2. In line with the fourth research question of this study, it was concluded that the complexity of the system had depended on expertise of the design team because all the members of the design team had indicated that they had not attend any professional training on the PMS (see § 6.3.2.3.4). As a result of the fact that the design team had possessed the required expertise the design of the system should have simple and that would have made it easy for staff members to complete the requisite forms (e.g. performance agreements, reviews and appraisal) with minimal support from the PMS facilitators in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). This finding was contrary to the advice given by Mbigi (2010) and Aguinis (2009) on the need for a simple design of the PMS forms. It appeared that the complexity of the system was caused by the limited subject knowledge and skills during the design and implementation process and that had cascaded down to the entire public service. In support, one of the PMS facilitator, who was driving the process, indicated that “[w]e cannot claim that we are capacitated at a level of a driver” (Respondent 3, 3 February 2015). This was also contrary to the advice given by Aguinis (2009:20) that it is essential that the design team is knowledgeable about the subject in question. This point constitutes what the researcher referred to as ‘a false start’ because the design team was supposed to have been exposed to both the theory and practices of the system before the design and implementation process. There is a strong relationship between the existing PMS expertise and its simplicity as perceived by the users. The simplicity of the PMS system depends on the expertise required for its design and also during the implementation process.

In addition, the EU Mid-term Review (2008:15) found that “the PMS concept in the Namibian public service was too ambitious and complicated”. As a result, there were changes on the frameworks before it was piloted during the 2009/2010 financial year. The complexity of the PMS tools and the frequent changes to the framework had resulted from the limited expertise in the PMS in the Namibian public service.



For example, the use of the term ‘operational objective’ and what was expected in terms of an “operational objective” constituted outputs at the level of the jobholder. However, the use of the word ‘objective’ and what was expected as outputs had created more complications. In addition, the design of the PMS tools (e.g. performance agreements) had not taken into account all the levels of public servants in the public service. Moreover, there was a relationship between the complexity of the forms, the level of expertise and stakeholder involvement because some of the issues which arose could have been sorted out during the design phase. The overdependence on the OPM on the part of the OMAs and the RCs was not their making but a design problem because it was not possible for the system to administer itself.

In short, the above discussions provided answers to several of the research questions (3, 4, 6, 7 and 8) and also meant that the last part of the first objective as stated in chapter 1 of this study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4) was realised. The absence of full leadership commitment, minimal stakeholder involvement and consultation, the PMS implementation structure, inadequate supporting documents (incompleteness of the system), the complexity of the PMS framework and inadequate expertise were some of the main constraints which were hampering an effective performance management at the time of the study.

Chapter 3 of the study revealed that there had been inadequate discussion on performance agreements for politicians (see § 3.3 and figure 3.2). In line with the third objective and research question nine as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), the next section focuses on the inclusion of political executives in the implementation process of the PMS.

## **7.6 THE INCLUSION OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES IN THE PMS IMPLEMENTATION**

The review of existing scholarship indicated that the issue of political accountability has been well documented in political science (Heywood, 2007). The new notion to include politicians through individual performance agreements was being practised in some African countries (e.g. South Africa and Rwanda) while the possibility of such a step was being discussed in Namibia at the time of

the study. However, the review of the relevant documents and publications led to the conclusion that there had been inadequate discussion on performance agreements for politicians (see § 3.3 and figure 3.2). In order to answer the research question nine and realise the third research objective of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), this section includes the following sub-sections, namely: the need for performance agreements for political executives, the content of such performance agreements and social contracts and their implementation modalities.

#### **7.6.1 The Need for Performance Agreements and Social Contracts for Politicians**

The respondents were asked whether political executives should also sign individual performance agreements and also to motivate their answers. All nineteen respondents who were interviewed supported the notion. One of the main reasons provided by the respondents was that the political executives are the political heads of governments' institutions and they are accountable to both Cabinet and Parliament. Although the results of the study found that there were institutions of accountability in the Namibian Government (e.g. Parliament, Office of the Auditor General, Anti-Corruption Commission, Office of the Ombudsman and Civil Society Organisation) (see chapter 4), the politicians interviewed (respondents 4 and 16) supported the notion of introducing individual performance agreements to strengthen accountability. In addition, poor performance and the return of money to treasury had been reported in both the Government Accountability Reports and the print media (Beukes, 2015:1), hence a need to introduce a system which is specific and with clear outcomes at all levels.

Furthermore, although the approved PMS Policy (2011) made provision for political executives to co-sign the performance agreements of their accounting officers/permanent secretaries, the study found that they were direct political and financial accountability should there be any failure to do so. The initial focus of this study was on political executives in the central government. However, during the interviews at the regional government level it was suggested that this notion should be extended to the constituency councillors through a social contract because they were directly elected by the people. The interviewees suggested

that a social contract should be signed between the constituency councillors and the inhabitants of their constituencies. In line with research question nine and the third research objective, templates for performance agreements for political executives and social contracts for the constituency councillors were developed (see Appendices 9 and 10).

The next section focuses on the content of the performance agreements and social contracts for politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the implementation of such performance agreements and social contracts.

### **7.6.2 The Content of the Performance Agreement and Social Contract**

During the interviews all the respondents were asked to suggest the possible content or the focus area of the performance agreements at political level in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. The results of the study indicated that the design (content) of the performance agreement for political executives should be different from, but aligned, to that of their accounting officers. For example, all nineteen respondents were of the opinion that the performance agreements of political executives should take into account the NDPs' desired outcomes (Dos) which were included in the sectoral and strategic plans of the respective OMAs and RCs (see § 6.3.2.4.3). In addition, respondent 3 indicated that "the SWAPO Manifesto and NDP 4 are very clear on the outcomes and only those key results should be considered" (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). Thus, in line with the third research objective of the study, it was concluded that the performance agreements of the political executives need to focus on the outcomes and not primarily on the outputs like those of their accounting officers.

For example, the study found that the ministers in the Government of the Republic of South Africa had performance agreements (Republic of South Africa, 2012:3). However, the researcher observed a number of gaps in the South African system that should be considered in the design of the performance agreements for the political executives in the Namibian Government. Firstly, there was no column for desired outcome but, instead, there was a column for sub-output to which the indicators were linked. This implies that the focus was on outputs rather than on the outcomes which are more crucial in terms of their social and economic impact. Secondly, the indicator titles were not worded in such a way that they provided the

baselines of the expected performance. Thirdly, there were no weights for each indicator title. This would probably make the assessments and ratings difficult at the end of the year. Fourthly, there were several signatories although these signatures should have appeared on the sectoral plan or through the memoranda of understanding (MOU) between key institutions. Although this policy was benefited team work but it should be the case for individual performance agreements. Finally, the design of the performance agreement was based on the once-off annual appraisal and may place the government at risk, because of the time required to obtain the report and initiate timely actions.

Therefore, the design of the performance agreement for the Namibian political executives should make a significant contribution in filling the gaps identified and discussed above in reference to the performance agreement being used by the Government of the Republic of South Africa at the time of the study. In addition, as pointed out earlier, it was found that a social contract between the Constituency Councillors and their electorates be introduced, because the Constituency Councillors are elected directly by the people and not appointed by the President as are Ministers. It was also suggested that the social contract should be accompanied by the Constituency Development Budget (CDB) as an enabler. Areno and Sadashiva (n.d.) suggested that the social contract should ensure both regular interaction or dialogue between the citizens/voters and specific government/political actors concerned and also that the latter fulfilled their commitments in accordance with the development agenda as defined on a public platform.

Finally, there was no consensus on the frequency of reporting because eighteen of the respondents suggested bi-annual reporting while only respondent (respondent 16) suggested a quarterly review because six months was too long in terms of problem identification and rectification (see § 6.3.2.4.3). In their study, Low and Tan (2008:2) concluded that “the design of a performance agreement which only makes provision for an annual review can fail the Government and stand a risk to lose citizen trust”. This finding implied that the design of the performance agreement for the Namibian political executives need to include bi-annual or more formal reviews and reporting, in order to ensure timely feedback

and action by the President, Cabinet and Parliament on strategic issues that could endanger the country's development, peace and political stability.

The inclusion of politicians at the Regional Government level in this study emerged during the data collection as a measure to reduce an accountability disconnection at both the central and regional government levels (see § 6.3.2.4.3). Accordingly, in line with the third objective of the study (see § 1.4), the final contribution of the study involved a focus on both the central and regional governments in terms of individual performance agreements and social contracts at the political level in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

This sub-section discussed the content of the performance agreements and social contracts for politicians while the next section focuses on their implementation modalities in the context of the Namibian Government while taking into consideration the democratic principles and also the principles of a unitary state. It focuses on the 'how' in detail, in order to provide practical guidelines for an effective implantation.

### **7.6.3 The Implementation Modalities of the Performance Agreement and Social Contract**

During the interviews the respondents were asked questions related to the implementation modalities of the performance agreements and social contracts for the Namibian politicians. Eighteen respondents suggested that an independent team of experts should be established in the Presidency in order to manage the process (see § 6.3.2.4.3). In this vein, respondent 13 indicated that "this team should be apolitical, consist of persons with integrity, sensitive about national issues and development and speak truth to power". It was also suggested that the performance agreements of politicians in the central government would be signed by the President and co-signed by the Speaker of the National Assembly while the social contracts of politicians in the regional government would be signed by their elected governor and co-signed by the Minister of Urban and Rural Development and two representatives from the Constituency Development Committee (CDC).

Therefore, with regard to the responses related to the research third objective, question nine as stated in chapter 1 (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4) and the inadequate

discussion identified in chapter 3 (see § 3.3), the following points highlight some of the existing gaps and guidelines with regard to the implementation modalities of the performance agreements and social contracts for the politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia: Firstly, the country does not have a PMS Policy for politicians in place and it would be impossible to introduce it within the existing legal framework, because of major amendments that would be required. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia made an attempt to do this in article (42), but this article is general and not specific in terms of the PMS for politicians. The issue of fairness featured prominently in the findings of the study and it needs to be considered in the formulation and approval of the PMS Policy for political executives (see § 6.3.2.5). The researcher is of the opinion that the PMS Policy for Namibian politicians should be discussed, approved and overseen by Parliament in order to ensure fairness during its implementation.

Secondly, the introduction and approval of a PMS Policy for politicians would imply the empowerment of institutions of accountability (e.g. Parliament), because political executives in the Republic of Namibia are accountable to the people through Parliament. This study also found that implementing a performance agreement and social contract for politicians without a policy such as those found in South Africa and Rwanda may defeat the primary objectives of the PMS in the country.

Thirdly, the introduction of a social contract between the Constituency Councillors and their electorates should be included in the PMS Policy of the Namibian politicians. It is suggested that the title of the policy should be “[t]he PMS Policy for the Namibian politicians” in order to ensure the inclusivity of the regional governments as well. In addition, there should be a specific section in the policy which deals with the social contracts of the constituency councillors in the Republic of Namibia. Most importantly, this policy (the PMS Policy of the Namibian Politicians) should detail the minimum requirements (both political and educational) to qualify for political positions because merit appointment would result in effective policy formulation and implementation in the government. At the time of study, the President-elect was requesting the CVs of the candidates who were eligible for appointment to his government. The researcher was of the

opinion that the issue of quality should be initiated at the section level before congress decides on the list of potential candidates for the new government.

Fourthly, the government should establish an independent body in the Presidency to advise and assist the President in formulating, reviewing and appraising the performance agreements of all political executives. In this vein respondent 2 suggested that “this team should work closely with the PMS team in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in order to ensure consistency and linkage between the two levels (politics and administration)” (Respondent 2, 3 February 2015). The researcher suggested that this team of experts should be able to conduct independent reviews and validation after self-evaluation by each political Executive. The fairness of this process is critical in politics because, according to the researcher’s own observations, there is a strong belief among politicians that favouritism matters more than performance. In addition, this team of experts may also help with the final assessment of the Constituency Councillors which should be conducted an independent evaluators assigned to the various regions of the Country.

Fifthly, the design of the performance agreements for political executives in the Government of the Republic of Namibia should differ from those used by the South African Government because of the gaps identified (see § 3.3). The content of the performance agreements for the Namibian political executives should take into account the following: the desired outcomes of the National Development Plans (NDPs), the manifesto of the winning political party, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that consist of targets and baselines, the weights of each KPI and linkages to the approved budget. Furthermore, in order to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness in the implementation of performance agreements for political executives, the Namibian Government should also consider the involvement of external companies or individuals to validate the overall performance of all politicians.

Sixthly, the requirements to become the Chairperson of the Regional Council should be taken into consideration because of the role of managing the performance agreement of the Chief Regional Officer. Its effectiveness requires an individual who should be able to understand public policies in the Namibian

context and the development agenda. It does not make sense for a Chief Regional Officer with two master's degrees to be supervised by an individual who has had only twelve years of schooling (Grade 12).

Lastly, there was a strong expectation voiced by the respondents that the government should have an effective and efficient monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system in place in order to ensure an evidence based PMS at all levels (political and administrative) (see § 6.3.2.5). It was then suggested that a strong and reliable record management system driven by technology should be one of requirements considered in the interests of an effective PMS. It was also found that the introduction of a PMS at the political level may impact on administration in several ways (e.g. structures, administrative policies, appointment requirements and information systems).

In short and in line with the research question nine and research objective three of this study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), it was concluded that the introduction of a PMS at the political level was long overdue in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. For example, respondent 3, who was one of the PMS facilitators in an OPM, stated that “[t]he Prime Minister, who is the next President, at one point asked a question: ‘Why are ministers not signing performance agreements?’” (Respondent 3, 03 February 2015). There was clearly a need to develop and approve a PMS Policy for all politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. In addition, an effective and efficient government should introduce minimum education requirements at the political level in order to ensure meritocracy appointments at all levels. According to Cloete et al. (2006:202), competent politicians are able to structure implementation. In addition, the researcher is of the opinion that competent politicians are needed not only to structure policy implementation but also to ensure the quality of the policy decisions taken at the political level.

In addition, this study concluded that the government should introduce social contracts at the regional government level in order to ensure proper accountability between the electorate and the councillors. This contract should make provision for both internal and external reviews. External reviews should be conducted by independent evaluators in consultation with the inhabitants of the constituency concerned. In addition, this study recommends a development budget for each



constituency be included in the regional budget. These points are discussed fully under the recommendations in the chapter 8.

The above discussions assisted in the realisation of the third research objective and provided answers to research question nine of the study. In line with the fourth research objective and all the research questions, as stated in chapter 1 of this study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4), the next section focuses on the requirements for an effective PMS at all levels of the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

## **7.7 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

The review of the scholarship on both policy studies and PMSs in chapters 2 and 3 provided answers to the first research question (see §§ 2.2.3; 2.2.4; 3.4 and 3.5). It was concluded from the discussions in this chapter on the achievements, success factors and constraints regarding the implementation of the PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia and which referred to the problem statement, as formulated in the first chapter (see § 1.3), that the PMS which had been implemented in the Namibian public service at the time of the study did not meet all the requirements of an effective PMS implementation as identified and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4). This contributed to the poor implementation and the fact that the system had not been fully implemented at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2).

Based on the constraints identified and which had hampered the implementation of the PMS from 2006 to 2014 and in line with the fourth research objective of this study (see § 1.4), this section identifies and discusses the requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service. These include, but are not limited, to the following:

- Leadership commitment at all levels and the PMS should become a permanent item on the agendas of all Cabinet and management meetings of all OMAs and RCs during which strategic issues are discussed and timely solutions to problems found. For example, the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, stated that “the type of

leaders required by Africa are men and women of reason, who are qualified and capable of holding their own and world affairs and who can be trusted in their dealing with people and resources” (University of South Africa, 2012:2). In addition, Mbigi (2009:20) stated that strategic leadership in government structures is active and progressive only if it continuously creates an enabling environment.

- Regular stakeholder involvement and consultation are essential at both the national and organisational levels during policy formulation and implementation. For example, the 7<sup>th</sup> CAMPS (2011:29) advised that the adoption of a PMS should involve not only technical staff members in the public service but all stakeholders including politicians, senior public servants, non-government organisations and members of the general public.
- Government should establish a Constituency budget which should be made available on time in order to support the implementation of the social contracts. Writers on the issue of PMSs (Aguinis et al., 2009) identified financial resources as one of the conditions for an effective PMS.
- The establishment of the appropriate and requisite implementing structures at both the administrative and political levels, for example, the establishment of dedicated units to spearhead all reforms initiatives in each OMA and RC as well as an independent body in the Presidency. Burke et al. (2012:10) support the argument that an effective PMS requires implementing teams of individuals who are multi-skilled and who are accountable for guiding the overall implementation process and building the internal capacity required to manage change.
- The development, approval and distribution of all supporting documents (e.g. Reward Policy, the National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, the Performance Standards and Customer Service Charters) are essential, as is adequate training on the PMS Staff Rules. In their studies, Saravanja (2011:2) and Neilson et al. (2008:1) found that a lack of reward or motivation was one of the main reasons for the failure of PMSs. Thus, an effective PMS requires a reward policy for good

performance, a development plan and sanction for ongoing poor performance.

- Parliament needs to approve and implement a PMS Policy for Namibian politicians with minimum education requirements for all political positions (e.g. Ministers and Constituency Councillors) in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. Most importantly, all Cabinet Ministers should lead by example in signing and implementing their performance agreements with the President. This point is related to the legality of the PMS as one of the success factors which play a role in an effective performance system (see § 3.4.3). Muthaura (2009:4) concluded that the absence of a legal framework to steer reform in Kenya had been one of the main constraints. In other words, there is a need to have a policy framework in place in order to make it mandatory at all levels.

In line with the third research objective of the study, it was concluded that full leadership commitment is a cornerstone for the effective implementation of a performance management system in the Government of the Republic of Namibia because this holds everything together. It was concluded that, for the Government of the Republic of Namibia to achieve its national Vision 2030, there is a need for leadership commitment (e.g. walking the talk) at both the political and the administrative levels. In addition, it is essential that political leadership leads by example at all time while the President of the country should be prepared to take unpopular decisions if such measures are required to protect the citizens. It is leadership commitment that enables the true transformation required for effective and efficient public service delivery.

The next section focuses on the concluding remarks to chapter 7 as a whole.

## **7.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter discussed and interpreted the data and information as presented in chapter 6 of the study. The discussions and interpretations of the data provided answers to all nine of the research questions and led to the realisation of five of the research objectives (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Research objectives five and six are covered in full in chapter 8 (see §§ 8.2.4 and 8.3). The achievements which were

identified in respect of the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service include: an integrated PMS framework by design (see figure 6.1) and a design which is in line with the design proposed by the African Union Commission (2011) (see § 3.4.1); funds were made available by the EU and ACBF and from the Government budget (see § 6.3.2.2.1); oversight bodies were established to support the implementation process (see § 6.2.4); the PMS Policy for the public service was approved in 2011 and launched in 2014 (see § 6.3.2.2.5); PMS capacity building interventions took place (see § 6.3.2.2.4) and 100% of the OMAs and RCs had strategic and annual plans in place by 2013/14 (see tables 6.1 and 6.2). These achievements, especially in the four most successful OMAs and RCs (two OMAs and two RCs), were attributed to, but not limited to, leadership commitment, expertise on the part of CROs or PSs and PMS Coordinators; and both the top down approach – as opposed to the bottom up approach – and the “willing buyer willing seller” implementation approach.

On the other hand, the poor PMS implementation process in the least successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service in Namibia was attributed to, but not limited to, the following constraints: absence of full leadership commitment at the political and administrative levels; lack of stakeholder involvement and consultation; the system was not simple for all the users; the location and chairmanship of the PMS oversight bodies did not comply with the AU requirements (2011) (see § 6.2.4); absence of a reward policy, lack of integration of the PMS with other human resources aspects during the implementation process and the implementation of an incomplete system (e.g. absence of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; performance standards and Customer Service Charter in the public service, and late approval of the PMS Policy and Staff Rules). All the respondents supported the notion of introducing a PMS at the political level in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

Leadership commitment was found to be the main success factor or driver behind the achievements recorded in the four most successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service of Namibia. Nevertheless, much still needs to be done at both the political and the administrative levels in respect of the

constraints identified if an effective PMS is to be realised in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

In view of the above discussions and analysis the next chapter (chapter 8) focuses on the general conclusions and recommendations as per the research questions and research objectives presented in chapter 1 of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **8.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter discussed and interpreted the results as presented in chapter 6. The discussions and interpretations were based on the research questions and research objectives as presented in chapter 1 of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4). The content of this chapter draws the study together and also demonstrates how the research results and general conclusions relate to the relevant scholarship discussed in the first four chapters of the study.

In addition to the main research question, the chapter also discusses the study's contribution to the notion of and discussion about performance agreements for politicians within the context of a unitary state (see §§ 8.2.2 and 8.2.4). Initially, the inclusion of the political arm was limited to the Central Government. However, during the data or information collection process at the Regional Government level, the importance of introducing the notion of a social contract for Constituency Councillors in the Government of the Republic of Namibia emerged

Thus, this chapter presents the general conclusions and recommendations based on all the research questions and research objectives of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4). The recommendations provide greater clarity on the way in which to introduce a PMS for politicians at both the Central and Regional Government levels in the Republic of Namibia. This chapter also discusses any unexpected results and anomalies which emerged from the study.

Finally, the chapter makes suggestions for further research.

#### **8.2 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS**

The implementation of a PMS (PMS) in the Namibian public service was not new because the system which the study investigated was the third such system after the two previous systems, namely, the Merit and Efficient Rating System (MERS) and the Performance Appraisal System (PAS) (see § 1.2.2) had been suspended.

In fact, what had transpired during the previous systems should have served as lessons for the system under investigation in this study. Based on the results as discussed and interpreted in chapter 7, this section presents the general conclusions drawn in line with all the research questions and the research objectives of the study, as stated in chapter 1 of the study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4). The topics that this section covers include the PMS implementation achievements, success factors and constraints in the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service from 2006 to 2014; guidelines to include political executives in the implementation of the PMS; requirements of an effective PMS in the Namibian public service and the contribution of this study to policy studies and the existing body of knowledge on PMSs.

#### **8.2.1 The PMS Implementation Achievements, Success Factors and Constraints in the Namibian Public Service**

The aim of the first research question was mainly to guide the researcher in identifying success factors and constraints during the review of the existing scholarship on policy studies and PMSs in general. The review of the existing scholarship concluded that there were similarities in terms of the success factors and constraints which played a role in policy implementation and PMSs (see §§ 2.2.3; 2.2.4; 3.4 and 3.5). The answers to the first research question guided the researcher during the data collection and data analysis as well as the general conclusions which were drawn and the recommendations made. Leadership was identified as the main success factor because it links together all the other factors. This conclusion is in line with Saravanja's (2011:2) argument that a "PMS has to be supported and driven by top leadership and management".

The aim of the second research question was to ascertain how success and failure could be defined and measured in the implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public service. The study found that success and failure were defined and measured in terms of procedures and using the milestones or stages of the PMS process by examining the number of OMAs and RCs that had met reached each milestone and/or stage (see §§ 6.2.5 and 7.2). It was further concluded that the criteria identified were appropriate only to process evaluation and not to results. In addition, the criteria identified were used to determine the

achievements, success factors and constraints regarding the PMS implementation in the Namibian public service. In line with the seven research questions (2–8), the PMS achievements, success factors and constraints in the Namibian public service are discussed below.

#### 8.2.1.1 Achievements

In line with research question three and the first part of first research objective, it was found that the Namibian public service had developed an integrated framework of the PMS and a PMS Training Toolkit, it had obtained financial resources from the EU and ACBF, certain oversight bodies had been put in place and the PMS Principles and Framework document and both organisational and individual planning frameworks had been drawn up (see § 7.3). However, the study also found that the PMS had not been fully implemented in the Namibian public service at the time of the study because not one OMA or RC had conducted appraisals.

In addition, the results of the study determined that only four government institutions (two OMAs and two RCs) were most successful and four the least successful (two OMAs and two RCs) in their implementation of the PMS in the Namibian public at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2 and § 7.3.6).

The next section focuses on the success factors or driving forces that contributed to the achievements listed above.

#### 8.2.1.2 Success Factors or Driving Forces

In line with four research questions (see No. 3, 4, 5, and 6) and the second part of the first research objective, it was concluded that the following success factors had contributed to the above achievements, namely: leadership commitment in the most successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service; to a degree the training conducted by the OPM and NIPAM; to some extent the simplification of the PMS framework in 2008; the establishment of certain implementing structures; funds from donors (EU and ACBF) and the top-down approach adopted together with ongoing consultation (see § 7.4). It was also found that there was a relationship between the level of the achievements made and leadership commitment in specific OMAs and RCs of the Namibian public



service at the time of the study. The results of this study support the argument of other scholars that an effective PMS requires the support of top leadership and management (Aguinis, 2009; Saravanja, 2011). This section also covered both the second research objective and the third research question although they are covered in the next section on constraints.

The next section focuses on the constraints that contributed to the poor implementation of the PMS in the least successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service in Namibia from 2006 to 2014.

#### 8.2.1.3 Constraints or Impediments

In line with the last part of the second research objective and the five secondary research questions (see research questions 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8), it was found that the following main constraints had hampered the effective implementation of a PMS in the Namibian public service at the time of the study, namely: absence of full leadership commitment in the least successful OMAs and RCs and, to some extent, the entire public service, minimal stakeholder involvement and consultation, absence of all the implementing structures required, inadequate supporting documents (e.g. reward policy, National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, Performance Standards, Customer Service Charters and the PMS Staff Rules), the complexity of the PMS framework, the adoption of the bottom-up implementation approach, a lack of internal commitment in the least successful OMAs and RCs and also the entire public service at the beginning of the process, late approval of the PMS Policy in 2011 and limited expertise on the part of officials.

In addition, in line with the third research question and second research objective, it was concluded that the internal leadership in the four most successful OMAs and RCs had taken ownership of the implementation process and applied the top-down approach with ongoing consultation. The exact opposite had happened in the four least successful OMAs and RCs. Furthermore, the four least successful OMAs and RCs had perceived the PMS implementation as the responsibility of the OPM and this had resulted in a lack of ownership and a poor implementation process. It was also concluded that some of the elements of an effective performance management and policy implementation, as identified and discussed

in chapters 2 and 3 (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4), were present in the most successful OMAs and RCs but absent in the least successful OMAs and RCs at the time of the study.

In short, it was concluded that the PMS which had been implemented in the Namibian public service at the time of the study did not meet either all the requirements of an effective PMS implementation or the conditions of policy implementation as identified and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4).

The discussions above covered the first eight research questions, and the first two research objectives. The next section discusses research question nine and research objective three regarding the performance agreements for politicians as stated in chapter 1 of this study (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4).

### **8.2.2 The Guidelines to Including Political Executives on the PMS Implementation**

The results of the study revealed that the introduction of a PMS at the political level of the Namibian public service was long overdue. During the data collection it was decided to expand the scope of the study to include regional governments in order to introduce the notion of a social contract between the constituency councillors and the inhabitants of the constituencies. In line with the research question nine and the third research objective, it was found that a notion of introducing performance agreements for politicians was gaining ground in certain African countries (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda and Namibia). However, it was also concluded that there had been inadequate discussion on the topic (see § 3.3; figures 3.2 and § 7.6.3). Accordingly, in line with the last research question and third research objective, the researcher proffers some suggested guidelines on and contributions to the design and implementation of performance agreements for politicians. Firstly, the results of the study found that the PMS policy which was approved in 2011 had been intended primarily for the administrative arm of the Government of the Republic of Namibia. The legality of the system was identified as one of the conditions for an effective PMS (see § 3.4.3). Thus, the formulation of a PMS policy for Namibian politicians would be the first step, because it would, among other things, inform the design of the policy framework and templates (e.g.

performance agreement form). It was recommended that this policy should go through the normal process of policy formulation and that Parliament should be the custodian of the policy because political leaders (Central Government) in Namibia are accountable to the people through Parliament.

In addition to the elements included in the normal format of policies in the Government of the Republic of Namibia, it was suggested that the design of this policy should consist of three sections:

- The first section should deal with the PMS for politicians at the Central Government level.
- The second section should deal with the PMS for Regional Governments.
- The third section should deal with the minimum appointment requirements for all political positions in the Government of the Republic of Namibia.

Furthermore, the policy principles should echo those for the administrative staff and of which fairness, accountability, inclusiveness and transparency are cornerstones (Republic of Namibia, 2011a). In addition, the policy should make provision for the establishment of an independent body which would advise and assist the President with the development of performance agreements for political executives and reviews and also conduct independent evaluations at all times.

Secondly, the results of the study provided suggestions for the design and implementation modalities of the performance agreements and social contracts for Namibian politicians (see § 7.6.3). It was concluded that the development and implementation of the performance agreements and social contracts should take the following into account:

- The government could use or refine the templates as proposed by the researcher, namely: the performance agreements for political executives and social contract for constituency councillors.
- The performance agreement for political executive should include the overall organisational targets as presented in the MTEF of each financial year (see Appendix 9). This was deemed to be the best approach

because everything contained in the performance agreements would be in line with the approved budget. The overall targets of the OMAs in the approved MTEF are included in all policy documents (e.g. the NDPs and the Manifesto of the Ruling Party). In addition, the social contract for the Constituency Councillors should include the key elements as presented by the researcher (see Appendix 10).

Consequently, a number of guidelines are suggested for the implementation modalities of both the performance agreements and the social contracts for the political arm of the Namibian Government. Firstly, the performance agreements of political executives should be signed by the President and co-signed by the Speaker of the National Assembly because, according to the Namibian Constitution Article 41, they (ministers) are accountable, both to the President and Parliament. The performance agreements should be reviewed bi-annually. In addition, the performance agreements of the permanent secretaries should also be reviewed the politicians' permanent secretaries' performance reports constitute inputs of the reviews and appraisals of the politicians. However, the President or Parliament may request quarterly review reports any time. This must be done at the Ministerial level as part of the self-assessments of politicians. The independent body in the Presidency should conduct a validation appraisal after the self-assessment of each political executive.

Secondly, the social contracts for the constituency councillors should be signed by the elected Regional Governor who should also be the Chairperson of the Regional Council. The social contract should be co-signed by the Minister of Urban and Rural Development and two representatives from the Constituency Development Committee (CDC). In order to achieve the targets stipulated in the social contracts, the government should introduce the Constituency Development Budget (CDB) and there must be alignment between the CDB and the targets as stipulated in the social contracts. Most importantly, the development of the social contract should be done through a consultative process with the voters and with the assistance of the RC officials. The Regional Development Committee (RDC) should obtain the strategic plans all the OMAs at the central government level in order to coordinate planned projects in their regions. The review of the social

contracts should be conducted bi-annually although this does not supersede the quarterly self-assessments by each Constituency Councillor which the Governor may request at any time.

Thirdly, the validation appraisals should be conducted by independent evaluators and all the reports should be submitted to the President through the line ministry. Both the political executives and the Constituency Councillors should be given the opportunity to appeal the final assessment if they are not satisfied with it. In such a case different evaluators should be appointed. Government should allocate sufficient money to the training budget for politicians while the NIPAM should offer courses that are relevant to the needs of politicians. In addition, politicians should also travel out of the country in order to learn from the best in the world.

The above discussions covered the guidelines as well as the study's contribution to individual performance agreements for politicians. It is hoped that these discussions will help to fill the gap as explained in section 3.3 and figure 3.2 in this study. In line with the research question nine and the third research objective, the following main conclusions were drawn, namely: It is essential that the introduction of the PMS is legalised through a PMS Policy for Namibian politicians; there should be an independent body to ensure the fairness of the process; the Namibian Parliament should be the custodian of the PMS Policy for Namibian politicians; there should be a social contract between the constituency councillors and the inhabitants of the constituencies because the former are elected directly by the people; the KPIs in both the performance agreements and the social contracts should consider the baseline and focus on the desired outcomes; but not ignoring the key outputs while, poor performance at both the political and administrative levels of the Government of the Republic of Namibia should be sanctionable. In this context, the power vested in the head of state by the Constitution of democratic states to appoint and dismiss Cabinet members should come into play.

The above discussions covered research question nine and the third research objective of the study. The next section presents the requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service.

### **8.2.3 An Effective Performance Management System in the Namibian Public Service**

In line with the two of the research questions (see Nos. 1 and 3), it was concluded that the PMS which had been implemented in the Namibian public service did not meet all the requirements of an effective one nor did it meet the conditions for policy implementation (see § 8.2.1). Accordingly, in line with the fourth research objective and the constraints identified (see §§ 7.5 and 8.2.1), the following points discuss the requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service. Firstly, there should be full leadership commitment at both the political and the administrative levels in the Namibian public service. The results of the study revealed that there was inadequate leadership commitment at the time of the study. For example, the Secretary to Cabinet had co-signed the performance agreements with six permanent secretaries in 2009 but no reviews had been conducted. It appeared that the OPM was merely pushing others but without walking the talk.

Secondly, there should be a culture of stakeholder involvement and consultation at all levels in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. The principle of participatory democracy should not only apply to elections but also to policy formulation and the implementation of such policy. Burke et al. (2012:9) indicate that consultation with and buy-in from all relevant stakeholders is vital for successful implementation because it creates awareness and ownership and reduces resistance.

Thirdly, there appears to be adequate internal expertise, supporting documents and policies and implementing units in all OMAs and RCs of the Government of the Republic of Namibia. The results of the study revealed that there was inadequate expertise in this regard on the part of officials, the system is too complex and there are inadequate supporting documents and policies. In addition, the study had revealed the absence of PMS units responsible for the implementation process and other reform initiatives in the Namibian public service.

Fourthly, a hybrid PMS which covers both reward and development should be developed. The study had revealed that the performance management under investigation placed greater emphasis on the development of individuals as part of

their performance agreements but without a reward policy and guidelines. A reward policy should be developed, accompanied by culture change initiatives, in order to promote a spirit of service throughout the public service.

Fifthly, the PMS should be introduced at the both the political and the administrative levels of the Government of the Republic of Namibia in order to ensure accountability at all levels. Poor performance should be sanctionable.

Sixthly, the PMS implementation should not be viewed in terms of stages but rather in terms of a holistic approach as discussed in chapter 2 (see § 2.2.1). In addition, the content of the performance agreements of political executives should feed into that of their accounting officers.

The requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service as listed above are in accordance with the results of the study as discussed in chapter 7. Thus, the main requirements for an effective PMS in the Namibian public service include, inter alia, full leadership commitment at both the political and the administrative levels; a hybrid PMS, a culture of stakeholder involvement and consultation; adequate internal expertise and supporting documents and policy. The majority of the requirements are similar to the conditions for both effective policy implementation and an effective PMS as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of the study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4).

The above discussions, excluding the introduction to the chapter confirmed that all nine of the research questions and the first four research objectives had been covered (see §§ 1.3 and 1.4). In line with the fifth research objective, the next section presents the main contribution of the study to the existing scholarship on policy implementation and PMSs.

#### **8.2.4 The Contribution of the study to the Scholarship on Policy Implementation and Performance Management Systems**

In line with the problem statement and the review of the existing scholarship on performance management, as discussed in chapter 3, the following gaps were identified. The responses to each of these may be regarded as the contribution made by this study:

- It appeared that no study had been conducted investigating all the PMS milestones with the focus on process implementation in order to identify the achievements, success factors and constraints in the Namibian public service as they emerged at the time of the study;
- As a result, it was not known whether the PMS which was being implemented in the Namibian public service had met the requirements of an effective PMS and
- A new notion to introduce performance agreements for politicians was gaining place in some African countries (e.g. South Africa, Rwanda and Namibia). However, there had been inadequate discussion on this topic at the time of the study (see § 3.3). This viewpoint was supported in a study conducted by Kim (2009) and which concluded that the PMS for political executives was underdeveloped.

Thus, in line with the fifth research objective and the significance of the study as discussed in chapter 1 of this study (see §§ 1.4 and 1.5), a number of points are made relating to the contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge in policy studies, PMS theory and implementation research methodology. Firstly, the study proposed that the process of implementation should not be viewed in stages but in terms of a holistic approach (see §§ 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).

Secondly, the study proposed a performance agreement template for political executives and one for the social contract for constituency councillors in the Government of the Republic of Namibia. These may also be applicable to other countries (see Appendices 9 and 10). In addition, the study provides guidelines for both the development and implementation modalities for both performance agreements for political executives and social contracts for constituency councillors (see §§ 7.6 and 8.2.2). These guidelines constitute the study's contribution to the new notion of individual performance agreements for politicians, but in the context of a unitary state although it is also possible that they may be adjusted to suit a federal state.

Thirdly, the study proposed the main elements of a PMS Policy for politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia (see §§ 7.6 and 8.2.3).



Fourthly, the study detailed a list of the achievements, success factors or driving forces, constraints or impediments and requirements for an effective PMS in the Government of the Republic of Namibia (see §§ 7.3; 7.4; 7.5; 8.2.1 and 8.2.3). The information in this context and which pertains to Namibia may, however, also contribute to the global body of knowledge in the subject of PMS. In addition, the results of this study strengthen the findings of different authors on the conditions for effective policy implementation (see § 2.2.4) and requirements for an effective performance management system (§ 3.4).

Fifthly the study listed the criteria which might be useful to future researchers and practitioners in defining and measuring success and failure when conducting the process evaluation of a PMS (see §§ 7.2 and 8.2.1). In addition, the study discusses the diagnostic tool or data set which was designed by the researcher and how it was applied during the first phase of the data or information gathering process. This is regarded as a contribution of the study to research methods in the area of implementation study (see § 5.3 and Appendix 1).

Sixthly, the study proposed the simplified annual rating form as contained in Appendix 14 and the rating guidelines as contained in Appendix 15 in order to address the complexity of the appraisal process which had not been conducted by any OMAs or RCs in the Namibian public service at the time of the study (see tables 6.1 and 6.2 and § 7.5.5).

Lastly, the study concluded that effective policy implementation does not involve either a completely bottom-up or top-down approach but rather requires a hybrid approach. This argument may imply that top leadership may drive the PMS implementation but that there should be ongoing consultation with staff members and citizen. In addition, policy formation should adopt a holistic and not a stage approach.

In short, based on the problem statement, the main research questions, research objectives and significance of the study as stated in chapter 1 of the study (§§ 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5), the above points highlight the contribution of the study to the global body of knowledge in the areas of policy studies, PMSs and implementation research.

It was regarded as a surprising result that all nineteen of the respondents, including two politicians, supported the introduction of individual performance agreements for politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia at the time of the study. The results of the study did not, however, include the experiences of any of the former presidents (Dr Sam Nujoma and Dr Hifikepunye Pohamba) as the supervisors of the political executives.

The above discussions form part of the general conclusion of this study, taking into account all nine of the research questions and the five research objectives as presented in chapter 1 of the study. It was confirmed that all the research questions had been answered and that five of the six objectives had been realised. Accordingly, the next section focuses on the recommendations of the study and, at the same time, covers the last research objective of the study (see § 1.4).

### **8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

In line with the main research questions and the general conclusions presented in section 8.2, it was concluded that, (a) some remarkable achievements had been made despite the fact that the PMS in the Namibian public service had not been fully implemented at the time of the study; (b) neither the PMS itself nor the implementation of the system had met the requirements for an effective PMS and the conditions for effective policy implementation as identified and discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this study (see §§ 2.2.4 and 3.4) while the introduction of performance agreements for Namibian politicians was overdue.

Accordingly, in line with final research objective of the study, the following recommendations are made as per the general conclusions discussed above.

#### **8.3.1 Recommendation 1**

Policy formulation and implementation, including that of a PMS, should adopt a holistic approach in order to avoid an incomplete design of the system and fragmented implementation. Moreover, the monetary reward mind-set that prevailed in the Namibian public service at the time of the study required a holistic approach at all levels of society, namely: community (householder level) and the

school curriculum while a Foundation Programme should be conducted at the NIPAM or at suitable institutions before people assume duties in the Namibian public service. In addition, exemplary leadership (e.g. traditional, schools and political leaders) is vital as such leaders are close to the hearts of the masses.

### **8.3.2 Recommendation 2**

The Government should invest both in the PMS and in change management training, including that of politicians. The training of the design team should assist the team to simplify some of the PMS forms (e.g. performance agreements and ratings) so that it is possible to complete them with minimal support. A number of points should be considered in this regard. Firstly, the term 'operational objective' in the performance agreements of administrative staff should be replaced by the term 'output'.

Secondly, the term 'personal objectives', as it appeared in the performance agreements of administrative staff should be replaced by the term 'development areas', because the content under that heading referred to what the staff member and supervisor had identified as areas that required improvement in terms of skills, knowledge and attitudes.

Thirdly, the action steps in the performance agreements for management (deputy permanent secretary and directors) should include what they will do to support the staff members under their supervision. For example, if the output is 'Training policy enacted' then the action step in the director's performance agreement should refer to the provision of human and financial resources and not drafting a policy.

Fourthly, the rating form as contained in Appendix 11 should be replaced by the form contained in Appendix 14 in order to facilitate the process and remove the fear of statistical methods.

Fifthly, there should be a simple form for all support staff (e.g. cleaners, drivers etc. which focuses only on their overall outputs and with related KPIs. The KPIs at this level should be formulated in such a way that they cover the performance standards. For example, vacuum five offices once a month. Most importantly, the

form should make provision for a strategic objective so as to enable the support staff members to understand their contributions to organisational performance.

### **8.3.3 Recommendation 3**

The Government should establish a reform unit in every OMA and RC in order to ensure synergy during the PMS implementation. These units should be staffed by multi-skilled staff members (e.g. PMS, Planning and M&E). The heads of these units should come from the office of the accounting officers. However, these units would only have an impact if certain factors are taken into account. Firstly, the capacity of the capacity builders at the Directorate Performance Improvement (DPI) in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) should be taken seriously.

Secondly, key OMAs (e.g. OPM, Ministry of Finance, National Planning Commission and Officer of the Auditor General) must agree on one common planning and reporting format. In other words, there should be one report which addresses the needs of four of the OMAs (Office of the Prime Minister, National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance and Office of the Auditor-General) in order to reduce reporting fatigue in the public service. The latter was a major problem at the time of the study.

Thirdly, the Office of the Prime Minister, in consultation with stakeholders, should develop a PMS implementation strategy which details the roles of the PMS facilitators at the OPM, PMS Coordinators in the OMAs and RCs, NIPAM and private consultants. Most importantly, all key role players should attend the same training in order to ensure consistency in the PMS implementation throughout the Namibian public service.

### **8.3.4 Recommendation 4**

The Government should enact a PMS Policy for the Namibian politicians in order to provide the policy with a legal basis should it be challenged in a competent court of law. In addition, the policy should make provision for the establishment of an independent body in the Presidency which would advise and assist the President and conduct independent evaluations at all times.

### **8.3.5 Recommendation 5**

The Government should contemplate either using or refining the templates as proposed by the researcher, namely, the performance agreements for political executives and the social contracts for Constituency Councillors (see Appendixes 9 and 10).

#### **8.3.5.1 Implementation Modalities**

The implementation of the proposed templates for the performance agreements and social contracts for the politicians in the Government of the Republic of Namibia should be implemented according to the guidelines provide under subsection 7.6.3 and taking into consideration the requirements under section 7.7.

In addition, the proposed annual rating form (see Appendix 14) and rating guidelines (see Appendix 15) should replace the existing and complicated form (see Appendix 11) in order to simplify the appraisal process at the end of the performance period.

The validation of appraisals should be conducted by independent evaluators and all reports must be submitted to the President. Both the political executives and Councillors should be given an opportunity to appeal the final assessments if they are not satisfied. Different evaluators should then be appointed. Government should allocate sufficient money to the training budget for politicians while the NIPAM should offer courses that are relevant to their needs. Furthermore, political executives and senior administrative staff should also participate in training outside of the country in order to expose them to the best practices in the world.

In conclusion, the five categories of recommendations were based primarily on the general conclusions which were drawn from the key findings of the study in line with the nine research questions and five research objectives. If these recommendations are implemented they should help to improve accountability and also the rate of policy implementation, including that of the PMS, with a view to the realisation of Vision 2030 and beyond.

#### **8.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

It is suggested that the following be considered by future researchers, namely:

- To test the applicability of the proposed performance agreements and social contracts for Namibian politicians
- To develop a generic competency framework for Namibian politicians in order to guide the training interventions they undergo.

## REFERENCES

- African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2004. Appraisal report The Namibian Performance Management System Project (NPMSP), Project proposal by the Government of Namibia Windhoek, Namibia. 32nd Regular Meeting of the Executive Board 15–17 December 2004, Gwayi Room, and Elephant Hills Hotel Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
- African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN). 2005. *Grant Agreement for the Namibian Performance Management System Project (NPMSP)*. Harare: ACBF
- African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2007. *Toward strategies and instruments for skills retention and utilisation: ACBF Operational Research*. USA: Lynne Rienner.
- African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2010. *Appraisal report. The Namibian Performance Management System Project (NPMSP)*. Harare: ACBF.
- African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2009. ACBF Project Supervision Mission to the Namibian Performance Management System Project (NPMSP). Harare: ACBF
- Africa Intellectual Resources (AIR). 2009. *Template/guide for the research proposal of master's and doctoral degree programmes*. Johannesburg: Africa Intellectual Resources.
- African Union Commission (AUC). 2011. *African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration*. Addis Ababa: AU Publishing and Productions Plant.
- Adebayo, A. 2000. *Principles and practice of public administration in Nigeria*. 2nd edition. Nigeria: Spectrum Books.
- Aguinis, H. 2005. *Performance management*. Great Britain: Edinburgh Business School, Heriot-Watt University.

- Aguinis, H. 2009. *Performance management*. 2nd edition. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall.
- Aguinis, H. 2011. *Performance management*. South Africa: Edinburgh Business School, Herriot-Watt University.
- Aguinis, H. 2013. *Performance management*. 3rd edition. United States of America: Pearson Education/Prentice Hall.
- Akhalwaya, I. 2015. Best practices from South African perspectives on improving performance in central and local government organisations. Presented at the First National Conference on Performance Management in Public Service, Windhoek, Republic of Namibia, 23–25 September.
- Allen-Collinson, J. 2012. *Interpretative research paradigm*. United Kingdom: School of Sport and Exercise Science, University of Lincoln.
- Andrews, Y. 1988. *The personnel function*. Pretoria: Kagiso Tertiary.
- Apreku, S. S. 2011. *Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa – Emerging Challenges & Constraints*. African Community of Practice.
- Areno, E. & Sadashiva, M. n.d. *Social contracts for political accountability*. Philippines: IDODE/CIVICUS.
- Armstrong, M. 2006. *Performance management: Key strategies and practical guidelines*. 3rd edition. London and Philadelphia: Kogan Page.
- Armstrong, M. 2008. *How to manage people*. London: Kogan Page.
- Armstrong, M. 2012. *Armstrong's handbook of reward management practice: Improving performance through reward*. 4th edition. New Delhi: Kogan Page.
- Babbie, E. 2008. *The basics of social research*. 4th edition. United States of America: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2011. *The practice of social research*. South Africa: Oxford University Press.



- Balbach, E.D. 1999. *Using the case studies to do program evaluation*. California: Department of Health Services, Tobacco Control Section.
- Barrett, S. 2004. Implementation studies: Time for a revival? Personal reflections on 20 years of implementation studies. *Public Administration Journal*, 82(2):249–262.
- Barrett, S. & Fudge, C. (Eds). 1981. *Policy and action*. London: Methuen.
- Bemthal, P.R., Rogers, R. & Smith, A.B. 2003. Managing performance: Building accountability for organisational success. *HR Benchmark Group*, 4(2):01–37.
- Bendheim, C. & Graves, S. 1998. Determining best practice in corporate-stakeholder relations using data development: An industrial level study, *Business and Society*, 37(3):306–339.
- Bervir, M. 2011. *Key concepts in governance*. London: Sage Publications.
- Beukes, J. 2015. Underspending ministries to face ‘consequences’. The Namibian Sun, 25 March. [Online] [www.namibiansun.com](http://www.namibiansun.com) [Accessed on 30 April 2015].
- Blackman, D., Buik, F., O'Donnell, M., O'Flynn, J. & West, D. 2012. Developing high performance: Performance management in the Australian public service. Paper prepared for the strengthening of the Performance Framework Project: A joint research program of the Australian National University, the Australian Public Service Commission, the University of Canberra and the University of New South Wales @ ADFA, 25 June.
- Bless C., Smith, H.C. & Kagee, A. 2006. *Fundamentals of social research methods: An African perspective*. 4th edition. South Africa: Juta.
- British Quality Foundation & EFQM. (1996). *Guide to self-assessment*. Britain: Bristol Quality Centre.
- Bryson, J.M. 2004. What to do when stakeholders matter? Stakeholder identification and analysis techniques. *Public Management Review*, 6(1): 21–53.

- Bourne, M. & Bourne, P. 2009. *Instant manager taking control of work and life: Balanced Scorecard*. Reading, UK: CPI Cox & Wayman.
- Burke, K., Morris, K. & McGarrigle, L. 2012. *An introductory guide to implementation: Terms, concepts and frameworks*. Dublin: Centre for Effective Services Guide.
- Bussin, M. 2013. *Performance management for government, universities, schools and NGOs: A practical and informative textbook for managing performance in service delivery oriented organisations*. Republic of South Africa: Bryanston.
- Business Dictionary. 2010. *Policy framework: Definition* [Online] [www.businessdictionary.com](http://www.businessdictionary.com) [Accessed on 29 Dec 2011].
- Business Dictionary. 2011. *Stakeholder: Definition* [Online] [www.businessdictionary.com](http://www.businessdictionary.com) [Accessed on 29 Dec 2011].
- California State Government. 2010. 'What gets measured gets done': An advisory report from the Performance Management Council, 30 September.
- Carcary, M. 2009. The research audit trail: Enhancing trustworthiness in qualitative inquiry. *The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods*, 7(1):11–24. [Online] [www.enjbrm.com](http://www.enjbrm.com) [Accessed on 21 March 2013].
- 7th CAMPS. 2011. Performance management including measurement, monitoring and evaluation: A management guide for African public service managers. Presented at the 7th CAMPS, Nairobi, 9–14 May.
- Chandrakumara, A., De Zoysa, A. & Manawaduge, A.S. 2009. Leadership style and company performance: The experience of owner-managers of SMEs. 4<sup>th</sup> *International Asian Academy of Applied Business Conference*, pp. 391–401.
- Chiraw, T.O. 2008. Issues of policy making and implementation at regional and local level. In: Mukwena, R. & Chiraw, T.O. (Eds), *Decentralisation and regional and local government in Namibia*. Windhoek: Chiraw, pp. 34–44.

- Cloete, F., Wissink, H. & De Coning, C. 2006. *Improving public policy: From theory to practice*. 2nd edition. Cape Town: Van Schaik.
- Cohen, L., Manion, L. & Morrison, K. 2000. *Research methods in education*. 5th edition. London: Routledge Falmer.
- Creswell, J.W. 2003. *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed method approaches*. 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications.
- DeGross, A. & Cargo, M. 2009. Policy implementation: Implications for evaluation. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 124:47–60.
- Denscombe, M. 2003. *The good research guide for small-scale social research projects*. 2nd edition. New York: Open University Press.
- Denscombe, M. 2010. *The good research guide for small-scale social research projects*. 3rd edition. UK: Open University Press.
- De Waal, A.A. 2002. The role of behaviour factors in the successful implementation and use of performance management system. PhD thesis. Free University of Amsterdam.
- De Waal, A.A. 2003. "Behavioural factors important for the successful implementation and use of performance management system", *Management Decision*, 41(8):688-697.
- De Waal, A.A. 2007. Is performance management applicable in developing countries? The case of a Tanzanian college. *International Journal of Emerging Markets*, 2(1).
- Dictionary.com. 2015. *Paradigm*. [Online] <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradigm> [Accessed on 10 May 2015].
- Diescho, J. 2014. Diescho's dictum, leadership and management: Not the same thing! Part 1. *New Era*, 19(206):7.

- Diescho, J. 2015. Request to extent the release of Ms Martha Tuyapeni and Mr Steve Njembo to assist with the PMS training. Letter to PS OPM dated on 24 March 2015, Windhoek.
- Durlak, J.A. & DuPre, E.P. 2008. Implementation matters: A review of research on the influence of implementation of program outcomes and the factors affecting implementation. *Am J Community Psychol*, (41):327–350.
- Dzimhiri, L.B. 2008. Experiences in New Public Management in Africa: The case of performance management systems in Botswana. Botswana: University of Botswana. *African Development Journal*, XXXIII(4):43–58.
- Dzimhiri, L.B. 2009. Challenges in managing change: The case of performance management system at the University of Botswana. *Review of Higher Education in Africa*, 1(1):1–20.
- Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI). 2010. *Performance management models*. Tanzania: Eastern and Southern African Management Institute.
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 2005. *Public sector management reforms in Africa: Lessons learned*. Addis Ababa: ECA Documents Reproduction and Distribution Unit (DRDU).
- Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 2011. *Africa economic report*. Addis Ababa: ECA Documents Reproduction and Distribution Unit (DRDU).
- Edmunds, M.W. & Scudder, L.E. 2009. How to make sense of qualitative research findings. *Medscape*, 1 December.
- Ehlers, T. & Lazenby, K. 2010. *Strategic management: Southern African concepts and cases*. 3rd edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Ehtesham, U.M., Muhammad, T.M. & Muhammad, S.A. 2011. Relationship between organizational culture and performance management practices: A case of university in Pakistan. *Journal of Competitiveness*, 3(4):78–86.

- Ellis, I. & Chinedu, O. 2011. Performance management as an imperative for effective performance in Delta State of Nigerian public owned organisations. *Sacha Journal of Policy Studies*, 1(2):46–54.
- Elmore, R.F. 1985. Forward and backward mapping. In K. Hanf & T.A.J. Toonen (Eds), *Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, pp. 33–70.
- Enkali, F. 2006. Performance coaching in the Department of Civic Affairs in the Ministry of Home Affairs. Masters dissertation. University of Namibia, Windhoek.
- Esu, B.B. & Inyang, J.B. 2009. A case of performance management in the public sector in Nigeria. *International Journal of Business Management*, 4(4): 98–105.
- European Union (EU) and Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN). 2006. *Financing agreement for the PMS capacity building*. Brussels: European Union.
- European Union (EU). 2008. *Mid-term review for the PMS project under EDF 10*. Brussels: European Union.
- European Union (EU). 2010. *European Development Fund Ten (EDF 10) for the Namibian PMS capacity building*. Brussels: European Union
- European Union (EU). 2012. *The PMS Project Inception Report*. Windhoek: Lattazio Associates.
- European Union (EU). 2014. *The PMS Project Final Implementation Report*. Windhoek: Lattazio Association.
- European Union (EU). 2015. *Final evaluation of the project ‘Support to Performance Management System’ PMS Namibia*. Brussels: PARTICIP GmbH Consortium.
- Ferlie, E., Ashburner, L., Fitzgerald, L. & Pettigrew, A. 2009. *The new public management in action*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Ferraro, G. 2008. *Part B The theoretical framework: Implementation, inducements and constraints*. Leuven: Public Management Institute, Katholieke Universiteit.
- Fixsen, D.L., Naoom, S.F., Blasé, K.A. & Wallace, F. 2005. *Implementation research: A synthesis of literature*. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida.
- Fredie, N., Mbabazize, M. & Shukla, J. 2015. An assessment of factors affecting the implementation of the performance appraisal system in Rwanda: A case of Nyamasheeke District Local Government (NDLG). *International Journal of Business and Management Review*, 3(4):1–35.
- Geens, I.M. 2005. *Balanced scorecard*. Delft University of Technology [Online] [www.managerialaccounting.org](http://www.managerialaccounting.org) [Accessed on 28 December 2011].
- Gildenhuis, J.S.H. & Knipe, A. 2000. *The organisation of government: An introduction*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Glatthorn, A.A. & Joyner, R.L. 2005. *Writing the winning thesis or dissertation: A step-by-step guide*. 2nd edition. California: Corwin Press.
- Goggin, M.L., Bowman, A., Lester, J. & O'Toole, L.J. Jr. 1990. *Implementation theory and practice: Toward a third generation*. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
- Government of Jamaica. 2010. *Accountability framework for senior executive officers (permanent secretaries, chief executive officers of executive agencies and public bodies)*. Jamaica: Cabinet Office Public Sector Modernization Division.
- Government of Kenya. 2010. *Performance contract guidelines*. Nairobi: Office of the President.
- Government of Singapore. 2008. Performance management in Singapore's public service. Workshop on Government Performance and Results Management. Taipei, Chinese Taipei, 26–28 March.

- Government of Singapore. 2005. *Public Administration Country Profile*. United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).
- Hlahla, D. 2015. *NIPAM Post course report: Performance agreements and reporting* (Module 3), 5-6 May. Windhoek.
- Hakes, C. 1996. *The business excellence handbook*. 5th edition. United Kingdom: Bristol Quality Centre.
- Harvard Business School. 2010. *Ten steps to becoming results-based leader*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press [Online] [www.hbsp](http://www.hbsp). [Accessed on 6 March 2010].
- Hersey, P., Blanchard, K.K. & Johnson, D.E. 2008. *Management of organisational behaviour: Leading human resources*. 9th edition. United States: Pearson Education.
- Heywood, A. 2007. *Politics*. 3rd edition. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hill, M. & Hupe, P. 2009. *Implementing public policy*. 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Homayounizadpanah & Baqerkord. 2012. Effect of implementing performance management on the productivity, efficiency and effectiveness of the Chabहार municipal employees. *Research Journal of Applied Science, Engineering and Technology*, 4(12):1767–1784.
- Hope, K.R. Sr. 2001. The new public management: Context and practice in Africa. Addis Ababa: *International Public Management Journal*, 4:119–134.
- Hopewood, G. 2008. *Guide to Namibian politics*. Windhoek: John Meinert.
- Hu, B. 2012. Education for migrant children: Policy implementation in the changing urban education system in China. PhD thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
- IRS. 2003. Trend in performance management. *Employment Review*, 1 August, 12–19.

- Iqbal, J., Aslam, M. & Arashad, S. 2012. Performance management: A review of 30 articles from a single source. *International Journal of Contemporary Research in Business*, 4(3):709–728.
- Ivory. 2011. *Boosting your academic success: Customer essay, assignment and dissertations*. (n.p):( n.p).
- James, N. 2008. *Authenticity*. Sage Knowledge. [Online] <http://knowledge.sagepub.com/view/research/n26.xml> [Accessed on 21 March 2014].
- Jones, G.R. & George, J.M. 2009. *Contemporary management*. 6th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
- Jooste, C. & Fourie, B. 2009. The role of strategic leadership in effective strategy implementation: Perceptions of South African strategic leaders. *Southern African Business Review*, 13(3):51–68.
- Joubish, M.F., Khurram, M.A., Ahmed, A., Fatima, S.T. & Haider, K. 2011. Paradigms and characteristics of good qualitative research. *World Applied Sciences Journal*, 12(11):2082–2087. Department of Education, Federal Urdu University, Pakistan.
- Kaplan, R.S. & Norton, D.P. 2010. *The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that drive performance*. Boston: Harvard Business Review.
- Kaplan, R.S. & Norton, D.P. 1996. *Translating strategy into action: The balanced scorecard*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Kaplan, R.S. & Norton, D.P. 2001. Transforming the balanced scorecard from performance measurement to strategic management. Part 11: *Accounting Horizons*, 15:147–160.
- Kaplan, R.S. 2010. *Conceptual foundations of the balanced scorecard*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.
- Kapofi, F. 2009. Approach being used to institutionalise performance management in the public service. A country paper presented at the 6th Forum for



Commonwealth Heads of African Public Service, Seychelles, 13–15 July.  
Republic of Namibia.

Kantema, S.H. 2007. The role of performance management system in improving the organisational performance and service delivery: The case of Namibia. MBA Thesis. Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI), Arusha.

Kaul, M. 1998. *Introducing new approaches: Improved public service delivery*. Managing the Public Service Strategies for Improvement Series: No. 5. United Kingdom: Commonwealth Secretariat.

Kendal, S.L. 2006. The implementation of public policy: University amalgamations in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. PhD thesis, University of Canberra.

Keyter, C.A. 2002. A distance education management model for the Polytechnic of Namibia. Doctoral thesis, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Kim, P. 2009. A case for performance management for political appointees. *Public Personnel Management*, Winter 38(4):1–18.

Kincheloe, J.L. & McLaren, P. 2000. Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In: N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds), *Handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 279–324.

Kreklow, S.R. 2006. Five critical factors: Preparing for success in implementing performance management. *Government Financial Review*.

Korpel, I.R. 2005. Identifying a leverage point to improve business performance through eLearning: A case study in a financial institution. PhD Thesis. University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Laegreid, P., Roness, P.G. & Rubecksen, K. 2005. Performance management in practice: The Norwegian way. Department of Administration and Organisation Theory/Rokkan Centre, University of Bergen. A paper prepared for the EGPA study group on productivity and quality in the public sector-

Public sector performance measurements, EGPA conference, Bern, 31 August – 3 September.

Lambeth, L. 2007. *Change management toolkit*. London: Borough of Lambeth.

Lavertu, S. & Moynihan, D. 2011. *Political Ideology and the implementation of executive-branch reforms: The contingent impact of PART on performance management in federal agencies*. Ohio: Ohio State University John Glenn School of Public Affairs.

Lawrie, G., Kalff, D. & Andersen, H. 2005. *Balanced scorecard and results-based management: Convergent performance management systems*. United Kingdom: 2GC Limited.

Lindblom, C.E. & Woodhouse, E.J. 1993. *The policy-making process*. 3rd edition. United States of America: Prentice-Hall.

Lipsky, M. 1980. *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

*Longman dictionary of contemporary English*. 2004. England: Pearson Education Limited.

Low, J. & Tan, E. 2008. *Public governance and public trust*. Singapore: Civil Service College.

Lutabingwa, J. & Auriacombe, C. 2009. Total quality management (TQM) in the public sector: A case of local government in South Africa. *Administratio Publica*, 17(2):125–142.

Mabengano, D. 2015. *NIPAM Post Course Report: Performance Agreements and Reporting* (Module 3), 7-8 April. Windhoek.

Machingambi, S. 2013. Teachers' perspectives on the implementation of the performance management system in Zimbabwe. *Internal Journal for Education Science*, 5(3):217–225.

- MacMillan, A. 2013. *Importance of performance management process & best practices: To optimize monitoring performance work reviews/feedback and goal management*. [Online] [www.successfactors.com/en\\_us/lp/articles/optimize-performance-management](http://www.successfactors.com/en_us/lp/articles/optimize-performance-management). [Accessed on 07 March 2013].
- Maphorisa, J. 2010. Global perspectives on performance management and measurement including monitoring and evaluation. A paper presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Ministers of Public/Civil Service, Eastern and Southern Regions on the Development of Management Guides: Namibia.
- Martinez, J. 2001. *Assessing quality, outcome and performance management*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organisation, Department of Organisation of Health Services Delivery.
- Matland, R.E. 1995. Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5(2):145–174.
- Maxwell, J. 2009. *The 4 pillars of leadership*. Cape Town: New Holland (South Africa).
- Mazmanian, D.A. & Sabatier, P.A. 1983. *Implementation and public policy*. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
- Mbigi, L. 2009. *Namibian Master and Doctoral Study School 23-25 October 2009 Learning Guide*. Johannesburg: Africa Intellectual Resources.
- Mbigi, L. 2009. Key strategic challenges in Namibia. *Prime Focus*, in press.
- Mbigi, L. 2010. Personal interview. 20 July, Windhoek.
- Mertens, D.M. 2005. *Research and evaluation in education and psychology: Integration diversity with quantitative and mixed methods*. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Meyers, D.C., Durk, J.A. & Wandersman, A. 2012. The quality implementation framework: A synthesis of critical steps in the implementation process. *American Journal of Community Psychology*.

- Meyer, T. 2012. *Strategy, leadership & change: A practical guide for busy executives*. Republic of South Africa: Knowres.
- Miller, G.J. 2005. *The political evolution of principal-agent models*. St Louis, MO: Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Political Science.
- Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Mitchell, W.K. 2005. *Research methodology*. 3rd ed. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.
- Mitnick, B.M. 2006. *Origin of the theory of agency: An account by one of the theory's originators*. Pittsburgh, PA: Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh.
- Minnaar, F. & Bekker, K. 2005. *Public management in the information age*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Minnaar, F. 2010. *Strategic and performance management in the public sector*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Molale, E.M. 2009. Managing and measuring performance in the public service in Botswana. A country paper presented at the 6<sup>th</sup> Forum for Commonwealth Heads of African Public Service, Seychelles, July 13-15<sup>th</sup>, 2009. Government of Botswana.
- Mouton, J. 2001. *How to succeed in your master's & doctoral studies: A South African guide and resource book*. South Africa: Van Schaik.
- Mothusi, B. 2009. *Public sector reform and change management in Botswana: The case of Performance Management System*. Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft.
- Morris, G. 2007. *Chapter 3: Research methodology*. [Online] [www.chesterrep.openrepository.com](http://www.chesterrep.openrepository.com) [Accessed on 12 July 2011].

- Munzhedzi, P.H. 2011. Performance management system and improved productivity: A case of the development of local government and housing in the Limpopo Province. Masters dissertation. University of South Africa, South Africa.
- Muraranganda, E. 2013. Consultants cost state over N\$1 billion: Government expertise lacking in key skills. *Namibian Sun*. No. 97799487600, March, 1.
- Musonera, G. 2015. Public service delivery, accountability and responsibility in the political leadership and senior public service to citizen. Presentation at the First National Conference on Performance Management in the Public Service. Windhoek, 23–25 September. Republic of Namibia.
- Mutahaba, G. 2011. *Report on the adoption and use of performance management system including measurement, monitoring and evaluation in Africa*: Prepared for 7th CAMPS. Tanzania: University of Dar es Salaam.
- Muthaura, F. 2009. Approaches to institutionalise Strategic Performance Management in the Public Service: Progress, Challenges and Lessons learnt. A Country paper presented at the 6th Forum for Commonwealth Heads of African Public Service, Seychelles, 13–15 July. Government of Kenya: Office of the President.
- Muthomi, J. 2014. Senate oversight roles and separation of power: An interview with Sen. Boni Khalwale, 2014, Kenya. *A Publication of the Parliament of Kenya: Understanding Separation of Power, Facts, Positions and Misconceptions*, 6(9):14–15.
- Moullin, M. 2002. *Delivering excellence in health and social care*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
- Naidoo, G. 2005. Leadership and governance for a sustainable public service. PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
- Namazi, M. 2012. Role of the agency theory in implementing management's control. *Journal of Accounting and Taxation*, 5(2):38–47.

- Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM). 2015a. *Post Training Report: Performance Agreements and Reporting (Module 3)*, 30-31 March. Windhoek.
- Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM). 2015b. *Continuous process for improvement*. Windhoek: NIPAM.
- Namibian Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM). 2014. *Post Training Report: Performance agreements and reporting (Module 3)*, 10-13 March. Windhoek.
- Neilson, G. L., Martin, K. L & Power, E. 2008. *The Secrets to Successful Strategy Execution*. Boston: Harvard Business Review.
- Nelongo, J. 2009. A critical analysis of the development of the strategic plan for the Khomas Regional Council. Masters dissertation. University of Namibia, Windhoek.
- Nelongo, J. 2015. Feedback from the PMS training. Email communication OPM facilitators, 1 April. Windhoek
- Neuman, W.L. 2011. *Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. 7th edition. New York: Pearson Education.
- Newton, K. & Van Deth, J.W. 2010. *Foundation of comparative politics*. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nghaamwa, N., Siamwanda, H., Hamuteta, T., Shilongo, G., Auwanga, C. & Immanuel, K.T. 2014. *A survey on factors contributing to non-performance in the public service: A case study of Office of the Prime Minister*. MMDP Research Paper: NIPAM and SBS
- Nghidinwa, A.N. 2007. *Public service reform in Namibia: A case study of cadre appointments in the central government*. PhD thesis. University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
- Nikodemus, S.T. 2009. *The quest for true leadership*. Windhoek: Truelead Training Institute (TLTI).

- Niitembu, M. 2006. Stakeholders' perceptions of parents' involvement in the governance of a Namibian rural school. Masters dissertation. Rhodes University, South Africa.
- Northouse, P.G. 2001. *Leadership. Theory and Practice*. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. London: Sage Publisher, Inc.
- Nyembezi, V. 2009. Development of a performance management system for the SABC (Port Elizabeth). Masters dissertation. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth.
- Odame, H.H. 2001. Engendering the Logical Framework, ISNAR.[Online] [www.isnar.cgiar.org](http://www.isnar.cgiar.org) [Accessed on 23 June 2015].
- Onwuegbuzie, A.J., Leech, N.L. & Collins, K.M.T. 2012. Qualitative analysis techniques for the review of the literature. *The Qualitative Report*, 17(56):1–28.
- O'Flynn, J. 2007. From new public management to public value: Paradigmatic change and management implications. *The Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 66(3):353–366.
- O'Toole, L.J. Jr. 1997. Implementing public innovations in network settings. *Administration and Society*, 29(2):115–138.
- Palinkas, L.A., Aarons, G.A., Horwitz, S., Chamberlain, P., Hurlburt, M. & Landsverk, J. 2010. Mixed methods designs in implementation research. *Adm Policy Ment Health*, (38):44–53.
- Parsons, W. 2005. *Public policy: An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis*. UK: Edward Elgar.
- Pauw, J.C. 2014. Personal communication. 21 November, Nelongo DPA thesis.
- Peters, D.H., Adam, T., Alonge, O., Agyepong, I.A. & Tran, N. 2013. Research methods and reporting implementation research: What is it and how to do it? *Business Management Journal*, 20 November.

- Philip, B. 2011. Implementation of the performance management system in senior secondary schools in Botswana: the perspective of senior management team. PhD thesis, James Cook University. [Online]. <http://eprints.jcu.edu.au/26275/> [Accessed on 10 March 2014].
- Philip, B. 2013. Constraints to senior management's capacity to implement the performance management system in senior secondary schools in Botswana. *International Education Studies*, 6(5):56–67.
- Poister, H.T. 2010. *The future of strategic planning in the public sector: Linking strategic management and performance*. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State University.
- Pulakos, E.D. 2004. *Performance Management. A roadmap for developing, implementing and evaluating performance management systems*. United State of America: Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) Foundation.
- Pressman, J. & Wildavsky, A.B. 1973. *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland*. Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the President. 1990a. *The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia as amended*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 1990b. *Public Service Commission Act 2 of 1990*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 1991. *State Finance Act 31 of 1991*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 1995a. *Public Service Act 13 of 1995*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 1995b. *Wage and Salary Commission Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.



- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2003. *Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the President. 2004. *Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development (Main Document)*. Windhoek: NAMPRINT.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2005. *The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) Mission Statement*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister: 2006a. *The PMS Implementation Toolkit Overview*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2006b. *The PMS ToT Implementation Complement*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2006c. *The PMS Module 1: PMS Overview*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2006d. *The PMS Training of Trainers' Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2006e. *PMS Toolkit: Performance Assessment (Module 10)*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2006f. *The role and functions of the Ministerial or Regional Implementation Team*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2007a. *Annual Report 2006-2007*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2007b. *Labour Act 11 of 2007*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.

- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2007c. *Ministerial Implementation Team (MIT) Training Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the President. 2008. *National Development Three (NDP 3)*. Windhoek: Office of the President.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2009. *The PMS Implementation States Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2010a. *The OPM-PMU PMS Progress Report 2010*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2010b. *NIPAM Act 10 of 2010*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2010c. *The PMS Consultation Workshop Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2011a. *Performance Management Policy, Public Service of Namibia*. Windhoek: NAMPRINT.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2011b. *Being a public servant in Namibia: The pocket guide*. 2nd edition. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Ministry of Finance. 2012a. *The Government Accountability Report*. Windhoek: Ministry of Finance.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2012b. *The Namibian Public Service Charter*. 2nd edition. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2012c. *The Customer Service Charter*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2012d. *The PMS Project Inception Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.

- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2013a. *The Namibian Performance Management System Project (NPMSP) Completion Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2013b. *The PMS Implementation Update Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2013c. *Survey on Citizen Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2014a. *The Minutes of the Steering Committee meeting, 20 February 2014*, Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2014b. *The PMS Accelerate Update Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2014c. *The PMS Accelerate Update Report*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of Namibia. Ministry of Finance. 2014d. *The Government Accountability Report*. Windhoek: Ministry of Finance.
- Republic of Namibia. National Assembly. 2014e. *Namibian Constitution Third Amendment Bill*. Windhoek: Ministry of Presidential Affairs and Attorney-General.
- Republic of Namibia. Office of the Prime Minister. 2015. *Public Service Staff Rule E VI: Performance Management*. Windhoek: Office of the Prime Minister.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA). Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. 2010. *The Delivery Agreement for the Basic Education Sector*. Pretoria: Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.
- Republic of South Africa (RSA). Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. 2012. *Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency*. Pretoria: Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation.

- Ripley, R.B. & Franklin, G.A. 1982. *Bureaucracy and policy implementation*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Robson, C. 1993. *Real world research: A resources for social scientists and practitioners-researchers*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Rosse, E. 2000. *Implementation of health promotion policy in Norwegian municipalities*. United Kingdom: Leeds Metropolitan University.
- Rossi, P.H. & Berk, R.A. 1981. An overview of evaluation strategies and procedures. *Society for Applied Anthropology*, 40(4):287.
- Ross, S.A. 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. *American Economic Association*, 63(2):134–139.
- Rowley, T. 1997. Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4):887–911.
- Sabatier, P.A. 1980. The implementation of public policy. A framework of analysis. *Policy Studies Journal*, 8(4): 538-560.
- Sabatier, P. & Mazmanian, D. 2005. The implementation of public policy: A framework of analysis. *Policy Studies Journal*, 8(4):538–560.
- Sacht, J. 2008. *The performance management toolkit developed for the renewal resources*. South Africa: Ezona.
- Saetren, H. 2005. Facts and myths about research on public policy implementation: Out-of-fashion, allegedly dead, but still very much alive and relevant. *Policy Studies Journal*, 33(4):559–582.
- Saetren, H. 2014. Implementing the third generation research paradigm in policy implementation research: An empirical assessment. *Public Policy and Administration Journal*, 29(2):84–105.
- Saldanha, C. 2002. *Promoting results-based management in the public sectors of developing countries*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. 2003. *Research methods for business students*. 3rd edition. London: Pearson Professional.
- Sarantakos, S. 2005. *Social research*. 3rd edition. China: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saravanja, M. 2011. *10 reasons why performance management fails and how to remedy them*. [Online] [www.regensys.co.za/2011/03/10-reasons-why-performance-management-fails-and-how](http://www.regensys.co.za/2011/03/10-reasons-why-performance-management-fails-and-how) [Accessed on 05 March 2013].
- Scharpf, F.W. 1978. Interorganizational policy studies: Issues, concepts and perspectives. In: K.I. Hanf & F.W. Scharpf (Eds), *Interorganizational policy making: Limits to coordination and central control*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 345–370.
- Schneideman, A.M. 2006. *Analog device: 1986–1992. The first balanced scorecard* [Online] [www.schneidemen.com](http://www.schneidemen.com) [Accessed on 28 December 2011].
- Scofield, J. & Sausman, C. 2004. Symposium of implementing public policy: Learning from theory and practice. *Public Administration Journal*, 82(2): 235–248.
- Senge, P.M. 2006. *The fifth discipline: The art & practice of the learning organisation*. New York: Doubleday.
- Seath, I.J. 2012. *Performance management: Managers failing to deal with under-performance?* [Online] [www.ianseath.wordpress.com](http://www.ianseath.wordpress.com) [Accessed on 07 March 2013].
- Shafritz, J.M. & Hyde, A.C. 2004. *Classics of Public Administration*. 5<sup>th</sup> edition. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Shafudah, E.B. 2011. Appraising performance management processes: A case of the directorate of customs and excise, Ministry of Finance, Namibia. MSc Thesis. Leeds Metropolitan University in collaboration with Harold Pupkewitz Graduate School of Business, Polytechnic of Namibia

- Shenton A.K. 2004. Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research projects. *IOS Press, Education for Information*, 22(2009):63–75.
- Smith, T.B. 1973. The policy implementation process. *Policy Science*, (4): 197–209.
- Steinbach, R. 2009. Problems of policy implementation, equality, equity and policy: Problems of policy implementation. *Educational Policy Journal*, 23(2):329–354.
- Strauss, A. & Corbin, J.M. 1998. *Basic of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory*. 2nd edition. California: Sage Publications.
- Syrett, M. 2012. *Successful strategy execution: How to keep your business goals on target*. London: Profile Books.
- Tibane, J. 2013. *Master your thoughts ... Transform your life, thinking styles and practices to achieve ultimate success*. South Africa: Struik Inspirational.
- Tidd, T., Bessant, J. & Pavitt, K. 2005. *Managing innovation tools: Business excellence model (BEM) also known as the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Model*. [Online] [www.wiley-europe.com/College/tidd](http://www.wiley-europe.com/College/tidd) [Accessed on 10 June 2014].
- The Namibian*. 2016. Summarised performance agreements. *The Namibian*, 27 January, 30(96):6–7.
- Toppo, L. & Prusty, T. 2012. From performance appraisal to performance management. *IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSRJBM)* ISSN: 2278-487X, 3(5):01–06.
- Tuyapeni, M.T. 2015. *NIPAM Post course report: Performance agreements and reporting (Module 3)*, 23–24 March. Windhoek.
- Ulrich, D., Zenger, J. & Smellwood, N. 1999. *Results-based leadership*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

- United National Development Program (UNDP). 2007. *Southern Africa Capacity Initiative (SACI) Methodology: Capacity transformation for effective service delivery*. Johannesburg: UNDP Regional Service Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa.
- United States of America (USA). 1993. *Government Performance and Result Act of 1993*. USA Government. [Online] [www.balancedscorecard.org/BSCResources/GovernmentPerformance/tabid](http://www.balancedscorecard.org/BSCResources/GovernmentPerformance/tabid) [Accessed on 29 January 2010].
- United States of America (USA). 2012a. *Performance standards. Office of the Personnel Management*. Government of United States: Office of the Personnel Management. [Online] on [www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/performance-a](http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/performance-a) [Accessed on 11 May 2015].
- United States of America (USA). 2012b. *Senior Executive Service (SES) performance management system policy and operating procedures*. Government of United States: Office of Executive Resource, Department of Energy.
- University of California. 2008. *Performance Management Phase III: Assessment*. Human Resources at UC Berkeley. [Online]. <http://hrweb.berkeley.edu/performance-management/cycle/assessment/tips/employees> [Accessed on 05 April 2011].
- University of South Africa (UNISA). 2012. *Authentic and adequate leadership needed for Africa*. South Africa: UNISA.
- Van der Walddt, G. 2002. *Managing performance in the public sector: Concepts, considerations and challenges*. South Africa: Juta.
- Van der Walddt, G., Van Niekerk, D., Doyle, M., Knipe, A. & Du Toit, D. 2002. *Managing for results in government*. Cape Town: Heinemann. Van Dooren, W. & Thijs, N. 2010. *Paradoxes of improving performance management (systems) in public administration*. [Online] [www.eipa.eu](http://www.eipa.eu) [Accessed on 13 June 2014].

- Van Dooren, W. & Thijs, N. 2010. Paradoxes of improving performance management (systems) in public administration. [Online] [www.eipa.eu](http://www.eipa.eu) [Accessed on 13 June 2014].
- Van Jaarsveldt, L.C. 2009. Human capacity building through public administration at UNISA. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(1.1):257–267.
- Van Schalkwyk, A. 2008. Interview no: E8 with Gelase Mutahaba, 20 November, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Van Zyl, J. 2011. Skill shortages continue to haunt Namibia. *The Namibian*, 15 February, 10(20):2–3.
- Wandersman, A., Duffy, J., Flaspohler, P., Noonan, R., Lubell, K., Stillman, L., et al. 2008. Bridging the gap between prevention research and practice: The interactive systems framework for dissemination and implementation. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 41:171–181.
- Wandjiva, J.T. 2011. An exploratory study on strategic planning and the role of communication in the public service of Namibia with specific reference to the Ministry Gender Equality and Child Welfare. Masters dissertation. Leeds Metropolitan University.
- Washington, M. & Hacker, S. 2009. Leaps in performance: Botswana's transformation story. *International Journal of Business Research*, 9(-):1–20.
- Watson, J. & Platt, S. 2000. *Researching health promotion*. London: Routledge.
- Werner, A. 2004. *A guide to implementation research*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
- Wescott, C. 1999. Guiding principles on civil service reform in Africa: An empirical review. *The International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 12(2): 145-170.
- Wessels, J.S., Pauw, K. & Thani, X. 2009. Taxonomies for the analysis of research design in Public Administration. *Administratio Publica*, 17(2):7–19.



- Wessels, J.S. & Van Jaarsveldt, L.C. 2007. The role of higher education in developing and retaining the best managers for the public service: A South African perspective. *Politeia*, 26(2):103–121.
- Wissink, H.F. 1990. *Policy analysis in public administration*. Stellenbosch/Grahamstown: University Publishers and Booksellers.
- World Economic Forum. 2013. *The Global Competitive Report 2012–2013*. Geneva Switzerland: World Economic Forum.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: The diagnostic tool (phase one)

**Title: Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service.**

#### **Instruction**

This study is divided into two phases. Phase one uses this tool (see Appendix 1) to obtain information and views on the current status of the implementation process of the performance management system in the Namibian public service during 2006-2014. This mini survey is limited to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) only, due to the following: Firstly, the Office is responsible for the design and support of the implementation process across the public service. Secondly, it is the only one with reliable statistical data required for phase one and for authenticity of the final product. The findings of phase one will be used to guide the data collection process during the second phase which will mostly depending on unstructured interviews. The data collection process for phase two is expected to take place early 2015. If you are not certain of something, then you may provide your views or opinions. Kindly, answer the following questions as accurately as possible and feel free to contact the researcher (Jafet Nelongo) for more clarification at 0812861242 or jpnelongo@yahoo.com.

- 1. What are the primary objectives of introducing a performance management system (PMS) in the Namibian public service?**

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

- 2. What criteria's can be or are used to measure success and failure regarding the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service?**

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. Indicate the number of OMAs that have met the PMS milestones or stages since 2006-2014.

PMS Stages/Milestones	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10	10/11	11/12	12/13	13/14	Comments
Had Strategic Plan									
Had Annual Plan									
Had Performance Agreements									
Conducted Q1 Reviews									
Conducted Q2 Reviews									
Conducted Q3 Reviews									
Conducted Q4 Reviews									
Conducted end of year Appraisal									
Rewarded Performance									

4. In your opinion, what were the most successful OMAs in meeting the PMS milestones during 2006-2014 and provide reasons?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

[illegible][illegible]

**7. In your opinion, what were the most successful RCs in meeting the PMS milestones during 2006-2014 and provide reasons?**

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**8. In your opinion, what were the least successful RCs in meeting the PMS milestones during 2006-2014 and provide reasons?**

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**9. Do you think there should be individual performance agreement for Political executives (Ministers)? Motivate your answer.**

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**10. If yes, should Political executives be part of the same system (bureaucratic-driven system) or not? Motivate your answer.**

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**“Thanks for helping Namibia on her road towards Vision 2030”**

## APPENDIX 2: Interview guide for facilitators, coordinators and managers (2015)

### Introduction

I am **Jafet Nelongo**, a Doctor of Public Administration candidate registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA). The purpose of this interview is to get your views regarding performance management system implementation in the Namibian public service in general and your organisation in particular.

Therefore, I am hereby humbly requesting your participation in this study and you have an option not to participate, but I plead with you to participate because the study will contribute to efforts being made towards effective and efficient public service delivery.

NB! You are assured of anonymity and response will be treated with strict confidentiality, may you please complete this consent form as prove that you have agreed to participate in this study. **Most importantly**, this interview will be based on the findings of the first phase, in order to get more details, confirmations and disagreements on emerging issues.

1. Briefly, explain your role in the implementation process of the performance management system in your organisation/ the general public service.
2. How do you describe the design of the performance management system (PMS) for the Namibian public service in terms of its usability or simplicity and stakeholders involvement?
3. What do you consider as achievements regarding the design and implementation process of the performance management system for the Namibian public service in general?
4. What do you consider as achievements regarding the implementation process of the performance management system in your OMAs/RC?
5. Based on your experiences, what do you consider as constraints and success factors with the performance management system implementation in the Namibian public service in general or in your organisation in particular?
6. Are there performance standards/ customer service charters in the public service / your organisation in particular?
7. **If yes**, how are they used in the implementation of the performance management system?

8. How do you describe the integration of the performance management system with other human resource aspects (e.g. recruitment, termination, promotion, payment, competence framework) in the public service?
9. Do you think political executives (ministers) should also sign individual performance agreement? Motivate your answer.
10. **If yes**, what do you think should be the key result areas for the performance agreements at that level?
11. How should the performance agreements of the political executives be developed, reviewed and appraised?
12. Do you think they (political executives) should be part of the same system which is used by administrative staff? Motivate your answer.
13. What do you think should be in place to effectively implement performance management system in the Namibian public service?
14. Anything else that you would like to share with me?

Thanks very much for sharing your views and experience on the implementation process of a performance management system in the Namibian public service.

## APPENDIX 3: Interview guide for M&E manager – NPC (2015)

### Introduction

I am **Jafet Nelongo**, a Doctor of Public Administration candidate registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA). The purpose of this interview is to get your views regarding performance management system implementation in the Namibian public service in general and your organisation in particular.

Therefore, I am hereby humbly requesting your participation in this study and you have an option not to participate, but I plead with you to participate because the study will contribute to efforts being made towards effective and efficient public service delivery.

NB! You are assured of anonymity and response will be treated with strict confidentiality, may you please complete this consent form as prove that you have agreed to participate in this study. **Most importantly**, this interview will be based on the findings of the first phase, in order to get more details, confirmations and disagreements on emerging issues.

1. Briefly, explain your role (**M&E**) in the implementation process of the performance management system in the general public service.
2. How do you describe the design of the performance management system (PMS) for the Namibian public service in terms of its usability or simplicity and stakeholders involvement?
3. What do you consider as achievements regarding the design and implementation process of the performance management system for the Namibian public service in general (**including M&E**)?
4. What do you consider as achievements regarding the implementation process of the performance management system in your OMAs/RC?
5. Based on your experiences, what do you consider as constraints and success factors with **M&E** implementation in the Namibian public service in general?
6. Are there performance standards/ customer service charters in the public service / your organisation in particular?
7. **If yes**, how are they used in the implementation of the performance management system including **M&E**?
8. How do you describe the integration of the performance management system with other human resource aspects (e.g. recruitment, termination, promotion, payment, competence framework) in the public service?



9. Do you think political executives (ministers) should also sign individual performance agreement? Motivate your answer.
10. **If yes**, what do you think should be the key result areas for the performance agreements at that level?
11. How should the performance agreements of the political executives be developed, reviewed and appraised?
12. Do you think they (political executives) should be part of the same system which is used by administrative staff? Motivate your answer.
13. What do you think should be in place to effectively implement performance management system in the Namibian public service?
14. Anything else that you would like to share with me?

Thanks very much for sharing your views and experience on the implementation process of a performance management system in the Namibian public service.

## **APPENDIX 4: Interview guide for political executives (2015)**

### **Introduction**

I am **Jafet Nelongo**, a Doctor of Public Administration candidate registered with the University of South Africa (UNISA). The purpose of this interview is to get your views regarding performance management system implementation in the Namibian public service in general and most importantly for political executives. The current system only covers accounting officers or permanent secretaries down and leaves out the political arm of the government.

Therefore, I am hereby humbly requesting your participation in this study and you have an option not to participate, but I plead with you to participate because the study will contribute to efforts being made towards effective and efficient public service delivery.

NB! You are assured of anonymity and response will be treated with strict confidentiality. May you please answer the following questions as honest as possible?

1. What are the functions or duties of political executives (Ministers) in the Namibian government?
2. What system does the appointing authority use to measure their performance?
3. Do you think political executives (ministers) should also sign individual performance agreement or contract? Motivate your answer.
4. **If yes**, how and with whom should the performance agreements of the political executives be developed, reviewed and appraised?
5. Do you think they (political executives) should be part of the same system which is used by administrative staff? Motivate your answer.
6. What do you think should be in place to effectively implement performance management system in the Namibian public service?
7. Anything else that you would like to share with me?

Thanks very much for sharing your views and experience on the implementation process of a performance management system in the Namibian public service.

## **APPENDIX 5: Interview consent form (2015)**

**Title: Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service.**

I am Jafet Nelongo, a Doctor of Public Administration student at the University of South Africa (UNISA). You have been purposively selected to participate in this research project due to your experience and key role in the implementation of a performance management system in the Namibian public service. The study investigates the implementation process of performance management system in the Namibian public service, in order to answer the main research question:

- What are the constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service during 2006-2014?

If you agree to participate, this will involve being interviewed once and it is expected to last no longer than one hour (60 min). I will record and take notes during the interview. All interview data will be treated with utmost respect, confidentiality and stored for a period of one year (1 year). Information will be shared with my supervisors and other appropriate staff at the University, but your identity will be removed, for example by using a number that represent your name. Your role is mainly to share with me your experience and opinions regarding PMS implementation in the Namibian Public Service.

You are also able to withdraw from the interview at any time. The final research project (thesis) will be available to the public at the Namibia Institute of Public Administration and Management (NIPAM), UNISA and the University of Namibia (UNAM) Libraries.

Thanks and please sign below to indicate your consent to participate in this research.

.....  
**Name of Participant**

.....  
**Signature**

.....  
**Date**

.....  
**Researcher**

.....  
**Signature**

.....  
**Date**

## APPENDIX 6: List of government publications required

The table below presents a list of documents that are required to ensure a successful study on the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibia public service during 2006-2014. Kindly, provide the researcher (Jafet Nelongo) with the soft or hard copies of the following and any documents as deemed relevant to this study.

Name of the document	Place or who should provide it.	Remarks
1. Copy of staff rules on Performance Management System	Office of the Prime Minister	
2. Organisational Culture Audit Report 2007/8	Office of the Prime Minister	
3. PMS Steering Committee Minutes (2007-2014)	Office of the Prime Minister	
4. Citizen Satisfaction Survey Report 2013	Office of the Prime Minister	
5. Stakeholders' Consultation Reports/ minutes (workshop or briefings) 2006-2014	Office of the Prime Minister	
6. Performance Management Implementation Plans (2006-2014)	Office of the Prime Minister	
7. Performance Management Implementation / Progress Report(s) (2006-2013)	Office of the Prime Minister	
8. Five samples of Strategic and Annual plans	Office of the Prime Minister	
9. Copies of signed Performance Agreements at all levels (1 OMA and 1 Regional Council).	Office of the Prime Minister / OMAs and RCs	
10. Consultants' and Mid-term review reports	Office of the Prime Minister	
11. Strategic and annual planning workshops' reports (2006-2014). 5 for strategic and 5 for annual plans, 2 from each year (good and better/ poor).	OPM	
12. OPM Annual Reports (2007-2014)	OPM	
13. Technical Advisors' Reports (Mr Delabi, Dr. Parker and Mr Stephen)	OPM	
14. Final Evaluation Report 2014 by EU	OPM	
15. ACBF Review Reports	OPM	
16. Minutes of internal staff (OPM) retreat or reflection meetings or workshops regarding PMS implementation (2006-2014).	OPM	

## APPENDIX 7: Permission letter to OPM, phase one

P.O. Box 63289  
Wanahenda  
Windhoek  
**Cell:** 0812861242  
**E-mail:**  
[jpnelongo@yahoo.com](mailto:jpnelongo@yahoo.com)  
**12 November 2014**

Ms Nangula Mbako  
The Permanent Secretary  
Office of the Prime Minister  
**Windhoek**

**Attention: The Director Performance Improvement**

### **REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACADEMIC RESEARCH**

I am a Doctoral of Public Administration (DPA) student at the University of South Africa (UNISA). As a requirement for the completion of my study, I am conducting an academic research on this topic: **Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service**. The study will be conducted in two phases, namely:

- **Phase one**, will use a mini survey (**Appendix 1**) limited to your office only, in order to determine the current state of the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service; and
- **Phase two**, will use the findings of phase one in order to identify most and least successful OMAs and RCs for interviews with key public servants early 2015.

Additionally, permission has already been granted by the Secretary to Cabinet in this regard (see attachment). Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you can help me in completing the attached diagnostic tools (**see Appendix 1**). Government publications (documents) will complement at all levels. Additionally, kindly, provide me with the soft or hard copies of the relevant documents (**see Appendix 4**). Furtherance, I will appreciate it if **Appendix 1** and all documents as indicated by **Appendix 4** will be ready for collection on **15 December 2014**.

Please note, the information obtained will only be used for the academic research purpose and treated confidential.

Thanking you in advance.

**Mr Jafet Nelongo**  
**DPA student (UNISA)**

## APPENDIX 8: Permission letter, phase two

P.O. Box 63289  
Wanahenda  
Windhoek  
**Cell:** 0812861242  
**E-mail:** [jpnelongo@yahoo.com](mailto:jpnelongo@yahoo.com)  
**November 2015**

**Ms Nangula Mbako**  
**The Permanent Secretary**  
**Office of the Prime Minister**  
**Windhoek**

**Dear Ms Mbako**

### **REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACADEMIC RESEARCH: PHASE TWO**

I am a Doctoral of Public Administration (DPA) student at the University of South Africa (UNISA). As a requirement for the completion of my study, I am conducting an academic research on this topic: **Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service**. The study is divided into two phases, namely:

- **Phase one**, which was conducted during October 2014 and used a diagnostic tool (mini survey) limited to the Office of the Prime Minister to obtain statistical data on the current state of the PMS implementation process in the Namibian public service; and
- **Phase two**, is guided by the findings of phase one.

Therefore, the Office of the Prime Minister was purposively selected in order to obtain more details through interviews between the researcher, the PMS Coordinator or Chairperson of the Ministerial Implementation Team (MIT) and the facilitators of the selected OMAs/RCs from the Directorate: Performance Improvements. The interview dates for your office are indicated on the attached program.

Apart from the permission letter from the Secretary to Cabinet in this regard (see attachment), respondents will be expected to sign a consent form (see attachment). Therefore, it will be highly appreciated if you can avail your Chairperson of the MIT and facilitators for the academic interviews. Please note, the information obtained will only be used for academic research purpose and treated confidential.

Thanking you in advance.

**Mr Jafet Nelongo, DPA student (UNISA)**

## APPENDIX 9: Draft performance agreement for political executives (ministers)



**Republic of Namibia**

### Part A: Personal Detail

Hon. Minister		Period for ½ Yearly Reviews Due /Completed	October
		Performance Agreement Period	
OMA		Supervisor	
Final End Of Year Report Due	April	Date Completed	

### Part B: High Level Statements of the OMA

<b>MISSION:</b>
<b>VISION:</b>

Defined Core Values:	

**Part C: Desired Outcome (DO) Relevant to the Sector**

(1).....

(2).....

**Part D: Key Challenges Faced By the (e.g. Agricultural, Water and Forestry) Sector**

(1).....

(2).....

**Part E: Strategic Objectives of the Ministry for Next five years**

(1).....

(2).....

**Part F: I Am Accountable For the Following during this Financial Year: 2014/15**

Risks and Assumptions	

Indicators No	KPIs	W	DO No	Baseline	Target	
					Q2	Q4
1.	% of OMAs and Regional Councils implemented the PMS Policy fully by 2014/15	40%	1	50%	70%	100%
2.	% of farmers accessing the veterinary service	50%	2	60%	80%	100%
3.	% increase in agricultural production	10%	3	30%	35%	50%
		100				

**Part D: Personal Development Plan**

Part D: Personal Development Plan				
Hon. Minister:		HE: President		
Period of plan :				
Development Area	Competencies	Intervention / Training	By when	Date completed



**This Performance Agreement and PDP is entered into as follows:**

I hereby acknowledge that I accept ownership of and commit myself to the terms of this agreement.

.....  
**Hon. Minister of.....**

.....  
**Date**

We agree to support the Hon. Minister in the achievement of his/her targets.

.....  
**HE: President of the Republic of Namibia**  
(For and on behalf of Government)

.....  
**Date**

**Co-Signed By:**

.....  
**Hon. Speaker: National Assembly**

.....  
**Date**

## APPENDIX 10: Draft social contract for honourable constituency councillors



**Republic of Namibia**

### Part A: Personal Detail

Hon. Councillor		Period for ½ Yearly Reviews Due /Completed	October
Region		Social Contract Period	
Constituency		Hon. Governor	
Final End Of Year Report Due	April	Date Completed	

### Part B: High Level Statements of the Regional Council

<b>MISSION:</b>
<b>VISION:</b>

Defined Core Values:	

**Part C: National Desired Outcomes From NDP No...**

(3).....

(4).....

**Part D: Key Challenges Faced By My Constituency**

(3).....

(4).....

**Part E: Key Strategic Objectives of the Constituency for Next five years**

(3).....

(4).....

**Part F: I Am Accountable For the Following During the Financial Year 2016/15**

Risks and Assumptions						
Indicators No	KPIs	W	Baseline	Targets 2015/16	Target	
					Q2	Q4
		100				

**Part D: Personal Development Plan**

Part D-1 Personal Development Plan				
Hon. Councillor:		Hon. Governor		
Period of plan :				
Development Area	Competencies	Intervention / Training	By when	Date completed

**This Performance Agreement and PDP is entered into as follows:**

I hereby acknowledge that I accept ownership of and commit myself to the terms of this agreement.

.....  
**Hon. Councillor**

.....  
**Date**

We agree to support the Hon. Councillor in the achievement of his/her targets.

.....  
**Hon. Governor**  
(As Immediate Supervisor)

.....  
**Date**

**Co-Signed By:**

.....  
**Chief Regional Officer**  
(Accounting Officer)

.....  
**Date**

.....  
**CDC Representative**  
(On behalf of the inhabitants)

.....  
**Date**

.....  
**CDC Representative**  
(On behalf of the inhabitants)

.....  
**Date**

**Endorsed By:**

.....  
**Hon. Minister of Urban and Rural Development**  
(For and on behalf of Government)

.....  
**Date**

## APPENDIX 11: Annual performance rating form (Old)

The Rating form must be completed by the Supervisor and the Staff Member Following the 'One on One' at end of year discussion.

			Final			
			A	B	C	D
Outputs	Summary of Performance over year (This should indicate and justify the marking against each Output)	Maximum possible	Weight	Performance Rating	Weighted Score	Max Weighted
A	Example - this output was overachieved by XX amount because of the staff members commitment to XXXX	5	3	4	12	15
B	Example - this output had a shortfall of XX amount because of the staff members failure to XXX Underachieved due to XXX	5	2	2	4	10
C	Achieved due to XXX	5	3	3	9	15
D	Significantly over achieved	5	3	4	12	15
E	Over achieved	5	3	4	12	15
F	Over achieved	5	2	4	8	10
G	Achieved	5	1	3	3	5
		<b>Totals</b>			<b>60</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Overall average rating (A) [(60/85) x 5]</b>		<b>3.53</b>				
<b>Personal Objectives Skills and CV</b>						
Description	Summary of Achievement		Rating			
	There is still no improvement in this competency and the quality of work is still low		2			
	The training was completed and communications have improved to an acceptable standard		3			
Personal Objectives Average Rating (B) [(2+3)÷2]					2.5	
Operational Objectives Final Rating A X 90% = C					3.17	
Personal Objectives Average B x 10% = D					0.25	
Overall average rating (C + D)					3.42	
<b>Final Rating (Rounded off)</b> Enter into Section D2 of the Annual Performance Appraisal Form (Annex F)					<b>3</b>	

## APPENDIX 12: Permission letter from the secretary to cabinet in 2013



REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

### OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CABINET SECRETARIAT

Tel: (061) 2707111  
Fax: (061) 226189

Private Bag 11539  
WINDHOEK  
NAMIBIA

13 February 2013

Mr. Jafet Nelongo  
DPA Student  
University of South Africa (UNISA)  
WINDHOEK

Dear Mr. Nelongo

#### REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT AN ACADEMIC STUDY IN THE NAMIBIAN PUBLIC SERVICE

Reference is made to your letter dated 01 February 2013, about the subject matter.

I am pleased to inform you that your request to do a research in the Namibian Public Service is hereby granted.

Yours sincerely

  
FRANS H. KAPOFI  
SECRETARY TO CABINET



## APPENDIX 13: Ethics approval/clearance by UNISA in 2014

26632



### DEPARTMENT: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE

Date: 24 November 2014

Ref #: PAM/2014/009 (Nelongo)  
Name of applicant: Mr J Nelongo  
Student #: 35196165

Dear Mr Nelongo

#### Decision: Ethics Clearance Approval

**Name:** Mr Jafet Nelongo, [jnelongo@yahoo.co.za], tel: 264-812861242

[Supervisor: Prof JC Pauw, 012 429 3948, pauwjc@unisa.ac.za]

**Research project:** Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service. **Qualification:** DPA

Thank you for the application for **research ethics clearance** by the Department: Public Administration and Management: Research Ethics Review Committee for the above mentioned research. Final approval is granted for the duration of the project.

The decision will be tabled at the next College RERC meeting for notification/ratification.

**For full approval:** The application was reviewed in compliance with the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics by the RERC on 24 November 2014. The proposed research may now commence with the proviso that:

- 1) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to the values and principles expressed in the Unisa Policy on Research Ethics.
- 2) Any adverse circumstance arising in the undertaking of the research project that is relevant to the ethicality of the study, as well as changes in the methodology, should be communicated in writing to this Ethics Review Committee. An amended application could be requested if there are substantial changes from the existing proposal, especially if those changes affect any of the study-related risks for the research participants.
- 3) The researcher will ensure that the research project adheres to any applicable national legislation, professional codes of conduct, institutional guidelines and scientific standards relevant to the specific field of study.

Kind regards,

  
**Prof Mike van Heerden**  
Chairperson:  
Research Ethics Review Committee  
vheerm@unisa.ac.za

  
**Prof RT Mpofu**  
Acting Executive Dean: CEMS

University of South Africa  
Pretoria Street, Maseru, Bldg: C/2/Tlokweng  
PO Box 162 UNISA 0003 South Africa  
Telephone: +27 12 429 3111; facsimile: +27 12 429 4110  
www.unisa.ac.za

## APPENDIX 14: Annual rating form (new and proposal)

KPI NO	KPI	BASELINE	TARGETS	ACTUAL	RATING	WEIGHT	SCORES = R X W	FINAL RATING CATEGORY
1.	PMS Policy fully implemented.	30%	100%	100%	5	100%	5X100=500	<b>5</b>
		<b>TOTAL</b>				100	500	
Supervisors' comments								
Supervisors' signature						Date:		
Staff members' signature (if in agreement)						Date:		



## APPENDIX 15: New or proposed rating guidelines

RATING CATEGORIES	LEVEL OF SCORES	DESCRIPTIONS
5 Outstanding	475-500	<u>Exceeds all objectives and standards by constantly delivering spectacular performance and the person makes a significant contribution outside of the normal job requirements to the benefit of the company.</u> Functions as a role model and informal leader in the team in setting standards of excellence.
4 Superior	400-474	<u>Performance in all areas is significantly better than expected of the position holder.</u> Some objectives may not be fully met but are compensated by higher performance in others. <u>Skills are highly developed.</u> The person exceeds objectives by constantly delivering outstanding performance levels and results. There is excellent feedback from both internal and external clients and high levels of expertise and initiatives are demonstrated. <u>Contributes constructively to the team at all times.</u>
3 Competent	300-399	Performing at required level of competence. Is achieving the standards agreed to across the majority of objectives. Some minor areas still exist for improvement but are compensated by overachievement in other areas.
2 Marginal	200-299	Performance in most areas is noticeably below what is expected of the position holder. Remedial action plan to be agreed and implemented for development area(s). Inconsistent in meeting standards. Requires supervision and assistance to improve performance. May not have all the required skills or may not apply skills.
1 Unacceptable	0-199	Unacceptably poor performance across all objectives. Significant underachievement compared with objectives – performing at a consistently low level. The poor level of achievement impacts both on the team and internal and external clients. Performance must improve, supported by documented counselling. Requires constant supervision. Continued performance at this level is likely to result in disciplinary action.

## APPENDIX 16: Editor's letter

*Alexa Barnby*  
*Language Specialist*

---

Editing, copywriting, indexing, formatting, translation

---

BA Hons Translation Studies; APED (SATI) Accredited Professional Text Editor, SATI  
Mobile: 071 872 1334 alexabarnby@gmail.com  
Tel: 012 361 6347

11 March 2016

To whom it may concern

I hereby declare that I, Alexa Kirsten Barnby, ID No. 5106090097080, a language practitioner in the fulltime employ of the Language Services Directorate of the University of South Africa and accredited by SATI, have edited the doctoral thesis entitled "Constraints and success factors in the implementation of the performance management system for the Namibian public service" by Jafet Nelongo.

The onus is, however, on the author to effect the corrections and changes suggested.

Signed:

